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ABSTRACT

JUDGING EMPIRE: MASCULINITY AND THE MAKING OF THE BRITISH IMPERIAL
ARMY, 1754-1783
Emily Merrill
Kathleen Brown
“Judging Empire” examines the culture of the British Army during its
transformation from a national army to a primary agent of the expanding British
Empire. Using letters, diaries, contemporary military manuals, and especially the
army’s court-martial records, it focuses particularly on the masculine culture of the
officer class. Due to their high social position and the lack of other authorities in the
imperial areas where the army operated, members of this group held
disproportionate power over both their military subordinates and the civilians with
which the army interacted. Officers’ presentation of themselves emphasized
traditional understandings of martial masculinity and class dynamics; their privileges
as men were inseparable from their privileges as members of the upper class.
Officers were determined to preserve these privileges as they came under threat
from the development of increasingly technical forms of warfare, imperial
administrators anxious to uphold centralized authority, enlisted soldiers demanding
authority and autonomy based on their own claims to masculine privilege, and
imperial civilian populations whose social hierarchies were often perceived to have a
dangerous lack of resemblance to those of the army.
Officers developed a culture in which men’s fragile honor needed to be defended
with deadly violence, and in which fighting wars and advancing the national interest
were frequently perceived to be of lesser importance than deciding questions of
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personal honor and individual reputation. This culture, in turn, affected the army’s
imperial role. Violent masculinity and honor culture negatively affected the army’s
military capabilities, and army administrators and government officials attempted to
control rogue officers through laws and regulations meant to curb their violent and
dangerous behavior. Yet the vast distances of empire made such attempts at
centralized control ineffective, and they found it necessary to cede to the officers
themselves the task of regulating officers’ problematic behavior. So long as officers
retained their power, imperial rule would be shaped by these men who insisted that
violent domination was the necessary and essential foundation of their masculinity,
military authority, status, and power.
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Introduction

Major General Lord Charles Hay was unhappy. He had arrived in Halifax in July
1757 to join the Earl of Loudoun, the British Army’s Commander-in-Chief in North
America, who was to lead a summer attack on territory held by Britain’s ancient
enemy, France. The skirmishes between British and French troops in the interior of
North America in 1754 had escalated into a general European war, but North
America remained an important theater of war for the British, who sought to
neutralize the threat that the French colonial presence in Canada, the Great Lakes,
and along the Mississippi River presented to their own colonies on the eastern coast
of North America.
To that end, orders had crossed the Atlantic instructing Loudoun to attack either
Quebec, at the heart of French Canada, or Louisbourg, the great Atlantic fortress
that protected the approach to the St. Lawrence River. The choice of target was left
to Loudoun to determine, as the weather and the need to coordinate with naval
forces would have to be taken into consideration. Loudoun called a council of war to
debate the question. Lord Charles Hay, a member of the council, found the meetings
interminable. An attack on Quebec was soon dismissed as unfeasible, but the
council spent several weeks debating whether or not it was too late in the year to
mount an expedition to attack Louisbourg, calling on various people to testify to
Louisbourg’s fortifications, winds, tides, weather, anchorages, and so on. Hay soon
took to making impatient remarks that the army ought to sail to Louisbourg and
begin fighting immediately—and not only in meetings of the council of war but also in
public. Loudoun reported in his diary that another council member had “told us that
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Ld Charles Hay this day at the Head of the Line declared that he could take
Louisburg in ten dayes.”1
But Hay’s dissatisfaction was not confined to the delays of the council. Upon
arriving in Halifax, Loudoun had started making arrangements to prepare his army
for operations in North America, ordering the engineers to construct a sample fort,
for the purpose of “instructing both Officers and Men in making Approaches towards
a fortified Place,” so that the troops would be prepared to attack heavily fortified
positions at Louisbourg.2 Furthermore, he had ordered the soldiers to clear ground
for a garden, “in order to Sow Turnips and other Greens for themselves,” this being
“the only thing that either prevents, or recovers them out of, those inveterate
Scurvies we are infested with in this Country, from the Salt Provisions.”3 Hay
publicly denounced these activities as well. One officer reported that Hay had
declared that the soldiers ought to be concerned with fighting, not with gardening
and “building Sham Forts, and making approaches to them, when we should be
employ'd in real Attacks.”4

Another officer claimed that Hay, having collected “a

great Number of People of all Ranks about him,” had reflected on the soldiers’
exercises at the fake fort, saying that “it was a very fine Farce, that we were now
carrying on, to cost Poor Old England three Millions of Money; but that, by God, it
would cost us very little Blood this Campaign, which would cut a very pretty figure in
History.”5

1.

Loudoun Diary, 27 July 1757, Huntington Library, Loudoun Notebooks, HM 1717 (v. 7).

2.

Relation of Major Francis Halkett, Halifax, 7 August 1757, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library, LO
6175.

3.

Earl of Loudoun to the Duke of Cumberland, Halifax, 6 Aug 1757, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library,
LO 4088. This letter has also been published in S. M. Pargellis, ed., Military Aﬀairs in North America,
1748-1765, (New York: Appleton-Century, 1936), p. 391.

4.

Relation of Captain Christopher French, Halifax, 8 August 1757, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library,
Box 129, LO 6175.

5.

Declaration of Captain Robert Ross, Halifax, 8 August 1757, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library, LO
4151.
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Hay made a particular connection between the lack of bloodshed and the
humiliation of the nation, saying “that the most agreeable Part of it wou'd be, that
there wou'd be no Blood Split; that it would be a very pretty Amusement for the
town of Halifax, but the People that wou'd be the most diverted, by God, wou'd be
the French.”6 For Hay, the proper action of a soldier was to display bravery on the
battlefield, not a concern for drills, logistics, and vegetable gardens. An army gained
renown because it fought together and shed blood together, and Loudoun’s careful
preparations appeared to Hay too timid and cautious, and unlikely to enhance the
military reputation and national honor of the British.
Loudoun, alarmed by Hay’s public criticisms, ordered him under arrest, claiming
that Hay had made remarks “tending to discredit me with the officers and soldiers,
and to rais [sic] mutiny among the troops.”7 But Hay was a member of the
aristocracy, held the exalted rank of major general, and had been appointed by the
king himself. Loudoun had no authority to sanction him for his behavior.

Ideally,

then, Hay ought to have been sent back to London for the matter to be settled by
men of higher rank—perhaps even by the indisputable authority of King George II.
But Loudoun was assailed by scruples on this matter as well, writing an anguished
letter to the Duke of Cumberland (the youngest son of the king and Loudoun’s
patron) begging for instructions: Hay had been sent out to America by the king; was
Loudoun overstepping if he sent him back on his own authority?8 And the exigencies
of war interceded; before either man had received a reply from London, Hay was
forced to travel with Loudoun’s army as it embarked for a sea voyage. It was a year
before Hay finally returned to London, and his court-martial occurred only in 1760,

6.

Declaration of Captain Robert Ross, 8 August 1757, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library, LO 4151.

7.

Loudoun Diary, 14 August 1757, Loudoun Notebooks, Huntington Library, HM 1717 (v. 7).

8.

Loudoun to the Duke of Cumberland, 7 August 1757, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library, LO 4109.
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three years after the events in question occurred, and this only after numerous
delays caused by the war (and many complaints from Loudoun that several key
witnesses had died during the interval, significantly weakening his case). And even
then the matter was not settled satisfactorily: Hay faced accusations that he had
“publickly, in the hearing of Officers and Soldiers,” used “Language tending to bring
into Contempt, the Conduct and Authority, of the Commanders” and exhibited
behavior “tending to excite mutiny and sedition among the troops,” but due to Hay’s
exalted social position the court-martial board chose to refer the matter directly to
the king rather than coming to any verdict themselves. And before any judgment
had been made by the king, Lord Charles Hay suddenly died.9
This dispute between Loudoun and Hay speaks to the central themes of this
dissertation: how ideas about masculinity shaped army culture and the nature of
military authority, and how these ideas ultimately constrained the ways the army
could use the law to operate in its new imperial role.
Their initial altercation reflected the complicated workings of masculinity and
authority in an imperial army and was a symptom of a larger national concern: how
to retain traditions of martial masculinity in a world where the practices of war were
becoming increasingly technical. And as with every war that did not deliver crowdpleasing British victories on a regular schedule, anxieties over martial masculinity
soon bled into the public sphere; the civilian public faced recurring fears that the
British troops had lost the manly vigor that would allow them to triumph in the art of
war.10

9.

Loudoun to Charles Gould, 10 February 1760, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library, LO 6812; Charles
Gould to Loudoun, 3 May 1760, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library, LO 6421.

10. Stephen Conway, War, State, and Society in Mid-eighteenth-century Britain and Ireland (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2006), 120.
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Furthermore, the case reveals the close links between masculinity, military
authority, and personal honor. By virtue of being Commander-in-Chief for North
America, Loudoun could plausibly conflate the maintenance of his individual
reputation with the national interest. Loudon perceived Hay’s remarks as a threat
not only to his authority as a military commander, but also as a threat to his
personal honor. “Reports injurious to me,” Loudoun wrote to officials at the War
Office in 1759, were being “spread all over the Kingdom in relation to that Affair.”
By this point, the dispute between the two men was well over a year in the past, Hay
was back in Britain, and Loudoun had returned as well, having been relieved as
Commander-in-Chief. But Loudoun persisted, claiming that until Hay was tried, his
personal reputation was in tatters and that Hay’s court-martial must occur as soon
as possible to clear his character. The interminable postponements of the trial date
(because several of the key witnesses were still fighting the war in America) were,
he insisted, “cruel and unjust” to him.11
The dispute also reveals the difficulty of maintaing authority far from the
metropole. In North America, Loudoun was fighting an imperial war—and for an
empire uncomfortable with the loss of centralized control that such a war required.
Loudoun, as commander-in-chief, had already developed concerns about the
difficulties he faced in carrying out (or justifying his departure from) orders that were
often no longer relevant by the time they crossed the Atlantic and reached him.
Hay’s remarks then highlighted the danger of challenging command in an imperial
space—especially when the challenger was also of high rank. In his diary, Loudoun
described a visit from one of Hay's sympathizers, Mr. Saul, who had gone to see Hay
about a week after he had been arrested, and reported that Hay "was now got cool

11. Loudoun to Viscount Barrington, 11 April 1759, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library, LO 6175.
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again" and "lived on Small Broth and Rice and Milk and drank no wine." According to
Saul, Hay protested his arrested, now claiming that he did not do "any more than
talkt up and around the Expedition." But Loudoun told Saul that "a man must be
very unfitt for any command who would permitt any Man under him to Raise Mutinys
and Desertions in the Army.” Loudoun insisted that “the Command must rest where
the King had put it till he was pleasd to change it, and that attempts to do such
things were very criminal in all Armys, but much more so at so great a distance from
where the King could applie a proper remedy."12
Loudoun’s arrest of Hay and his demands for Hay’s court-martial were attempts
to use the law both as a way of projecting centralized power into imperial space, and
as a way to defend his individual honor. But the extensive delay—the three years
between the incidents and the trial—demonstrates how difficult and impractical it
was to attempt to control an imperial army’s exercise of military justice from the
metropole. Justice from London—even justice three years delayed—was often a
luxury reserved for military officers of the very highest ranks. The needs of war,
combined with the vast distances of empire, meant that members of the military who
lacked Hay’s lordly title and aristocratic connections were tried on location.
However, this necessarily had the effect of removing these trials from central
oversight.
The expansion of Britain’s colonial empire in the second half of the eighteenth
century made officials ever more anxious to maintain centralized control, but also
made this goal impossible; military autonomy flourished in imperial space. Thus,
these years emerge as a time of transition for the British Army as an agent of
empire. Earlier in the century, the army fought wars primarily on the European

12. Loudoun Diary, 14 August 1757, Loudoun Notebooks, Huntington Library, HM 1717 (v. 7).
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continent, close to home. But in the period covered by this study, 1754-1783,
Britain’s involvement in warfare became increasingly imperial, with substantial
numbers of troops deployed throughout the Atlantic world, in garrisons located far
afield in North America and the Caribbean.
These circumstances might have led to a fracturing of army culture, as each
regiment adopted the norms of the local community in which it was stationed.
However, what actually occurred was precisely the opposite.

Regiments were

regularly rotated between various stations abroad and at home according to a
schedule, and individual officers were constantly exchanging between regiments,
seeking opportunities for promotion to a higher rank, a posting closer to friends and
family, or from a desire to gain martial glory in a regiment that was likely to see
military action. Enlisted soldiers, too, frequently moved between regiments, though
not in so voluntary a fashion as the officers: groups of soldiers were routinely
“drafted” from a full-strength regiment to make up the numbers of one that had
recently suffered losses. Thus, the regular rotation of regiments between postings
abroad and at home, combined with the geographical movements of individual
officers and soldiers, served to facilitate the development of the British Army as an
Atlantic institution with a shared military culture despite the dispersion of its
troops.13
The army’s propensity to be stationed far from other sources of authority, in
distant and foreign lands, determined the degree to which military culture could be
influenced by metropolitan authority. The commander of a regiment that was
stationed far from London had far greater autonomy than one that was stationed
within the British Isles. Operating in imperial space allowed the army to develop and

13. William P Tatum, "Civilian Intervention and Military Justice in the Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic,"
Transnational Subjects 1, no. 1 (2011): 65-71.
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champion its own norms away from civilian oversight, and also allowed it to enforce
those norms through the use of military law. In Britain, the army (in theory, at
least) was only permitted to try and punish soldiers who were accused of purely
military crimes—mutiny, desertion, disobedience to superiors, and so on. A soldier
who was accused of other crimes, such as theft, murder, rape, or robbery, was
supposed to be turned over the the civil authorities to be tried by them. However,
the Articles of War established that in areas where there were no civilian courts
under British authority, the army was to use its own system of military courts.14
These military courts produced the records on which much of this study relies:
the British Army’s court-martial proceedings—the official records of trials, which were
sent to the Judge Advocate General in London and are now archived in the War
Office.15 They had some resemblance to a civilian court, but the outcome was
determined by the court-martial board, a group of thirteen officers selected from all
the regiments present on the spot, who acted as both judge and jury. Officers were
not expected to have any formal legal training, so the task of advising them on
points of military law fell to the officer appointed as Deputy Judge Advocate, who
was expected to organize and administer the trial. In addition to his advisory role to
the court-martial board, he was also responsible for collecting and assembling
witnesses, acting as the prosecutor, keeping the official record of the trial, and
providing legal assistance to the defendant.

14. An Act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion (London, 1771), 205. A situation requiring the replacement
of local civilian courts with military courts occurred in the colony of Massachusetts Bay after martial
law was declared in 1775: not only military crimes, but also crimes in which civilians were both the
accused and the victims, were now to be tried by court-martial, necessitating the expansion of the
military court system to cope with the expanded case load (Stephen Payne Adye to Sir Charles Gould,
4 October 1775, Stephen Payne Adye Papers, American Philosophical Society).
15. The number of cases transmitted to London by regiments stationed abroad varied widely from year to
year, increasing substantially in wartime. About 500 individual cases were examined for this study.
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Although these court-martial proceedings have much value as a record of the
formal, legal uses of power, the testimony within also contains even more valuable
information on the informal and extralegal contests between military officers,
enlisted soldiers, and civilians. In the courtroom, opponents described and disputed
the various events that led up to the commission of the crime, and thus the
proceedings often record in minute detail the social interactions between members of
the army community, as well as the participants’ and witnesses’ interpretations of
these interactions.
In this way, these sources offer far more information about the precise nature of
interpersonal actions and the creation of social relationships of deference and power
than other commonly-used sources. During this period, officers produced military
manuals and treatises to instruct their fellow officers about their duties or to
advocate for proposed reforms.16 While the prescriptive nature of these works
provides intriguing insight on what the authors considered the greatest problems
facing the army (for example, the numerous paeans to the virtue of obedience
suggest that insubordination was a serious concern), they ultimately describe the
army as it ought to be, rather than the army as it actually was. Officers also
produced letters and diaries that reveal their personal feelings as victims or
witnesses to interpersonal disputes, as well as providing information on disputes that
never escalated to the point of a court-martial. These are often a helpful supplement
to the court-martial records, but usually do not provide a similar level of detail.
However, these records also have some limitations. They were preserved because
they dealt with accusations of very serious crimes; many more minor offenses were
resolved on the spot and never recorded in written form. Heated exchanges
16. Ira B. Gruber, Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2014) describes the most common of these works, and which ones were most
popular and circulated among army oﬃcers.
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between witnesses sometimes resulted in language vulgar enough that the Deputy
Judge Advocate refused to preserve it in an official record. And because the
potential participants in a court-martial knew that the proceedings would become an
official and fairly public record, officers who wanted to avoid the publicity and shame
that followed a conviction often tried to resign quietly rather than be tried formally.
However, these records have the irreplaceable advantage of preserving a range
of voices. Few people were absolutely excluded from the court, including
marginalized people who normally would not be allowed to testify in colonial civilian
courts because of their religion, ethnicity, or slave status.17 And because the courtmartial was a forum for self-presentation—where witnesses did not naively testify to
the unvarnished facts as they knew them without any idea of self-interest, but with
specific goals (such as gaining conviction or acquittal, defending reputations,
presenting themselves in a good light to the court-martial board or the audience)—
these records also provide information about how these witnesses wished to be
perceived, and what they valued. Thus, they illuminate the thoughts and principles
of individuals connected with the army during a time of transition for the army itself.
European norms of warfare in this period were becoming increasingly technical,
and armies themselves were becoming unified, national militaries controlled by the
state rather than the semi-private forces that evolved from the mercenary bands of
previous centuries. Yet although the British army by this period had largely shed the
vestigial remains of Tudor proprietary soldiering and organized itself under more
centralized royal control, its cultural ideals lagged behind, remnants of an earlier

17. The court-martial records are also the most important source that preserve the voices of the majority
of the army community; unlike oﬃcers, who produced numerous memoirs about their wartime
experiences, first-person accounts of the Revolutionary War by enlisted soldiers were extremely rare.
Most of them have been collected in Don Hagist’s British Soldiers, American War: Voices of the
American Revolution (Yardley: Westholme, 2012).
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age.18 Its officers were concerned with honor, individual reputation, and personal
glory, and, in fact, the transition away from mercenary custom had rendered the
position of army officer so unprofitable that officer ranks were dominated by the
upper-class men with an amateur’s love of things military; few other men could
easily afford the expenses of a military career.19 Thus, the British army was in the
position of trying to fight increasingly technical wars with an increasingly
unprofessional officer corps.
In the long view of British imperial warfare, the late eighteenth century was the
last high tide of amateur soldiering. The key component of officers’ understanding of
themselves was as gentlemen motivated by honor, eager to demonstrate individual
courage and proper martial masculinity in public displays of battlefield bravery.
However, they were uninterested in mastering the more technical elements of
warfare, and far less concerned with the good of the nation than their government
might have wished. For them, personal honor, the maintenance of their upper-class
position and the privileges they accrued from it, and upholding their masculine
reputation naturally trumped their desire to provide selfless service to their country—
especially if such service would undermine their carefully-guarded class and gender
privileges.
The examination of the effects of this culture of privilege have been neglected in
most military histories of this period in favor of the traditional emphasis on tactics,
strategy, and supply. In others, the social culture of the army has been explored in
almost purely military terms, with little acknowledgment that the power that officers
had over other officers, soldiers and civilians did not come solely from their military

18. For more on the transition to centralized, royal control of the army, see Alan J Guy, Oeconomy and
Discipline: Oﬃcership and Administration in the British Army, 1714-63 (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1985).
19. Guy, 80.
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rank, but also from the positions they occupied in civilian social hierarchies as adult
men and as upper-class gentlemen—and from the value that their society placed on
these positions.20
Officers’ understanding and presentation of themselves strongly emphasized the
importance of manliness and masculinity. However, their conception of manhood
was inseparable from class; their masculinity was defined not in opposition to
women, but in opposition to men of other classes. Thus, it departs from the
tendency of histories of gender to emphasize difference and to examine how
masculinity was constructed in opposition to femininity, and how these constructions
allowed men to dominate women.21 It was far more common for the army to use
ideas about gender to sustain the power of men to dominate other men; enforcing
the subordination of women was not a particularly important goal, and it was often
more profitable for officers to consolidate their own power over enlisted men by
allowing women to threaten the masculine power and authority of lower-class men.22

20. As noted previously, Guy’s Oeconomy and Discipline suggests that changes to the military culture and
the composition of the oﬃcer class were due to the unintended consequences of attempts at
economic reform, while J. A. Houlding’s Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) attributes the Army’s culture and methods of training to the
nation’s need for the army to police and subdue its own population as well as to fight wars. Two
doctoral dissertations, Glenn Steppler’s “The Common Soldier in the Age of George III” (Oxford, 1984)
and Mark Odintz’s “The British Oﬃcer Corps, 1754-1783” (Michigan, 1988) examine the military
cultures of enlisted soldiers and of oﬃcers more generally; the latter also reveals the tensions that the
oﬃcers’ culture of personal honor created for commanders who desired a stricter observance of the
military hierarchy. Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy’s The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership,
the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013) notes
the importance of cultural experiences to military eﬀectiveness, but, as the title suggests, confines his
analysis to the men at the highest ranks of the military and government.
21. R.W. Connell’s Masculinities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005) complicates this dynamic
and promotes the idea of multiple masculinities, formed largely by the interaction of men with other
men, but still sees the subordination of women as a fundamental goal of these masculinities.
22. Similar strategies have been studied by Ann Farnsworth-Alvear, “Women, Men(?), and a Strike in
Colombian Mills,” which examines elite men’s defense of striking female workers in gendered terms as
a strategy for upholding the existing hierarchy and neutralizing their potential political role as workers
engaged in class politics; and Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the
'Eﬀeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995),
who notes that defending the “rights” of women (often construed solely as the protection of their
chastity) was a way for men to contest or undermine the patriarchal power of other men.
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Complications of the simple male/female gender dynamic, especially from the
standpoint of colonial and imperial history, tend to be dominated by arguments for
the crucial importance of race and ethnicity in creating social hierarchies.23 However,
this customary focus on difference would obscure the internal dynamics of power
within the army. The army itself operated with very different demographics from a
civilian society, and consequently its hierarchy was one that could not establish its
right to coercive power on a simple appeal to gender or racial privilege.
Furthermore, favoring the study of interaction between imperial forces and colonial
civilians over the internal structure of those imperial forces can result in a misleading
understanding of the motivations and goals of these imperial actors. The most
fundamental need of the army was to preserve order among its own members.
Before the army could subdue colonial populations, it had to subdue dissenters
within its own ranks. Its social structure was, first and foremost, designed to
accomplish this goal, and the effects that its decisions might have on its imperial
interactions were a decidedly secondary priority.
The juxtaposition of an army whose administration was centralized and statebased, but whose culture was steeped in more traditional ideals of martial
masculinity, combined with an expanding empire that allowed army officers an
unprecedented autonomy when they operated in imperial space, provides a unique
opportunity to study the gender history of the early imperial British army, and sheds
light on how gender and masculinity complicated the larger imperial project.
The first part of this work (chapters 1 through 5) examines the role of gender in
the army, focusing on the subculture of the British Army as it sought to implement
23. Kathleen Brown, in Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1996), suggests that the emergence of the patriarchal social structure of colonial
Virginia came from ideas of diﬀerence between sexes and races and the interconnected comparisons
and diﬀerentiations between them, and subsequent studies have followed it in seeing race and gender
as two of the most essential categories in constructing the lived experiences of empire.
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the necessary structures for linear warfare within its ranks, and the consequences of
that implementation—most notably, the creation of an officer culture in which
gentlemen’s fragile honor needed to be defended with deadly violence, and in which
fighting wars and advancing the national interest were frequently perceived to be of
lesser importance than deciding questions of personal honor and individual
reputation.
The first chapter, “Linear Warfare and the Politics of the Body,” examines the
military tactics of the eighteenth century and military writers’ assessment of the
social organization necessary for an army that wished to use those tactics effectively.
In particular, one idea gained especial credence in Britain: that an army could not
excel at the linear tactics necessary to fight successfully with muskets unless it
adopted and vigorously enforced extreme differences between the perceived status
and rights of officers and of enlisted soldiers.
Chapter 2, “Paternalism and Symbolic Patriarchy,” describes the ways that the
British Army sought to implement these status differences by borrowing the
frameworks of already-established class and gender hierarchies. Officers justified
their control over enlisted soldiers by suggesting that the latter were akin to
irresponsible children who needed to be subordinate to their paternalistic officers,
thereby negating the privileges these enlisted soldiers would otherwise enjoy as
adult men.
But once subordination had been linked so strongly with being childlike and
unmasculine, military commanders then found it difficult to extract obedience from
members of the officer class. This is the focus of the third chapter, “Above the Law,”
as officers insisted that their high status and high position in the social hierarchy
rendered them rightfully immune to the rules and regulations that restricted lowerclass men.
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Chapter 4, “The Cult of Courage,” tracks officers’ growing dissatisfaction with the
army’s attempts at modernization. The fundamental tactics of linear warfare, which
emphasized order, discipline, practice, precision, and training, did not suit
aristocratic officers’ conceptions of proper military masculinity. Preferring dashing
displays of battlefield courage to endless drills and maneuvers, they asserted that
these new systems of military discipline were sapping the nation’s soldiers of the
masculine vigor necessary to win wars.
Chapter 5, “No Retreat,” examines the growth of honor culture among army
officers, along with the belief that a reputation for manhood and courage could only
be established and upheld through the use of violence. Disagreements between
officers frequently led to deadly quarrels and duels, because the masculine culture of
the army allowed them no honorable way to retreat from conflict.
Part II (chapters 6-8) looks at how these workings of gender in the army,
examined in Part I, affected the army’s imperial role. Violent masculinity and honor
culture negatively affected the army’s military capabilities, and army administrators
and government officials attempted to control rogue officers through laws and
regulations meant to curb their violent and dangerous behavior. Yet the vast
distances of the empire made such attempts at centralized control ineffective, and
the army found it necessary to cede to the officers themselves the task of regulating
officers’ problematic behavior.
This, too, created its own challenges; Chapter 6, “A Government of Men, not of
Laws,” examines officers’ perception of military law—and, indeed, the very concept
of the principle of impartial law—as a pernicious force that needed to be subverted in
order to uphold officers’ personal honor.
Chapter 7, “The Supremacy of Honor,” reveals how honor culture posed many
threats to military discipline and to the proper functioning of the army. Yet the
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government capitulated to the demands of officers insistent on upholding their
reputations as honorable gentlemen, thus conceding that officers’ personal honor
must necessarily trump military and imperial interests.
The final chapter, “Imperial Protectors?” looks at officers’ actions in the American
War of Independence. Their understandings of masculinity, status, and the law
affected their interpretation of their imperial role and how they believed they should
treat civilians. Certain civilians were believed to be deserving of protection as loyal
imperial subjects; others they considered rebels against the class and gender
hierarchies officers sought to uphold. Thus, the role of gender in the army had
significant consequences for the operation of the army in its increasingly imperial
role, as well as for the empire itself.
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Chapter 1: Linear Warfare and the Politics of the Body

On December 10, 1777, Private John Rowland of the British Army’s 7th Regiment
of Foot was sentenced to death. Unlike the other soldiers brought before the
General Court Martial that convened in Philadelphia that month, Rowland had not
plundered the houses of the inhabitants of that city, or robbed stores, or taken the
British occupation of Philadelphia as an opportunity to desert to what the British
authorities termed “the Rebel Army.” Rather, Rowland stood before the court
“Accused by Lieut. Span of having Struck him, been insolent to him and disobeyed
his Orders.”24
That Rowland was sentenced to death for this becomes even more extraordinary
considering how the charge came about. Rowland’s accuser, Lieutenant George
Frederick Augustus Span of the 28th Regiment of Foot, testified that he had been in
his quarters when his servant came in and informed him that three soldiers were
tearing down a house that was Span’s property. Span claimed that when he went
out and demanded that they leave, “they did not pay the least attention to him.”
While alcohol-fueled disrespect to officers and their property was nearly endemic
in the eighteenth-century British army (“Was the Prisoner in Liquor at the time?” was
a perennial question of the court), here this emphatically was not the case.25 In his
testimony Span “beg’d [the Court] that they would take notice that the Prisoner was
perfectly Sober,” and that Rowland’s behavior was not due to any drunken lack of

24. The National Archives of the United Kingdom, War Oﬃce (hereafter WO) 71/85, pp. 137-141.
25. Paul Kopperman, “‘The Cheapest Pay’: Alcohol Abuse in the Eighteenth-Century British Army." Journal
of Military History 60 (1996): 445-470; Rabin, Dana. "Drunkenness and responsibility for crime in the
Eighteenth Century." Journal of British Studies 44.3 (2005): 457-477. Crimes committed by intoxicated
soldiers made up substantial portion of the British Army’s courts-martial (e.g. WO 71/83, pp. 41-48);
Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763 (Cambridge ;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 105, suggests that the exception was rather the trial in
which no soldier claimed to be drunk.

18
control over his actions but that his disobedience to Span’s wishes proceeded from a
deliberate and obstinate denial of Span’s authority.
Span disputed their right to take the wood: “taking up a lath,” he reported, and
striking the soldiers, he had driven off the two men. Rowland, however, proved
more intractable. At Span’s demand that he “not touch a log of that wood,” Rowland
replied “that he had as much right to it as [Lt. Span] had, and that he would take as
much of it as he had torn down.” Span, still holding the lath, testified that he then
told Rowland that “he had better go off & not attempt to touch the wood, or that he
would strike him with the lath, incase [sic] he was in the least impertinent.”
But this threat failed to persuade Rowland of the dangers of impertinence. He
advanced towards the lieutenant in what Span characterized as “a very daring
insolent manner,” and “standing upon the wood swore, he would be damned, if he
would leave it.” If Span dared to strike him, he declared, Rowland would strike him
back. Span, soon convinced that “he had nothing left but to drive the Man off
himself,” found a stick and told Rowland “that if he did not leave the Wood, he would
lay that Stick about his shoulders, as long as it would last.” Rowland reiterated his
assertion that if Span “offered to touch him,” he would be assaulted in return. Span
hit him with the stick. Rowland proceeded to grab him by the hair, drag him to the
ground, and strike him several times. According to Span’s testimony, the altercation
continued in this pattern until Span found the stick unserviceable, and went away in
search of more effective weapons. On the way, however, he encountered three
officers of the 7th Regiment, Rowland’s own, who upon hearing his account confined
Rowland and brought him before the court martial.
Rowland, called upon to defend himself from the charge, told a slightly different
story. According to him, Lieutenant Span took the lath and “broke it over his head &
then took up another and struck him again.” Rowland claimed that he responded not
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with a “daring insolent manner,” but rather “beg’d [Span] repeatedly not to strike
him, but to confine him, if he was in fault.” But Span had “a great Stick, and struck
him very severely,” and Rowland feared that the assault “would have taken away his
Life.” Yet even then, Rowland claimed that “he still beg'd him not to strike him, and
lifted up his Arm, to save the blows from his head, which with that stick, he might
have been cloven in two, but Lt. Span continued to follow him.” Only then did
Rowland strike him back, with “three blows in his own defence.” Here Rowland laid
out the fundamental elements of his defense: that he responded to the lieutenant’s
assaults not with defiance but with submission, and that he only struck the officer
because he feared that Span’s beating would kill him.
Remarkable in this case is how much Lieutenant Span’s testimony concurs with
Rowland’s—not, perhaps, in the question of whether Rowland’s manner was
unacceptably insolent or properly deferential, but in whether or not Rowland had
cause to fear for his life. Span openly claimed before the court that he had had the
intention of killing Rowland, and that Rowland knew it: after “finding the Stick could
be of no Service,” Span testified, “he threw it at the Prisoner, and was going towards
his house, to get his bayonet or Sword, telling him that he certainly would put him to
death.” When Span encountered the officers from the 7th while going to his house,
upon being asked what was the matter, “he answered that he had been most
scandalously treated by a Soldier of the 7th Regiment & that he was going to get a
Sword or bayonet, or something to put him to Death with.” He was only dissuaded
from this murderous course by the other officers, who convinced him that he “would
get more satisfaction by bringing him to a Court Martial.”26

26. WO 71/85, pp. 137-141.
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And yet, the court martial board found Span’s assaults on Rowland and even his
homicidal intentions to be excusable, even unremarkable, while Rowland’s far milder
response, made under severe provocation and in self-defense, was deemed a crime
punishable by death. Here, then, is an indication of the vast gulf between the status
of officers and enlisted in men in military law.
The case of John Rowland reveals the extreme differences between the treatment
of the bodies of officers and enlisted men, and helps us understand the role of class
in determining which bodies were subject to violence and coercion. Furthermore, the
case highlights the expectation of enlisted men’s obedience, even in the face of
extreme and unjustified violence perpetrated by officers. These personal interactions
between officers and the enlisted reflected contemporary military theories concerning
the tactics of linear warfare. Far from being confined solely to the battlefield, the
exigencies of linear warfare demanded the strict regulation of the bodies of enlisted
men in everyday life. These class-based hierarchies, which demanded the absolute
subordination of enlisted soldiers to their officers, were perceived to be the
necessary foundations of every effective army in the age of linear warfare.
These status differences were reflected in the army’s rules about who could touch
whom. By the standards of today, we make distinctions between a mere touch and
other, more violent forms of assault. But in the culture of the late eighteenth
century army, a “mere touch” was part of a continuum of assault on the integrity of
the body, and military law made no distinction between an enlisted soldier tapping
his commanding officer on the shoulder and the soldier punching him in the face;
both were considered assault and a severe enough violation of the officer’s bodily
integrity (and thereby his status as a gentleman) that the soldier could be tried and
executed for either.
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On the other hand, an officer could touch anyone but another officer with
impunity. Officers could also authorize the use of touch by one enlisted soldier on
another, in the case of flogging, generally carried out by the drummers, the most
junior members of the army. This, then, was another assertion of their power over
the bodies of their men: not only could officers exercise direct authority over their
men by hitting them themselves, but they could also order others to do the work of
assault for them. (Sergeants and other non-commissioned officers were immune to
this level of physical punishment, but they were differentiated from officers in that
this immunity was not inherent to them as people, only to their rank and office,
which could be revoked at will by their officers. Officers’ concern for maintaining the
military hierarchy made them careful to remove NCO status before ordering a
sergeant or corporal to be flogged: in every case, the man was formally demoted
from his rank and made a mere private again, and then flogged.

)
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Cases of enlisted men being charged with assaulting officers were not infrequent,
but officers were charged with assaulting enlisted soldiers far more rarely, though it
is apparent that such assaults, even severe ones, were a regular part of army life.
Officers asserted their right to informally discipline the soldiers under their command
through this “manual correction,” and officers’ outrage when this treatment met with
resistance indicates that these casual beatings were not exceptional occurrences—
the exceptional occurrence was when the men they beat resisted.28 Yet officers were
only prosecuted if an assault went so far as to cause death.29
27. See John Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement; Comprehending the Tactick, Exercise,
Manoevres, and Discipline of the British Infantry (London: Printed for Thomas Egerton, 1782), 206-207:
“Corporal punishment must not be inflicted on a non-commission oﬃcer; but when simple reduction
may appear too light a penalty for any oﬀence committed by a non-commission oﬃcer, he may be
ordered in the sentence to be reduced to the ranks, and then to receive such corporal punishment as
may be adjudged by the court.”
28. Brumwell, 102.
29. See, for example, WO 71/80, pp. 336-350, in which Captain Richard Symes was tried for “Wounding a
Marine, of which wound said Marine is Supposed to have died.” Symes convinced the court that he
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The army enforced these extreme differences in status and in the right to bodily
integrity in order to create and sustain a social structure for effectively wielding
violence with the military weapons of the eighteenth century. The problem that the
British army faced, stripped to its barest foundations, was essentially this: to make it
possible for one group of people (the officers) to completely subordinate another
group of people (the enlisted), such that the latter will both kill and be killed on
command—and only on command.
The tactics of every age of warfare are dependent on its weaponry. In European
warfare in the late eighteenth century, the most common weapon was the musket—a
firearm of limited range that had to be reloaded after each shot—and the tactic that
maximized its effectiveness was the linear formation: the standard deployment of
troops on the field was in a formation that might be over a mile long, but only two or
three ranks deep. This formation was adopted because it allowed every soldier to
fire at the enemy without obstruction.30 However, this lack of depth made the
formation very vulnerable; any gap in the line might be exploited by enemy cavalry
or infantry, who could then break through and attack the line from the rear. Thus,
contemporary military treatises emphasized the danger that even a single
disobedient soldier presented in battle if he panicked and left his place in the
formation.31
In order to present an unbroken front to the enemy as it approached, an army
deployed in the line had to move very slowly across the terrain, pausing constantly

wounded the marine while attempted to prevent them from breaking into a house, and since violence
under those circumstances was justifiable, he was acquitted of the charge despite the court’s
determination that the marine had died because of Symes’s actions.
30. Christopher Duﬀy, The Military Experience in the Age of the Reason (London ; New York: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1987), 200-201; Lynn, 119-120.
31. Humphrey Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline; In Which Is Laid Down and Explained the Duty of the
Oﬃcer and Soldier, Thro' the Several Branches of the Service (London, 1753), 134-135. Duﬀy,
215-216.
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to re-form after navigating obstacles.32 Therefore it was usual for armies seeking to
rapidly change position to march in columns, which was quicker but made the troops
more vulnerable if they came under attack before they could move back into linear
formation. However, an army that could perform this difficult maneuver well had an
enormous tactical advantage, and the proficiency of the Prussian army in quickly
redeploying from column to line was instrumental in gaining several victories for
Frederick the Great.33
The short effective range of muskets required an army to advance (extremely
slowly, as defensive necessity meant that they had to remain in line so long as they
were within sight of the enemy) close to the opposing side before they could hope to
do any significant damage to enemy forces with their shots. The most devastating
damage occurred when the troops fired from a distance of less than fifty yards.34
Furthermore, the time it took to reload the weapon, especially on the decidedly
compromised setting of the battlefield, meant that the tactical advantage in a battle
generally went to the army whose soldiers fired second.35 Unlike all subsequent
rounds, the first bullet was loaded before the fighting began—in the best possible
conditions—and commanders tried to preserve that first shot as long as possible,
ideally using it for devastating close-range fire at an enemy who had fired first at too
great a distance and was now facing them with unloaded weapons.36
Thus, one of the fundamental concerns of military commanders was to restrain
their soldiers from firing; the primary problem when commanding inexperienced
32. Duﬀy, 201-203.
33. Duﬀy, 113.
34. Duﬀy, 208.
35. A Starkey, "War and Culture, a Case Study: The Enlightenment and the Conduct of the British Army in
America, 1755-1781", War & Society 8, no. 1 (1990): 1-28. In his influential military treatise, Humphrey
Bland claimed that it was “a received Maxim, that those who preserve their Fire the longest, will be
sure to Conquer” (Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 134).
36. Duﬀy, 211.
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troops was preventing them from firing too early.37 Firing as soon as the enemy was
seen was the natural instinct of the soldier, and one of the most essential parts of
military training was to teach him not to fire his loaded musket in the face of an
approaching enemy. As the influential military strategist and British general
Humphrey Bland noted, an infantry battalion that had “that Perfection of Discipline,
as to recover their Arms, after they are Presented, without Firing, in the Face of the
Enemy,” was invulnerable to the threat of a cavalry charge, but “if they throw away
their Fire too soon,” the enemy would “take Advantage of it, and be upon them in an
Instant.” And the results would be devastating: “if they can once penetrate but with
one Squadron, it will throw a Battalion of six hundred Men into Confusion; after
which, their Conquest will be easy.”38
However, as Bland suggests, this restraint was the hallmark of a well-trained,
highly-disciplined battalion. In normal practice, it was dangerously foolhardy to
allow soldiers to move towards the enemy with their weapons leveled; the
temptation to shoot too soon would become irresistible.39 Thus, the general practice
was to command the soldiers to march with their muskets shouldered, under the
threat of immediate death should they point their weapon at the enemy without
instruction.40
Preventing men from firing was not the only part of linear warfare that went
against human instinct; the entire process was thought to be utterly unnatural. The
formation itself, the line, went against the natural human instinct to crowd together

37. Matthew H Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America,
1775-1783 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 226-228.
38. Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 94.
39. Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 80.
40. See, for example, James Wolfe, General Wolfe's Instructions to Young Oﬃcers (London: Printed for J.
Millan, 1768), 48, for General Wolfe’s order that “A soldier that takes his musket oﬀ his shoulder, and
pretends to begin the battle without order, will be put to death that instant.”
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in the face of danger, and the tactical need to preserve the formation at all costs
went against both the impulse to flee danger and the impulse to fight and engage
the enemy.41
Officers’ role in battle, as they understood it, was to curb men’s natural instincts
to seek safety. Only by “the force of discipline men are kept in order and obedience
to command, in opposition to the strongest immediate impulse of their passions,”
officers believed. Without it, “every man consults his own personal safety, at the
instigation of the predominant passion, fear, or the desire of self-preservation.”42
Only the fear of certain death for disobedience could keep this in check: “Soldiers
should be more afraid of their own officers than the enemy,” one military author
advised. “If a man lies down, or offers to run away, you must without hesitation, put
him to death.”43 Similarly, General Wolfe ordered that “A soldier that quits his rank,
or offers to fly, is to be instantly put to death by the officer that commands that
platoon...a soldier does not deserve to live who won't fight for his king and
country.”44
But officers intent on preserving the line had to contend not only with the threat
of its disintegration as men seeking safety fled to the rear, but also with the equal
danger presented by belligerent aggression. The soldiers had to be kept from firing
and engaging the enemy too soon, and also had to be discouraged from pursuing a
fleeing enemy. Once the opposing army’s line had been broken and the soldiers put
to flight, “great Care must be taken by the Officers to prevent their Men from
Breaking after them; neither must they pursue them faster than the Line advances.”
If, Bland continued, the “Battalion advances out of the Line, it may be attacked on
41. Duﬀy, The Military Experience in the Age of the Reason, 199.
42. John Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement (London, 1791), 2-3.
43. James Callandar, Military Maxims, Illustrated by Examples (London, 1782), 28.
44. Wolfe, Instructions to Young Oﬃcers, 48.
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the Flanks by the Enemy's Horse....if they should separate in pursuing those they
beat, the Enemy may destroy them one after the other, with such an inconsiderable
Number of Troops, that were they in a Body would fly at their Appearance.”45
Some explanation for the system of savage punishments for disobedience to
officers is suggested by the behavior of the ideal infantry battalion: One that
arranged itself in a neat and vulnerable line; that remained in that formation as it
marched towards an enemy army that was shooting at them, without returning fire
or having any soldier break away to flee in fear or eager to attack prematurely; a
battalion that marched, orderly and inexorable, into close and deadly range of the
enemy before firing only at the command of their officers—a battalion, in short,
whose officers had successfully convinced its soldiers to line up neatly and wait to be
shot by the enemy.
This was fundamentally a problem in regulating violence; the need of the army
was to both restrain and compel violence, to train men to kill the enemy if and only if
they were commanded to do so by their officers. Military manuals emphasized the
need to keep discipline in the ranks at all costs, because undisciplined men who had
not been trained in the precise tactics of linear warfare were an active danger in
battle.46 Military author Stephen Payne Adye claimed that “discipline is more
conducive to victory than numbers,” while an army that lacked it was “no better than
so many contemptible heaps of rabble, which are more dangerous to the very state
that maintains them, than even its declared enemies.”47

45. Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 134-135.
46. J A Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1981), 273.
47. Stephen Payne Adye, A Treatise on Courts Martial ... To Which Is Added, I. An Essay on Military
Punishments and Rewards. II. Considerations on the Act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion, and the
Rules and Articles for the Government of His Majesty's Land Forces (London: Printed for J. Murray,
1778), 139-140.

27
Officers’ duty, then, was preserving discipline at all costs, and against the
opposition of every natural instinct of their men. Officers had to gain the obedience
of their men by any means necessary, and any and all means were acceptable to
enforce discipline, from brutal floggings to summary execution. Gentler means
would not suffice; men (especially, officers thought, the uneducated, lower-class
men who comprised the majority of enlisted soldiers) could not be persuaded by
reason to act in so unnatural a fashion. “There is an absolute necessity of
sometimes inflicting punishments for the good of society,” Adye wrote. “[I]t is
essential in order to keep up good order, and military discipline in any army”48
Extreme control over bodies was not only justified by tactics; it was also the
method for achieving the requisite level of military discipline. Basic training in the
British army consisted of continual repetition of the basics of musket-drill, which
served to mold soldiers in the proper soldierly character—the purpose of training was
to discipline soldiers so that their responses to commands in battle would be
automatic and unquestioned; to create automatons rather than spirited,
individualistic men.49 This was a deliberate decision to favor control rather than
soldiers who could take advantage of fortuitous chance on the battlefield—to
decouple violence from individual initiative, to remove all autonomy from the
exercise of violence, to use soldiers as instruments of violence without allowing them
any choices about when to exercise it.
Naturally, then, it was necessary to establish obedience as the first duty of the
soldier. Military writer Thomas Simes wrote that the soldier was “to be sober and
orderly in his behavior, respectful to his superiors, and obedient to all officers.”
Simes emphasized that the soldier’s subordination was to be unquestioning (“He is

48. Adye, A Treatise on Courts Martial, 139.
49. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795, 268-269.
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ever to be alert, and observe his orders; ask no reasons for them, or dare to think
them of little consequence”50) and was to persist even in the face of perceived
injustice: “If a private soldier should think himself aggrieved, or ill used, by any
Serjeant or Corporal, he must not only refrain from abusing him; but, on the
contrary, in the first place obey, and then lay his complaint before the Commander of
his company,” adding a warning that “the greatest care is to be taken for preventing
all frivolous and ill-grounded complaints; for misplaced indulgence will retort upon
himself.”51 Officers’ highest praise for soldiers was for their cheerful obedience to
orders.52
Rowland was not the only soldier to be brought before a court martial charged
with the capital crime of assaulting an officer. There were many other cases of
enlisted men who struck officers and a common thread through the majority of them
is the fact that they did so only after the officer had assaulted them. Corporal
William McSkimming was hit with a switch and punched in the head before he
resorted to knocking down the ensign who had treated him so.53 Private Jeremiah
Nicholas testified that he was in bed with his comrades when Captain James
Hamilton of the Coldstream Guards suddenly “burst into the Room, and immediately
Struck him (the Prisoner) as he was sitting up in Bed, with a large Cane,” and “might
have fractur'd his Skull.” Hamilton “then dragg'd him out of Bed, and said you
50. Thomas Simes, The Military Instructor, for the Non-commissioned Oﬃcers and Private Men of the
Infantry Containing Every Thing Necessary to Be Understood by the Independent Companies of
Volunteers Now Raised, or Raising, in Great-Britain and Ireland: Such As the Manual Exercise, Use of
Arms, Manuvres, &c. &c. (London; 1779), 32-33.
51. Thomas Simes, The Military Guide for Young Oﬃcers : Containing a System of the Art of War (London:
printed for J. Millan, 1781), 165.
52. E.g., Wolfe: “the soldiers did behave themselves on that occasion with all the steadiness chearfulness,
and obedience that may be expected from brave men and good subjects; not a man declined the
service, and all marched oﬀ with a resolution never to dishonor the corps they served in, and to do
their utmost for his Majesty's service and the good of their country; such troops as these, men that
may be depended upon in all changes and circumstances, deserve to be considered as real soldiers,
and to be valued and esteemed accordingly.” Wolfe, Instructions to Young Oﬃcers, 38.
53. WO 71/84, p. 401-410.
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Rascal, I'll hang you, and Struck him again Several times.” Other witnesses for the
defendant claimed that upon discovering that the nighttime assailant was the
possibly-intoxicated Captain Hamilton, a sergeant “came in and said, my dear
Captain Hamilton, you had better go Home,” but that Hamilton “answer'd that he
would not quit the Room till he sought that Villain's Life,” and the blows with the
cane continued.54
But similar to John Rowland’s case, the court did not accept these provocations
as legitimate justifications for assaulting officers. Rowland “beg'd to show the Court
the bruises he had received from Lt. Span, which were the Cause of his returning the
blows,” and McSkimming told the court that the blow to the head that he had
received from Ensign Bathe was so severe that he still felt its effects at his trial, but
to no avail. Just as Rowland was sentenced to death, so too was McSkimming.
Nicholas, too, was found guilty of assaulting Captain Hamilton and might have
shared their fate, but had the fortune to have on his court martial board an officer
who knew him and could attest to his good behavior, and was sentenced instead to a
thousand lashes for his crime. These cases make the principle clear: an enlisted
soldier who struck back at an officer, no matter how severe the provocation, was
guilty; there was no possible circumstance that could excuse or justify such
behavior. Consequently, most soldiers brought before a General Court Martial for
striking an officer were convicted and punished harshly.55
It is also important to note that in none of these cases was there any dispute
about the officer having struck them first. In the officers’ own testimony, they

54. WO 71/86, p. 239-250.
55. The one defense a soldier might make was that of mistaken identity—claiming that he was not the
soldier who hit the oﬃcer; for example, WO 71/85, p. 34-40: Along with Samuel Webb, William Collins
was brought before the court accused of striking their captain, but after doubts arose about whether
Collins had actually taken part or had been mistaken for another man in the dark and crowded room,
he was acquitted.
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revealed to the court their commission of brutal assaults on enlisted men for
relatively trivial matters without any fear of prosecution or even censure. Ensign
John Bathe testified that he had given Corporal McSkimming “two or three strokes,
with a small switch,” not because of anything McSkimming had said or did to him,
but because he had, in response to the Ensign’s order to parade the men of his
company, “put on an insolent gloomy look.” McSkimming was not the only soldier to
feel the ensign’s wrath that day; the defendant and another soldier of his company
testified that Bathe had “Struck two other Corporals, and almost every Man in the
Company that he (the Prisoner) belonged to,” and when asked to give a reason, said
it was “for not having their hair tied.”56

Captain Colin Campbell of the Royal Artillery

claimed that the altercation between him and his men (which resulted in a black eye
that he exhibited to the court as proof of the defendants’ dangerous insubordination)
started when he observed that “there was nothing but noise & Rioting among the
Artillery men in their Room,” though he “frequently desired them to be quiet.”
Finally resolving to settle matters himself, he entered the room and saw Samuel
Webb,“standing behind the door, in a most Insolent Posture.” After Campbell had
ordered the men to go to bed and be silent and left the room, Webb closed the door
behind him in a way that Campbell found unacceptable. Therefore he re-entered the
room, he testified, where “he found the Prisoner Webb in the same situation,
standing behind the door, & having ask'd him how he dare to continue there (at the
same time giving him a slap on the Cheek) ordered him then to Obey & go to bed
with the rest.” Webb told him that he was not in bed because he was a sentry.
Campbell declared that this information had been conveyed “in an Insolent Tone,”
and seized Webb by the ear with the intention of arresting him.57
56. WO 71/84, p. 401-410.
57. WO 71/85, p. 34-40. See Richard Holmes, Redcoat: the British Soldier in the age of Horse and Musket
(London: HarperCollins UK, 2011), p. 34, for oﬃcers reacting to perceived insolence or disrespect from
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It was the clear expectation of the court that enlisted soldiers accept such
assaults from officers without resistance. Corporal McSkimming told the court that
he had only assaulted Ensign Bathe because the ensign had given him “a
blow…which rendered him so insensible that he did not know what he did,” and “had
he had his Senses,” the ensign “might have beat him till this time and he would not
have returned it.” Another witness called by McSkimming testified that when the
ensign had “said that he would knock him down, the Prisoner answered that he
might do it at his pleasure.”58 Nicholas claimed that although he had first responded
to Captain Hamilton’s beating by scuffling with him for control of the cane that the
officer had used to strike him, this was only because he did not know that he was
being beaten by an officer: “as soon as [the man] said that he was Captain
Hamilton,” Nicholas testified, he “gave him his Cane again”—presumably so that
Captain Hamilton, his identity as an officer and therefore a legitimate source of
beatings now established, could resume his chastisement of Nicholas armed with the
proper instrument for it and without any fear of further objections from him.59
When Sergeant George Smith was beaten by Captain Benjamin Charnock Payne,
Smith testified that he reacted not with rage but with continued expressions of
loyalty and acceptance, telling Payne “that if he beat and kicked him from one end of
the Parade to the other, and reduced him to live on two pence a day, yet he should
never oblige him to desert his Colours.”60
These sharp differences in the official response to assaults on the bodies of
officers compared to those of enlisted men reveal a larger military practice of

enlisted soldiers with physical violence. Holmes cites an oﬃcer’s recollection of seeing an ensign “get
a poor man flogged because he had passed him without taking oﬀ his hat.”
58. WO 71/84, p. 401-410.
59. WO 71/86, p. 239-250.
60. WO 71/81, p. 43.
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complete control over the bodies of the enlisted; officers were not censured for
assaulting the men under their command because those men were not recognized to
have any particular rights over their own bodies. Once they joined the army, the
army controlled the food, location, dress, posture, grooming, and even the domestic
relations of enlisted men.61 A favored method of establishing discipline was by
asserting extreme control over every aspect of the soldier’s life. The regulation of
the body was a way of establishing control. Military manuals contained careful
instructions specifying exactly how soldiers were to salute,
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and orders detailing

how the men's hair was to be cut, styled, and tied.63 Some of this regulation was
justified using claims of military necessity, such as instructions about sentries’
behavior. Ordering that they were not to “sing, smoke Tobacco, nor to suffer and
Noise to be made near them,” or “to sit down, lay their Arms out of their Hands, or
sleep; but to keep moving about their Posts if the Weather will allow of it” could
easily be linked to the clear military need for sentries to preserve the proper
vigilance.64
Claims of military need could also be understood in a more expansive sense: the
body of the soldier was not his own—it was essentially the property of his officers
and his regiment; he therefore had no right to unfit his body for service. In this way
officers argued that soldiers should be punished for contracting a venereal disease,
or for being drunk, or for failing to keep themselves healthy. General Burgoyne
61. Don N. Hagist, British Soldiers, American War: Voices of the American Revolution, pp. 282-287; also
J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service: the training of the British Army, 1715-1795. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1981.
62. Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 61-62.
63. Stephen Gilbert, "The Long and Short of It: Military Hairstyles During the American Revolution Part 1
(of 3): British Army Hairstyles", The Brigade Dispatch XXXV, no. 1 (2005): 10-19. Also: "Any Man that
presumes to cut oﬀ his Hair...shall be sent to the Black Hole for fourteen days" Thomas Simes, The
Military Medley Containing the Most Necessary Rules and Directions for Attaining a Competent
Knowledge of the Art: To Which Is Added An Explication of Military Terms, Alphabetically Digested
(Dublin: S. Powell, 1767), 17.
64. Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 162.
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suggested the prevailing view on the rights of the soldier to any personal autonomy
when he declared that "The life of the Soldier is the property of the King.65
However, this understanding of the enlisted soldier as a being without rights
conflicted with Britons’ ideas about national identity. In the British public
imagination the soldier upon enlistment had deprived himself of the rights and the
liberties that were the birthright of all Britons, but while most were content to look
upon the redcoat with scorn for having relinquished his rights, others reacted with
pity, and determination to ameliorate his wretched condition. Too many interfering
civilians were willing to act as “the soldier’s friend” and interest themselves in his
sufferings when the army was thought to have taken things too far.66
By positing the obedience of the enlisted as an unnatural state that was
nevertheless an absolute requirement on the battlefield, officers justified using
savage punishments to enforce order, by suggesting that they necessarily underlay
the structure of every victorious army.67 “[T]hose armies which have been subject to
the severest discipline, have always performed the greatest things,” Simes claimed.68
Particularly singled out for both its savage disciplinary regime and for its numerous
battlefield victories was the Prussian army. British admirers sought to follow

65. “General Order,” Sept. 18, 1777, in E. B. O’Callaghan, ed., Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne,
from his entry into the State of New York until his Surrender at Saratoga, 16th Oct., 1777 (Albany, N.Y.,
1860), 113-14, quoted in John A. Ruddiman, “’A Record in the Hands of Thousands’: Power and
Negotiation in the Orderly Books of the Continental Army.” The William and Mary Quarterly 67, no. 4
(2010): 757.
66. For example, civilian objections to a captain’s attempt to separate an enlisted husband from his
‘unsuitable’ wife, by claiming that the oﬃcer’s behavior was contrary to “the Natural Rights of
Mankind,” and was giving the army “the Air and appearance of Abject Slavery”: PRO WO 1/987, pp.
645-647, Freeman to Secretary at War, 14 January 1764, cited in G A Steppler, "The common soldier
in the reign of George III, 1760-1793" (Ph. D. dissertation, Oxford, 1984), 110. Also, civilian
intervention in military punishment: Tatum, "Civilian Intervention and Military Justice in the EighteenthCentury British Atlantic," 68; Ala Alryyes, "War at a Distance: Court-Martial Narratives in the Eighteenth
Century", Eighteenth-Century Studies 41, no. 4 (2008): pp. 525-542.
67. Lee, Barbarians and Brothers, 180.
68. Simes, The Military Guide for Young Oﬃcers : Containing a System of the Art of War, 1.
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Frederick’s example, but there were limitations on the extent to which it could be
implemented in the British Army and in the British empire.
The political realities of British society, whose long-standing distrust of standing
armies meant that no plan for systematic conscription was tenable, required both
officers and enlisted soldiers to be recruited as adults; therefore, the extreme
subordination necessary for effective linear warfare had to be implemented within
the constraints of the existing social structure, which provided further obstacles. The
enduring strength of men’s claims to marital rights and privileges, and a conception
of masculinity that linked courageous insolence with true British manhood
(contrasted with the unmanly submission of foreigners) were all resilient cultural
values that made difficulties for military authorities who tried to implement in the
British army a method of social organization that would allow them to triumph in art
of linear war.
Perhaps even more importantly, by the 1770s, harshness was going out of
fashion (but certainly not out of practice) in the army, especially among the
uppermost classes who filled the highest ranks of the officer corps.69 The rise of
sensibility in the late eighteenth century emphasized the importance of feelings.
One’s social status as a refined gentleman was asserted by displaying the ability to
be emotionally hurt and wounded by insults, and refinement was also implied by the
ability to recognize the sensitivity and emotions of others.70 Traces of the new
emphasis on sensibility showed in the questioning of the traditional savage
69. Mark Urban, Fusiliers: The Saga of a British Redcoat Regiment in the American Revolution (New York:
Walker & Co, 2007), 51.
70. Sarah Knott on the shared transatlantic culture of sensibility among British and American oﬃcers, even
when on opposite sides of a war, in Sensibility and the American Revolution, (UNC Press, 2008), pp.
157-160. However, Knott suggests a considerable divide between the enlisted soldiers and oﬃcers of
the Continental Army, as oﬃcers aspired to the gentility and sensibility displayed by their British and
French counterparts, while enlisted soldiers cared little for displaying refinement and concern for their
enemies. Also, Nicole Eustace, Passion is the Gale: Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American
Revolution (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2011).
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punishments inflicted by the army and an increased recognition of the humanity of
the common soldier.71 The courts-martial assembled under General Gage might still
have handed down sentences of hundred of lashes, but added the proviso that the
flogging would be administered “at such a time and place that the Commander in
Chief shall think proper,” and Gage frequently would not think of such a proper
occasion and pardoned the offender instead. He was similarly unwilling to actually
carry out the executions ordered by the court-martial board, often to the dismay of
more junior officers.72 Lieutenant Colonel Bernard, who commanded the 23rd
Regiment (Royal Welch Fusiliers), and Earl Percy, heir to the Dukedom of
Northumberland and Colonel of the 5th Regiment, were known to disapprove of
flogging. Percy even went so far as to completely disallow flogging as a punishment
in his regiment, seeking instead “to win [the enlisted men] to their duty by generous
treatment, and by his own excellent example.”73
The majority of officers were not willing to go that far. Though many of them
deplored the indiscriminate use of flogging as a punishment, conceding that many
soldiers could be led without it, they continued to believe that flogging, though
extremely distasteful to them personally, was absolutely necessary to preserve
discipline.74 Simes suggested that officers ought to "gain the love and affection of
the soldiers" by seeing to their interests and treating them fairly, but also thought
that some men could not be governed without the threat of the lash.75
71. Starkey, "War and Culture, a Case Study: The Enlightenment and the Conduct of the British Army in
America, 1755-1781," 21.
72. Urban, 18; Urban also notes Gage’s judge advocate disapproved of frequent floggings and executions,
preferring to reserve such punishments only for the most egregious oﬀenses, and worried that “Too
frequent a use of the gallows” would actually undermine order and discipline because it would “lead to
oﬃcers conceal crimes in order to save both lives and regimental reputation.”
73. Urban, 18, 72-73; also Holmes, 34, 53, on some oﬃcers’ belief that British men couldn’t “bear patiently
corporal chastisement”.
74. Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763 (Cambridge
University Press, 2006), p. 101.
75. Thomas Simes, The Military Guide for Young Oﬃcers (London, 1772), 1: 168, quoted in John A
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However, officers’ concerns on this point suggest that this military system, which
demanded extreme obedience and extracted it through brutal punishment, needed to
be justified not only to the British public—which already had some unfavorable
opinions on militarism as a threat to national liberty—but also to the officers
themselves. They needed to understand their control over and coercive interference
with enlisted lives not merely as the necessary but morally-repugnant domination of
a less powerful group, but as just and proper actions. Therefore, they sought to
make rhetorical links with already-existing systems of social control that justified one
group’s subordination to another by entangling military, social, and gender
hierarchies.

Ruddiman, "'A Record in the Hands of Thousands': Power and Negotiation in the Orderly Books of the
Continental Army", The William and Mary Quarterly 67, no. 4 (2010): 747-774. Ruddiman also traces
the use of sensibility in military orders in the Continental Army, noting the use of emotional language to
persuade soldiers to reform their behavior: Washington portrayed himself as "Disappointed" and
"much Aﬀected" by the poor behavior of the troops under his command.
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Chapter 2: Paternalism and Symbolic Patriarchy

The 18th Regiment of Foot had had an unhappy experience in North America.
After its arrival in Philadelphia in 1767, parts of the regiment had been stationed at
various western forts in the Illinois country, as well as the eastern cities of Boston
and New York. It had endured Indian attacks in the west and increasing tensions
with the colonists in the east, but most damaging of all were the various internal
disputes of the 18th Regiment’s officers. By 1774, these disputes had devolved into a
series of courts-martial as officers sought to have their personal enemies convicted
of unbecoming behavior and dismissed from the army.76
The court-martial of Captain Benjamin Charnock Payne stemmed from his dispute
with another officer of the 18th, Lieutenant Alexander Fowler. Fowler accused Payne
of being unfit to hold an officer’s commission because he had been “Guilty of
tyrannical, cruel, and oppressive treatment both of the Non-Commissioned Officers
and private soldiers, in consequence of which conduct … one or more of the former
and several of the latter have been compelled to desert His Majesty’s Service.” In
support of his charge, Fowler exhibited as witnesses several enlisted soldiers and
officers in Payne’s company, who testified to Payne’s temper, his severe beatings of
enlisted men, and the petty cruelties he had inflicted on the common soldiers of his
company and their families, such as refusing to allow soldiers’ wives to see their
husbands or to live with them, and throwing overboard the petticoats and other
baggage of the women of the company.

76. For a history of the 18th Regiment during this period, see Steven M. Baule, Protecting the Empire’s
Frontiers: Oﬃcers of the 18th (Royal Irish) Regiment of Foot during Its North American Service, 1767–
1776, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014).
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Fowler’s accusations may have stemmed from a personal dislike of Payne rather
than any idea of championing enlisted men’s rights, but the enlisted soldiers used
Payne’s court-martial to air their own grievances and to protest their ill-treatment by
appealing to two powerful and related cultural ideals: sensibility, and traditional
understandings of the rights and privileges of adult men.
The ideals of sensibility gave enlisted soldiers a new—and safer—option for
responding to the assaults from officers. Instead of reacting with retaliatory
violence, they might react with tears. These men failed to accept the prevailing
military view that they could be encouraged, taught, or corrected with physical
chastisement, but instead suggested that they must be led with concern and
kindness.77 The prosecution’s discussion of the cases of some soldiers, Sergeant
Brogden, and Private Thomas Maddison, who had deserted the regiment while it was
in New York, due to—according to Lieutenant Fowler—Captain Payne’s cruel
treatment of them, explicitly expressed their plight in the language of emotion and
sentiment: Lieutenant Triste claimed that Sergeant Brogden had “frequently come
[to him] in tears.”
In fact,Triste claimed, Brodgen and other non-commissioned officer, Sergeant
Smith had both told him that “Capt. Payne treated them so cruelly that their lives
were become a burthen to them; and that it was not possible that they could
withstand such cruelty and oppression long, as their hearts were broke.”78 Smith
himself testified that Brogden had told him “he had a heart like a Lyon to withstand
Captain Payne’s bad treatment, that he had began the same usage with him some

77. Eustace’s Passion is the Gale especially focuses on the transition from sensibility as an emotion
reserved for the upper classes to one claimed as a universal human attribute among American
colonists, but a similar appropriation of the language of sentiment by British enlisted soldiers seems to
have occurred during this period.
78. WO 71/81, pp. 27-28.
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months before, but that it was not in his power to put up with it.”79 Brogden, lacking
Smith’s leonine resilience, had deserted the regiment, but remained in the city, and
Triste recalled meeting him some time later “on a Common near New York.” There,
Brogden, once again in tears, “began a long story relating how Capt. Payne had used
him, and that he would never have deserted, had it not been for that usage.” The
erstwhile sergeant claimed he was completely willing to rejoin the regiment if he
would no longer be subject to Payne’s poor treatment, and looked forward to the
arrival of the regiment’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkins. The moment that
he heard that Wilkins was once again in command, Brogden asserted, “he would
walk even bare foot to join the Regiment again.”
Triste heard similar sentiments from Thomas Maddison, a deserter from Payne’s
company whom he had met in the streets of New York. Maddison, too, claimed to
have “deserted from the Regiment owing to the ill usage received from Capt. Payne.”
And Maddison characterized his willingness to return in similar melodramatic terms:
should the possibility of pleading his case before Lieutenant Colonel Wilkins arise,
“he would immediately [re-]join the Regiment, although obliged to creep on his
hands and knees three or four hundred miles.”80 But the other soldiers of the
regiment believed that Maddison had deserted not because of Payne’s physical illtreatment of him, but because the captain would not allow his wife to live with him in
the barracks. This, and Payne’s numerous other violations of traditional marital
privilege by interfering in the relationships between enlisted men and their wives,
were exhibited to the court by Payne’s enlisted accusers as an unjust lack of
recognition for their position as adult men.

79. WO 71/81, p. 44.
80. WO 71/81, pp. 26-27.
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Payne’s case suggests the ideological difficulties officers experienced. They
sought an uneasy balance between theories of military government that emphasized
the necessity of controlling soldiers at any cost (and the harsh treatment that such a
theory implied), and the ascendant theory of sentiment, which insisted on
recognizing the humanity of the enlisted soldiers and their capacity to be moved by
feeling and emotion. And the enlisted men who denounced Payne not only made
claims that they, too, were capable of refined feelings and sensibility, but also claims
that they were being denied the rights traditionally bestowed on every adult male
upon his marriage. To suggest that enlisted soldiers lacked the rights traditionally
enjoyed by other men of their same age, class, and race was, in some sense, an
attack on the more universal principle of masculine privilege.
But Payne’s (successful) defense of his behavior suggested a way of reconciling
patriarchal ideals with the practice of denying enlisted soldiers male privileges. He
put the enlisted soldiers under his command in the role of subordinate children—
irrational, and unable to manage their own affairs—rather than acknowledging their
status as adult men, with the right to autonomy over themselves and the control of
their wives and other dependents. Concurrently, he presented himself to the court
as a patriarchal figure, with the right to discipline childlike subordinates, but also as
a kind paternal figure who provided his men with provisions and cared for them in
illness.
By modeling his rights on the traditional rights of a father, Payne asserted that
he had the legitimate authority to supervise various aspects of his subordinates’
lives. Just as a biological father had the right to control many aspects of their
children’s lives, so Payne had the right to determine where the soldiers under his
command lived, what work they were to do and when, what food and drink they
were permitted to have, whether they were dressed correctly, with whom they were
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permitted to associate and what houses they were allowed to visit, to make rules for
their behavior and to determine whether those rules had been broken, and to
discipline them for those infractions.
This symbolic patriarchy allowed pre-existing frameworks of power and authority
to be applied to the military relationship. Ultimately, officers attempted to
implement the principles of military discipline and subordination by grafting them on
to existing social hierarchies and exercising control within the established framework
of patriarchy. The gendered language of patriarchy and paternalism allowed military
commanders to mobilize existing class and gender hierarchies in order to support the
military hierarchy.
Paternalism was the most powerful rhetorical tool officers had for justifying their
extreme authority over the enlisted. By characterizing the relationship between an
officer and the enlisted men under his command as analogous to that of a father and
his children, officers justified keeping enlisted soldiers in economic and social
relationships of subordination by claiming that, like children, enlisted soldiers lacked
the financial and moral competence to regulate their own lives. And by asserting
control of enlisted men’s wives and marital relations, officers also denied enlisted
soldiers’ the privileges they might otherwise enjoy as adult men and characterized
them as children, rather than as husbands and fathers.
Payne’s ideas on his fatherly role and patriarchal privileges had a prestigious
provenance. Military manuals of the eighteenth century often emphasized the
desirability of maintaining a paternal control over one’s soldiers for a well-run
battalion. Bennett Cuthbertson’s influential instructional treatise on the
management of a regiment emphasized the need to supervise soldiers’ every move
and attributed to them a childlike inability to operate without simple and constant
instruction. Both Cuthbertson’s treatise and officers’ private writings frequently
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characterized the lower ranks as “ignorant” and “clownish.”81 But writers
emphasized that officers’ relations with them should be characterized by paternalism
rather than unmitigated contempt for their ignorance. If the enlisted ranks were
simple and childlike, it was the officer’s duty to act as a father to them, to be an
authority and to impose discipline, but also to care for them and see to their
welfare.82
Officers’ remarks about the paternalistic relationship between them and the men
they commanded testify to the rhetorical power of paternalism as an ideal.83 In his

81. Bennett Cuthbertson, A System of the Compleat Interior Management and Economy of a Battalion of
Infantry, 182.
82. Brumwell, 70-71.
83. Oﬃcers asserted paternal claims of being patrons and protectors: Captain Fitzwilliam claimed that he
looked upon himself ”as a Father and protector of my Company” (WO 71/55, p. 322). Similarly,
Captain Whitely “thought the Men of my Company under my especial care and protection, that it was
my duty to represent their wants, and get them redressed,” (WO 71/58, p. 371) and Captain Gray of
the Queen’s Royal Regiment remarked, "I have ever look'd upon it as the indispensable duty of a
Captain or any other Oﬃcer having the care of a Company, to prevent as far as they are able, any
Iǌustice or hardship being done to any of the Men who are their particular Charge” (WO 71/82, p. 270).
However, historians have often uncritically accepted these statements as evidence for the actual
nature of these relationships across class and rank. Their failure to note that claims of enlisted
incompetence exist primarily in sources produced by or for the dominant class is particularly
problematic. Steppler writes that “Regimental orders could read like so many iǌunctions against the
behaviour of delinquent children....It was made clear that soldiers were always to be supervised, were
never trusted to keep a clean shirt, do their duty, spend their money wisely, or even to look after their
own health” and from this concludes that “The behaviour of the soldier could be simple and child-like
in the extreme.” Similarly, Spring claims that “One factor that lends some weight to the idea that a
paternalistic relationship existed between at least some oﬃcers and their men was that the proclivity of
eighteenth-century common soldiers for amazingly irrational and irresponsible acts necessitated
constant supervision.” But Steppler is basing his estimations of the common soldier’s childishness on
the regimental orders of oﬃcers seeking to establish or justify their authority over enlisted men, and
Spring’s quotations of many touching scenes of paternal aﬀection and filial attachment between
enlisted soldiers and their oﬃcers are selected exclusively from oﬃcers’ correspondence and other
writings. Both have unquestioningly accepted oﬃcers’ self-interested claims of enlisted men’s
financial, intellectual and moral incompetence. Steppler supplements his understanding of the enlisted
with their own defense statements given during courts-martial (“Court-martial proceedings in particular
reveal an often simple minded attitude, lacking in an appreciation of the seriousness of walking oﬀ
guard duty, abandoning a sentry post, or disobeying any number of other regulations. 'I thought no
harm' was a frequent plea...there were others whose acts of petty crime, disobedience and
misbehaviour were committed in so clumsy and stupid a fashion as to defy belief”) but fails to consider
the venue in which these statements were produced; the fact that enlisted men defended themselves
in military courts by presenting themselves as children who lacked understanding is evidence only that
they believed such self-presentation might benefit them during the trial, not evidence of their actual
character. Similarly, Spring’s sources are not evidence for enlisted and oﬃcers seeing themselves in a
paternalistic relationship, but rather only evidence that some oﬃcers saw their relationship to their men
in this way. Steppler, "The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III, 1760-1793," 123-124. Spring,
With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783,
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defense, Payne indignantly refuted charges that he had treated the men of his
company with “Tyranny and oppression,” claiming that “there was more indulgence
and attention given by him to his Company than any of the other five Companies at
New York enjoyed.” Payne himself attempted to portray himself as a humanitarian
commander and a provider, frequently inquiring of the witnesses in his trial whether
he had not provided the men of his company with fresh meat and grog.84
Furthermore, Payne claimed he was capable of providing individual attention to
soldiers in need. When “Serjeant Smith was ill at Amboy,” Payne inquired, did he
not “receive many favours from Capt. Payne; such as having a Physician sent to
attend him, and being supplyed with wine, spices” to hasten his recovery? Did he
not provide all this care from his own purse?85
Payne also claimed to have shown “particular kindness” to the men of all the
companies stationed with his own, and to have a special interest for their welfare
when the vagaries of military life interfered with their ability to provide for their
families. When the companies were ordered to embark a transport ship, Payne,
concerned “that as the married men could not then work at their different trades, to
help their families as they used to do, he supposed that many of them must want
provisions,” and asked the regiment’s sergeant major “to enquire and let him (Capt.
Payne) know if there were an in want, and he would give them some.” Payne
elicited heartwarming tales of his spending almost six pounds to purchase beef and
mutton for sick soldiers and their families, and more “to buy milk for the Children.”86

107-110.
84. WO 71/81, p. 52-53. Other British military oﬃcers also used their generous treatment of the enlisted
soldiers under their command to support their reputations as men of sensibility. Mark Urban, Fusiliers,
describes Earl Percy as an exemplar, who chartered a ship at his own expense to convey home to
Britain the widows and children of the soldiers of his regiment who had died at Bunker Hill (p. 72).
85. WO 71/81, pp. 59-60, 54, 38.
86. WO 71/81, p. 149.
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Thus, Payne portrayed himself in the role of fatherly provider: the men in his
regiment were cared for when they were sick and were given extra food and other
indulgences. And, Payne implied, enlisted men were not entirely capable of
supporting their dependents; Payne was paying for the food their families needed.
But Payne and other officers did not justify their paternalism merely by
portraying themselves as humanitarian-minded gentlemen who used their lofty social
position to protect those less fortunate and more vulnerable. They also claimed that
it was an absolutely necessary part of maintaining a well-run army, for the enlisted
soldiers were like untutored children, who constantly sought pleasures that the wiser
mind of the officer could clearly see would lead to no good end. Unless these
disordered desires were regulated by an officer, they would ultimately harm both
themselves and the army.
By asserting both the moral and economic incompetence of the enlisted, officers
could claim it was militarily necessary to regulate otherwise unrelated aspects of
enlisted lives, and thereby deny them the autonomy they would otherwise have had
as adult men, consolidating their power over them in both the military and social
realm.
This thinking was behind many of the regulations promoted by officers: enlisted
men must be kept from ale houses and taverns because they would get drunk and
behave disgracefully; they must be prevented from associating with prostitutes
because they would become infected with venereal disease; they must not be simply
given their pay when they were owed it, because they would spend it all on drink or
lose it gambling and would not have enough money to feed themselves and to
purchase clothing when they were in need of it.87
87. See Dana Rabin, "Drunkenness and Responsibility for Crime in the Eighteenth Century", The Journal of
British Studies 44, no. 3 (2005): 457-477, on the eighteenth-century conception that “the poor had less
of an ability to control the eﬀects of alcohol on their emotions and their behavior,” as well as seeing
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For these reasons, officers claimed, it was only the act of a prudent and humane
officer to ban soldiers from entering certain houses where liquor was known to be
sold, to violently turn out from the camp women suspected of being prostitutes, and
to keep men’s pay for them and dispense it only when a soldier wanted to purchase
an item that the officer thought necessary or beneficial. Cuthbertson claimed that it
was necessary to have enlisted men’s clothing entirely under their officers’ control
because of soldiers' inability to choose clothing correctly: for instance, if an officer
allowed his soldiers to choose their own shoes, “every Soldier will certainly indulge
his own particular taste, in the fashion of shoes, without considering any other
advantage,” and end up with shoes unsuitable for long marches and other military
needs.88 Similarly, it was necessary to regulate soldiers’ absences from the
regiment. With their captain’s permission, Cuthbertson explained, soldiers might
occasionally be allowed a leave of absence, but never for more than three months; if
they were gone for a longer time, he warned, “they might form connections very
prejudicial to that sort of spirit, which should actuate the conduct of every good
Soldier.”89
Any respite from the regime of control was dangerous, in Cuthbertson’s view—
not only travel, but illness might challenge the army’s authority. Therefore, “Soldiers
should never be sent to an Hospital for trifles, nor detained in it longer than is
absolutely necessary for their cure, as they are too often apt to contract a habit of
idleness, and a dislike for returning to their Duty,” and “every method must be used,

drunkenness by the rich as a private vice, while drunkenness by the poor was a threat to the social
order.
88. Bennett Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of
Infantry (Dublin, 1768), 98.
89. Cuthbertson, 167-169.
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to detect their pretending sickness, merely for the sake of avoiding Duty or
exercise.”90
This insistence on control went to the point of insisting on their right to regulate
soldiers’ bedtime: Cuthbertson recommended that the orderly Serjeant of each
company be sent around "after Tattoo-beating" (the signal for the soldiers to retire
to their quarters, and for “The Publick Houses…to shut their Doors, and sell no more
Liquor that Night,”91 generally 8 p.m. in the winter and 10 p.m. in the summer) to
"insist on all fire and candle being extinguished," because "late hours must be
discouraged, else the morals of a Regiment will soon be destroyed."92
Soldiers’ supposed inability to manage their financial affairs also justified officers’
need to regulate enlisted travel. It was entirely for their own benefit, Cuthbertson
claimed: “[F]rom an eagerness to see their friends,” soldiers might “inconsiderately
request a leave of absence,” without taking into account “whether they are in
circumstances, sufficient to maintain them, during their absence, without becoming a
burthen” to their hosts. Therefore, to avoid the journey turning into “a distress to
both parties,” officers ought to refuse soldiers permission to travel unless they were
convinced that it was financially feasible. If the wise and kindly officer made sure to
explain his reasoning, and did not do so “in a harsh or austere manner,” Cuthbertson
assured the reader, the soldier would perceive “that his interest and advantage are
the only causes of the denial,” and “instead of being discontented, he will be rather
thankful to his Officer.”93
In the case of their clothing, enlisted men were actually dependent on their
officers. The government paid each regimental colonel a sum of money with which
90. Cuthbertson, 60-61.
91. Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 173.
92. Cuthbertson, 45.
93. Cuthbertson, 168.
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to clothe his regiment as he saw fit. While some colonels prided themselves on
losing significant amounts of money on this transaction as they outfitted their troops
with extravagant uniforms, others saw it as a handy source of profit and chose to
clothe their troops as economically as possible, or, sometimes entirely neglected to
provide them with any the clothing they were owed.94
This economic control could easily be connected with moral regulation. Captain
Neil McLeane of the 84th was tried for neglecting his duty as an officer by failing to
provide the soldiers in his company with “necessaries.” This term referred to the
smaller items of clothing—shirts, shoes, stockings—that made up a soldier’s uniform,
which were to be supplied as needed by the soldier’s company officer. (This was in
contrast to “regimentals”—the red coat, breeches, and waistcoat, and hat, which
were supplied by the colonel.) The regiment’s major reported that he had given
orders that the 84th was to be properly provided with clothing, as it might be sent on
march at short notice, but that he had seen several examples of soldiers in
McLeane’s company who did not have the proper clothing. In particular, the major
cited a soldier who "came to him to complain that he had no Shoes to March in, and
that one of the Shoes he had was tied to his Foot by a bit of Packthread.” When the
major ordered Captain McLeane to provide the man shoes, he had refused, telling
him that “he was not oblig'd to furnish every Vagabond with Necessaries.”95
McLeane’s defense rested on his right to judge whether the clothing his men had
was sufficient or not, and which of his men were deserving of being clothed by him.
He claimed that the soldier’s shoes were sufficient for the march, as “the Roads were

94. Lord Percy and Lord Cornwallis were known for outfitting their regiments splendidly out of their own
pockets, while other colonels fought with their successors over who had the right to profit from
clothing the regiment. Soldiers were also often subject to pay deductions for ornamental clothing, or
unique regimental accessories ordered by the colonel, but paid for from soldiers' pay. Steppler, "The
Common Soldier in the Reign of George III, 1760-1793," 82-83, 50.
95. WO 71/56, pp. 255-259.
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very good” and that he had “known Soldiers March further in worse Shoes than those
he then wore.”96 McLeane dismissed his men’s claims against him by asserting that
they owed him money. Roberts, the soldier who applied to him for shoes, “was
nineteen Shillings in debt to him” and furthermore, McLeane “knew him generally to
sufficiently stock’d with necessaries.” Taken together, these made a moral
judgment: Roberts was constantly draining his purse with unnecessary demands for
clothing and shoes. In the case of Private Higgins, who also applied to McLeane for
necessaries, McLeane was even more explicit: Higgins was known to be "a bad Man
in many respects particularly as a Thief.” Moreover, Higgins was “considerably in
debt,” especially because McLeane had recently been forced to pay “Five and twenty
or Thirty Shillings to an Inhabitant of the Parish of St. Genevieve for a Sheep and a
number of Fowls that he had Stolen there.” Given this unpromising history, McLeane
claimed, he “therefore was very unwilling to furnish him with any more necessaries
than barely to keep him clean.”97
These disputes about clothing, in which officers asserted their right to control the
economic and material lives of the the soldiers under their command as part of their
‘natural’ moral authority over them, were part of a larger system for controlling
behavior by using economic dependence to enforce deference and obedience to
officers. A private's pay, with which he was to buy his food and other equipment,
and pay for his washing, was 8d. per day, but 6d. was the amount actually paid to
soldiers. 2d. was withheld for "off-reckonings,” the primary financial perquisite of
the regiment’s proprietary colonel; supposedly it was the money given by the soldier
to his colonel in return for the colonel supplying him with clothing and weapons.98
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And even the 6d. per day was paid at the discretion of his officers, and could be
stopped to pay any debts he might have incurred to his officers, or simply if his
officers thought he would not spend it wisely.
Officers stopped pay from their men in custom amounts, according to their
opinion of the character of each soldier.99 This was supposed to be a class-based
right: Cuthbertson warned officers that sergeants (who often had the actual charge
of disbursing enlisted men’s pay, it being considered too tedious a task for the
officers) were not to have any economic power in the regiment: “a Serjeant, who on
any pretence, advances a farthing to a Soldier, without an order for it, should be
reduced, as they are not to be the judges, when such a thing is proper.”100
Thomas Thompson of the Royal Artillery was sentenced to 500 lashes for his
“insolent behaviour” in asking for his own pay. Upon asking his commanding officer,
Captain John Stewart, for the prize money due him for his role in capturing a frigate,
Stewart noted that Thompson lacked the full complement of shirts and stockings,
and told him that his money would instead be used to make up new clothing for him.
Any leftover funds, he added, would be given "to his Pay Master Serjeant, to be laid
out in Necessaries as he might want them.” And he made it clear that this was a
particular judgment on Thompson: “foreseeing from the Prisoner's Character and
usual Conduct, he would very soon be in want of Necessaries, and he not fit to be
trusted with buying them himself...he stopt what would have remained of the Prize
Money."101
Claims that soldiers used any money they were given as an opportunity to get
drunk provided many justifications for officers to prevent soldiers from having much
99. Steppler, "The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III, 1760-1793," 66-67.
100.Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry,
27.
101.WO 71/88, p. 227
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money and sabotaging any attempts to gain financial independence. Wolfe claimed
that “The shameful drunkenness observed among the men, on pay-days in
particular, is thought in a great measure to proceed from their not putting in a
proportion of their pay regularly into their messes,” suggesting that not only did
soldiers spend all their pay on liquor, but that they neglected to buy food for
themselves in order to get drunk.102 Thus, officers claimed that it was necessary to
insist that their pay was used for provisions.103
“[E]very Pay-Day,” Bland advised, “each Man should be oblig'd to appropriate
such a Part of his Pay to buy Provisions.” Were this not done, “the Soldiers will be
apt to spend their Pay on Liquors, which will not only occasion their Neglect of Duty,
but, in all Probability, the Loss of a great many Men by Sickness for Want of proper
Victuals to support them.”104 Bland was suggesting that the enlisted men were not
competent to feed themselves, and would fall sick and die from malnutrition without
officers supervising them.
However, a greater obstacle for a private seeking to keep himself adequately fed
was the fact that his pay was not actually sufficient for the task.105 And officers were
often not particularly concerned with providing adequate provisions when it would
result in the soldier contracting debts that the officer would ultimately be liable for.
When three soldiers were tried for stealing an ox and slaughtering it for food, they
defended themselves by claiming that they did it because they had not been
provided with enough food by their officer, Captain Charles McClean of the 43rd
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Regiment of Foot. McClean responded that he had supplied the men with vegetables
“till they became scarce and too Expensive for a Soldier, when this was the case I
saw no use in giving Men, much in Debt more Money than was necessary to keep
them Clean.”106
The problem of soldiers’ inadequate pay could be mitigated to some extent by
their ability to supplement their earnings with additional labor. Some were employed
within the regiment as tailors, shoemakers, and officers' servants, while others took
on outside employment as laborers when they were off duty.107 However,
opportunities for additional labor were also ways for officers to assert economic
control. Cuthbertson recommended that “When a Soldier is permitted to work, the
whole of his pay should remain in his Captain's hands, to supply the extraordinary
consumption of linen, etc. which his working must occasion.” He then tried to frame
the confiscation of the entirety of a soldier’s wages as “a regulation, so
advantageous for his own interest” and claimed that any soldier who refused to
comply made it obvious that “drink alone, is the object, for which he labours, and
therefore he should be struck off, from any further indulgence of that kind.”108 This
blithe assumption that a soldier unwilling to surrender the whole of his pay to his
supervisors must be using the money for drink, and thus rendered himself unworthy
of being allowed to work, neatly provided officers a way to negate any financial
advantage to be gained from independent work.
Paternalism served as a moral justification for the subordination of the enlisted,
but also provided a justification for domination through physical violence and gave it
an aura of righteousness. It was Captain Payne’s standard defense to the numerous
106.WO 71/88, p. 227.
107.Steppler, "The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III, 1760-1793," 79-81.
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complaints of soldiers under his command, who complained that he had unjustly
confined them, or had struck them or committed other physical assaults on them.
Payne never denied that he had done so. However, he did not justify his behavior by
appealing to military manuals and treatises that emphasized the necessity of this
treatment due to the hardened and unrepentant nature of some enlisted soldiers.
Instead, he claimed it as his paternal right. His defense rested on two points: first,
that every man he punished had deserved it due to “Disobedience & Mis-conduct,”
and—just as a father must chastise a misbehaving child—to strike them was not just
his right but also his duty. Second, not only was he acting in the role of a paternal
disciplinarian, he was also acting as a wise and humane patriarch, far-seeing enough
to realized that if his charges were not punished for their crimes, it would merely
lead them into worse behavior and more dangerous consequences: “The Truth is,
any Strokes I may have given were intended more to frighten than to hurt, and have
been the means of saving them from more severe and disgraceful Punishment,”
Payne explained, claiming that his casual blows were done for the men’s own good,
to prevent their unwise behavior from leading to a court-martial and flogging.109 The
author of one satirical military manual advised colonels that “You are to consider
yourself as the father of your corps, and must take care to exercise a paternal
authority over it: as a good father does not spare the rod, so should not a
commanding officer spare the cat-of-nine tails.”110
And not only did Payne defend his striking of the soldiers under his command by
claiming it was fatherly chastisement done for the soldier’s own good, he also
appealed to the soldiers themselves to uphold Payne’s judgment in choosing to strike
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them. Payne called upon the enlisted men of his company (that is, those of them
who had not yet deserted or already been called by the prosecution to tearfully
testify to his cruelty) and demanded to know whether they had been struck by him
and, if so, the circumstances under which it had occurred. Private John Lambton
obligingly deposed that “Capt. Payne once struck him, but however he does not
know but that he might deserve it as he might give him some provoking language.”
Corporal Graham, too, admitted he had been struck by Captain Payne, and, upon
Lieutenant Fowler pointedly asking him if he “look[ed] upon that as good usage?”
answered that “He could not look upon it as bad usage, as he told Capt. Payne a lie
to his face, and when he argued with him that he was in the right, the Deponent
persisted that he himself was in the right, although he know that he was wrong.”
Isaac Hotson, a private who also acted as Payne’s servant, was asked if Payne had
not “often struck and cruelly beat him,” but replied that he was “struck by Capt.
Payne, when he deserved it.”111 Thus, in contrast to officers, who were independent
adult males who could never “deserve” to be struck, for whom every blow was an
insult punishable by death, enlisted soldiers were given the status of children, who
could legitimately be assaulted in retribution for their misdeeds.
One part of ensuring that enlisted men remained in the subordinate role of
symbolic children was to negate the traditional cultural and social power that soldiers
enjoyed because they were men. If soldiers were looking back to older models of
masculinity, asserting male privilege over their wives and defending the rights
associated with marriage against the interference of other men would be a key
component in upholding their conception of masculinity.112 Attacking these
111.WO 71/81, pp. 79-80, 60.
112.Karen Harvey, "The History of Masculinity, Circa 1650–1800", Journal of British Studies 44, no. 2
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marriage-based rights, on the other hand, would help higher-status men (officers)
assert their dominance.
Officers undermined the older code of patriarchy by discouraging marriage for
enlisted soldiers, thus barring them from one of the traditional social markers of
patriarchal status, but also by interfering with the marital relations of the soldiers
who did manage to marry by controlling their wives’ labor, food, and ability to live
with their spouses. Officers also made no effort to uphold the traditional marital
privileges of enlisted men by recognizing their exclusive right to sexual access to
their wives.
Simes’ Military Guide advised commanders to prevent “the inconveniencies and
ill consequences produced” by soldiers’ marriages, “for their wives are in general so
abandoned, as frequently to occasion quarrels, drunkenness, diseases, and
desertions; they involve their husbands in debt; and too oft are the ruin and
destruction of a soldier.”113 It was quite common for officers to forbid the men under
their command from marrying, or introducing barriers to marriage, with the
justification that enlisted men were not capable of judging the character of a
potential wife properly. Wolfe insisted that enlisted men receive permission to marry
from their officers so that "the Woman's Character may be enquired into" first. He
claimed that "many women in the regiment are very inconvenient, especially as
some of them are not so industrious, nor so useful to their husbands, as a soldier's
wife ought to be."114 They wrapped their control of soldiers’ marriages in the
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language of paternal concern. Officers were "incontestably" better judges of
marriages than their men, Cuthbertson claimed, and they, “being a sort of Guardians
to the Men in their respective Companies, should use every means, that prudence
can suggest, to prevent the distress and ruin, which so often attends their
contracting Marriages with women, in every respect unfit for them.”115
He added that soldiers who failed to heed the advice of their officers and were
“imprudent enough to marry” unapproved women justly deserved to be punished for
their “folly and disobedience.”116 Wolfe promised that any soldier who presumed “to
marry clandestinely,” or neglected to “consult his officer before his marriage” would
be “punished with rigour.”117 Cuthbertson also advised that officers should attempt
to break up unsuitable marriages, and suggested several methods that might serve:
he, who contrary to all advice and order, will engage in a
dishonourable connection, exclusive of any punishment he may
receive, for such contempt and insolence, should as much as
possible be discouraged, by obliging him, not only to mess, but lie
in the Quarters of the Company he belongs to, at the same time,
that his wife is prevented, from partaking of any advantage either
from his Pay or Quarters: this severity, of course, must soon expell
her from the Regiment, and be the certain means, of making other
Soldiers cautious, how they attempt such acts of disobedience.118
Historians have primarily seen the discouragement of marriage by commanders
as stemming from military needs. Although they recognized the need to allow wives
to accompany the army to nurse and wash for the men, and to recruit married men
and to keep them from deserting, officers were not enthusiastic about the presence
of women and treated them, at best, with resignation, considering them a necessary
115.Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry,
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evil. Officers didn't like women accompanying the army, claiming that they spread
venereal disease, illicitly sold liquor to soldiers, and cost both the army and the
individual soldier too much in rations for themselves and their children.119 Examining
the treatment of soldiers’ wives through this purely military lens leads historians to
question the inability of the British high command to value women for the labor they
provided to the army as nurses and laundresses, and to be somewhat puzzled by
commanders’ recurring characterizations of all women who accompanied the army as
an undifferentiated mass of diseased prostitutes despite the historians’ conclusion
that the majority of them were “respectable wives.”120
But when one considers the historic role of marriage as a necessary marker for
establishing a man’s status as a patriarch, the interest of officers wishing to
undermine the male privileges of the soldiers under their command by denying
enlisted men the ability to marry or by de-legitimizing enlisted men’s marital
relationships becomes apparent. By classifying the soldier as a bachelor, his
employers could justify lower pay (because he did not need to support a family) and
increased control (because of the historic link between independent manhood and
marriage/house-holding).121 Marriage often meant economic gain for the newlywed
soldier if his wife had the means to earn an income from washing or nursing, or,
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most lucrative of all, a suttling license permitting her to sell goods to the men of the
regiment.122 More importantly, marriage gave men patriarchal authority in the form
of dependents to rule, support, control, and protect. By denying soldiers this marker
of adulthood and authority, officers prevented them from accessing the cultural and
social power that would otherwise accrue to them as adult men.123
Officers failed adequately distinguish between legitimately-married women and
prostitutes, because this very ability to conflate these two groups gave officers
considerable power. When Private Elijah Reeves protested his officers’ interference
with his visits to his own wife’s house, Captain Mawby denied that Reeves was
actually married to her, describing how Reeves had written improper pleas to be
allowed to “go to his Wife (as he call’d her).” When Reeves produced a marriage
certificate, he called into question its legitimacy. He also pointed out that Reeves
never sought permission to marry his wife, and that an order was given “that women
who were married to Soldiers of the Regiment without Leave, should not be regarded
as wives but only as followers of the Regiment.”
By asserting the right to determine whether a woman was a wife or not contrary
to the opinion of civil and religious authorities, officers gave themselves the option of
122.Hurl-Eamon, Marriage and the British Army in the Long Eighteenth Century, 115; Simes, The Military
Instructor, 44, permitted sergeants to profit from their duty to supply their men with linen clothing,
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Warfare in Anglo-America, 1754-1815, ed. Julie Flavell and Stephen Conway (Gainesville: University
Press of Florida, 2004), 53, notes another way for men to profit from their wives’ labor: expanding their
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responsibilities of married men: “the army usurped the role of paterfamilias by providing food and often
shelter and by intervening in family and sexual life as a matter of discipline, even to the extreme of
causing de facto divorces by ordering women from camps for infractions.” Douglas M Peers, "Privates
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denying the enlisted soldier the right to protect the woman to whom he was married,
and to give her the status and protections afforded by marriage, thereby making
women in relationships with soldiers common prostitutes and lewd women (subject
to use and abuse by men generally) rather than respectable wives (only subject to
their husbands).
Payne’s treatment of Corporal Greer’s wife suggested this tactic: He ordered her,
as well as some other soldiers’ wives, to leave the barracks, ordering the drummers
and Sergeant Smith, to lead her out of the barracks. Smith started to escort Mrs.
Greer away accompanied by the drummers, but “Capt. Payne came running up to
him,” and demanded that he “take hold of that woman and lead her before the
drums.” Because he “never heard any body speak ill of her,” Smith did not “rightly
understand” Payne’s intention at first: he had merely walked with Mrs. Greer beside
the drums. But Payne actually wanted her to be forced to march before the beating
drums, making use of the traditional disgraceful method used to announce the
forcible ejection of a woman from a military encampment because she was
prostitute.124

Payne’s other threats of legal action to soldiers’ wives similarly denied

their status as wives and respectable women. Mrs. McLaughlin related that he has
threatened to “put her in Bridewell,” a reference to the London prison which
specialized in confining and reforming common prostitutes and other “disorderly
women.”125
So long as an enlisted man was under an officer’s command, his wife was
subject his officer’s approval. Officers could determine whether he was permitted to
live with her, whether she was to be allowed in the barracks, and even whether he
was allowed to visit her. Commanders' power to eject women from the military
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camp made it important for women to keep on good terms; a vindictive officer could
destroy family ties and leave women destitute.126
Officers paraded the power that they had to damage enlisted men's marital
relationships: Major Samuel Montgomery of the 12th reminded Corporal Jamieson of
the many favors he had done for him and his wife before telling him that his current
"Conduct was such, as to forfeit all further claim to his protection, either on his own
account or that of his Wife; and that if his behaviour in future was not better, the
Major would prevent his Wife, or his Family" from living with him in the future.

127

When Jamieson was later tried for attempting to murder the Major, he claimed that
the Major's treatment of his family had driven him mad.128
Commanders asserted their power to dissolve the bonds of marriage in practice if
not in law: Lt. Col. William Eyre, commanding the 44th Foot at Fort Niagara, had
engaged the wife of Serjeant Cameron to do his washing. However, having found
her skills as a laundress unsatisfactory, he ordered that she should be turned out of
the garrison. When Cameron protested this treatment of his wife, Eyre responded
that although he "was no Bishop or Pope, therefore could not take upon him to
divorce the wife from the Husband, but he swore she never should come where he
had anything of a command."129 The commander of Fort Stanwix, trying to suppress
sales of rum, issued an order warning the “Married Women” at the fort that if they
were caught, he would “turn them out of their Hutts…Cut them of the King's
Provision & chase them Shamefully away.” He made an acknowledgment of their
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marriage, immediately followed by a threat that emphasized officers' ability to
negate the protections traditionally conferred by that status.130
Officers’ power also demonstrated the inability of soldiers to protect their wives
from physical violence. Women serving as nurses or in other regimental jobs
mandated by the army during wartime were vulnerable not only to disease, but also
faced the threat of being captured or killed.131 Furthermore, they were subject to the
same harsh military discipline as their husbands. Soldiers’ wives were flogged or
whipped for disobeying orders, either from the summary judgment of the provost
martial or from after being convicted at a court-martial. Being punished in the same
manner as men both denied them the protections of feminine status and dishonored
their husbands, because these punishments exposed their bodies to public view.132
Officers could interfere even more directly with marital relationships by making
sexual advances toward soldiers’ wives. Daniel Morison, a surgeon’s mate of the 60th
Regiment stationed at Michilimackinac from 1769 to 1772, kept a diary that
consisted primarily of a litany of complaints about the behavior of another officer
there, Ensign Johnstone: he “Vaunted he had Carnal dealings with Mrs. Oldham”;
another wife claimed that “he used uncommon libertys with her Character”; and he
“attempted a rape on a girl betwixt nine & ten Years of age,” the daughter of a
soldier and his wife who lived in the barracks. The child was spared only because
“Her shrieking out Violently alarmed her step-father, Arthur Ross, & others in the
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barracks.”133 Private Reeves claimed that “Capt. Chapman sent to his Wife…to come
to his Quarters & when she came there, he Locked the Doors and wanted to lay with
her,” but was prevented when her shouts caught the attention of the landlord. Ever
since that incident, Reeves claimed, Chapman and the other officers of the 18th had
held “a spite against the woman.”134 Ensign Johnstone, too, used his rank to make
life difficult for those who resisted his advances; Morison recorded the plight of “John
Savage, Taylor & Soldier in the general's Company,” who “had the Door of his house
forced open [and was] committed to the guard-house for not suffering his wife to
comply with obscene propositions made to her.”135
Interference with soldiers’ wives and their marriages was a way of denying men’s
patriarchal authority and establishing hierarchies of dominance because officers were
interfering in an institution with so much cultural power. Raping a soldier’s wife or
child blatantly proclaimed his inability to act effectively as a protector and thereby
deeply undermined his male identity.136
Because officers’ interference in enlisted marriages so often took the form of
denying wives rations, expelling them from military camps, accusing them of being
prostitutes, and sexual and other violence towards them, historians have commonly

133.Daniel Morison, The Doctor's Secret Journal (Fort Mackinac Division Press, 1960), 63, 57, 62.
134.WO 71/79, p. 165. Also, LO 2826, for a petition by an enlisted soldier to the Duke of Marlborough,
claiming that he had been demoted because his wife had refused to sleep with his Captain (cited in
Kopperman, "The British High Command and Soldier s Wives in America, 1755-1783," 18).
135.Morison, The Doctor's Secret Journal, 57.
136.Sharon Block, "Rape Without Women: Print Culture and the Politicization of Rape, 1765-1815", The
Journal of American History 89, no. 3 (2002): pp. 849-868, notes the common perception that the
victim of a rape was not so much the violated woman, but her male protector, who was dishonored by
her rape. See also: Robin Griller and Jessica Warner, "’My Pappa Is Out, and My Mamma Is Asleep.’
Minors, Their Routine Activities and Interpersonal Violence in An Early Modern Town, 1653-1781,"
Journal of Social History 36, no. 3 (2003): 561-584, in which the father of a twelve year old who had
been sexually assault suggested that “what was really at issue was not so much his daughter's safety
as his own honor.” And WO 71/79, pp. 7-8, 13: After Ensign McDermott was accused of raping the
young daughter of another oﬃcer, the other oﬃcers of his regiment asked him how he could treat a
“Brother Oﬃcer” in such a cruel manner, and fretted about how to keep him from encountering the
victim’s father, “whom he was suspected to have iǌured in so particular a manner” and “in so tender a
point.”
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interpreted it as an expression of misogyny and part of a larger patriarchal project in
the army to subordinate or exclude women.137 I argue that in the eighteenth-century
British army, when officers broke up marriages, separated wives from husbands, and
inflicted economic, social, and sexual violence upon army women, their goal was not,
in fact, to subjugate women. Rather, this misogyny was a byproduct of men’s
attempts to oppress other men.
Officers were not concerned with the enforcement of an ideology that demanded
the fundamental subordination of women to men, but instead sought the
subordination of lower-status men to high-status men. Lower-class women could be
privileged over lower-class men when officers wanted to subordinate the latter, and
in fact this was a common tactic they used. Officers could and did undermine
soldiers’ authority over their wives without inflicting any overt violence upon the
women themselves; they could publicize soldiers’ lack of masculinity by interfering in
their marriages not only through the acts of expelling soldiers’ wives from the camp
or raping them, but also by protecting them. Quite often, this took the form of
interfering in soldiers’ marital violence.138 Because of the link between violence and
masculinity, violence against a wife or other dependents was a way of establishing a
man’s dominance, and publicly preventing a man from beating his wife undermined
his claim to exercise authority over his own wife and household.139 By using the
rhetoric of humanity and tenderness for the gentler sex to justify lessening lower137.Way, "Venus and Mars: Women and the British-American Army in the Seven Years' War," 43-44,
argues that the army put soldiers in the role of “dependent children,” and that “the patriarchal army
validated its unique claim on men by conceptually divorcing them from women. Conceiving of the
feminine as corrupting of discipline and parasitical of resources, the army sought to eliminate women
from its masculine world. Militaristic misogyny was a necessary complement to martial endeavor.”
138.Way, "Venus and Mars: Women and the British-American Army in the Seven Years' War," 58-60,
describes a commander’s order that an enlisted man move out of the rooms for married soldiers and
into the barracks, while his wife was allowed to remain, citing his abusive behavior towards his wife as
justification.
139.Joanne Bailey, "'I Dye [sic] by Inches': Locating Wife Beating in the Concept of a Privatization of
Marriage and Violence in Eighteenth-Century England", Social History 31, no. 3 (2006): 273-294.
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status men's authority over their dependents, officers could also raise their own
status and reputation by this portrayal of themselves as men of sensibility and
compassion, and better judges than the domineering husband of what sort of
treatment the wronged wife deserved.140
The inability to protect one's dependent women from rape was a marker of a
shameful lack of masculine agency. However, the defining factor in what made a
wife or child’s rape shameful was not that another man had sex with a woman under
his protection without her consent, but that another man had sex with the woman
without his consent. No violence needed to be offered to the woman. Indeed, a lack
of violent coercion might even serve the purpose more effectively, as a man whose
wife had been seduced rather than raped was far more limited in his options for both
violent retaliation and legal redress. In addition to his attempts to rape the women
of the garrison at Michilimackinac, Ensign Johnstone also made sexual advances
towards soldiers’ wives without using overt violence. Morison reported that he had
“Attempted to sow Discord betwixt George McBeath and his wife to whom he offered
one hundred pounds &c provideing she would take up with him & quit her
husband.”141 Mrs. McBeath refused his offer, but Johnstone found soon found a more
willing participant:
Ens. Johnstone decoyed away Sergt. Carlile's wife, which he has
been contriveing to accomplish many months before this finishing
stroake, & tho' her husband was like to break his Heart, and crying
out his Eyes on the occasion. Yet no Remonstrances would be
payed the least attention to.… [He] sleeped with her that night in

140.Jennine Hurl-Eamon, "'I Will Forgive You If the World Will': Wife-Murder and Limits on Patriarchal
Violence in London, 1690-1750," in Violence, Politics and Gender in Early Modern England, ed. Joseph
Patrick Ward (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), in concluding that there were real limits on early
modern patriarchs' ability to inflict violence on their wives, seems to ignore the class dimension. Her
examples of men’s intervention into other men’s marital violence does not acknowledge the
implications of the fact that many of the men who intervened were of higher social status—justices of
the peace, or men who employed the battered wives as servants.
141.Morison, The Doctor's Secret Journal, 63.
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his new room where he lives with her still, without dread or
shame, while the poor Husband is left in such a disconsolate
situation that is not easy to describe.142
And officers refused to censure any of their own for violating traditional
conceptions of a man’s marital rights when the violated man was an enlisted soldier.
Lieutenant George Quin was accused of improper behavior after his commander
received a letter from a captain in another regiment concerned about rumors that
Mrs. Davis, the wife of one of his regiment's sergeants, "eloped from her husband
this day, & has robbed him of Fifty Guineas & most of his Cloathes,” and had been
seen “this Morning in Mr. Quin’s Room.” But the officer’s primary concern was that
the stolen property be tracked down, so “that the poor Man who is an Invalid may
recover his Money.” Quin admitted that the woman had told him “that if he would
Support her, she would come & live with him, for she did not chuse to stay any
longer with her Husband,” and that he had agreed to support her, but that he had
warned her not “to bring any Money or Wearing Apparel” with her when she left her
husband. Once Quin had satisfied his brother officers that he had no intention of
defrauding the husband by claiming any of the Davis property, any further complaint
that he had acted improperly was dismissed as “frivolous.” Quin was apparently still
openly living with the woman when he was tried and acquitted.143
Whereas men had generally been acknowledged to have certain rights and
privileges over the women to whom they were married, to take charge of their
financial affairs and determine where they would live, to regulate their sexual
conduct and to correct their behavior, officers refused to respect or even
acknowledge this authority when it came to the relationships between enlisted
soldiers under his command and their wives. They asserted power over soldiers’
142.Morison, The Doctor's Secret Journal, 57.
143.WO 71/96, pp. 158-224.
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wives, women who would otherwise be under the jurisdiction of their husbands, and
increased their own authority by denying enlisted men’s right to control their wives’
bodies and their marital rights. They did not do so without significant opposition.
Enlisted men vigorously resisted what they saw as the infringement of their
fundamental rights as men and as husbands, and sought to retain as much male
privilege as possible.144
Certain social relations of asymmetrical power already had an established history
in eighteenth century Britain—that the wealthy rightfully had the authority to direct
the actions of the poor, that fathers rightfully exercised authority over their children,
that those of superior morals had the right to superintend those whose weaker
natures inclined them to criminality. Borrowing from more traditional systems for
organizing power and using these accepted relations of inequality to frame and
justify the principles of military subordination allowed the military hierarchy to
operate within wider, mutually reinforcing systems of power.
Closely linking patriarchal authority, wealth, class, military authority, privilege,
and moral authority allowed the army to uphold the economic and social dependence
of enlisted men and their deference to officers. The army’s hierarchy denied the
ability of enlisted men to regulate their own lives and put them in the subordinate
role of the perpetual child rather than allowing them to exercise the privileges of
independent manhood that might otherwise accrue to them as adult men.
But even as civilian social hierarchies were used to support military hierarchies,
claims of military need allowed officers to justify coercive interference in enlisted
lives that ultimately served to uphold and strengthen existing social hierarchies. By
positing their interventions as necessary for the proper functioning of the army,

144.Hurl-Eamon, Marriage and the British Army in the Long Eighteenth Century, 5, explores the “surprising
resilience of partnerships severed by war and army anti-marriage policies.”
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officers could justify interference in matters that would not be acceptable even in the
highly-stratified class system of civilian society, such as meddling in men’s marital
relationships. The class hierarchy supported the military hierarchy, but this also
worked the other way around: the military hierarchy was used to shore up faltering
social hierarchies of deference. The army’s demands for bodily control supported
tactical movement on the battlefield, but also could be used to support the class
hierarchy. When Cuthbertson wrote that “Soldiers should be instructed, never to
avoid their Officers, through design, but rather to put themselves in the way of being
seen, that they may have an opportunity of shewing their respect,” by elaborately
saluting them, he was seeing an opportunity to use military practice and the military
system of coercive discipline to increase, display, and solidify the distinctions
between two social classes as well as two military ranks.145
The goal was to collapse the multiple systems for organizing authority and power
in the civilian world into a very simple one, with just two levels: the officers, and the
enlisted. Subordinating the enlisted by assaulting their masculinity—insisting that
they were to be obedient not only because of their lowly military rank, but because
they were economically dependent on their officers, unable to regulate their own
behavior without an officer to enforce morality, and ought to be seen as akin to
children rather than adult men—allowed the officers to exercise extreme power over
enlisted soldiers. But it ultimately left army officers unable to effectively advocate
for the subordination of lower-ranked men who were officers rather than enlisted
men, for subordination had now been conclusively linked with low status, denial of
male privilege, and a lack of proper masculinity.

145.Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry,
181.
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Chapter 3: Above the Law

“When a young gentleman betakes himself to the profession of
arms, he should seriously reflect upon the nature and duties of the
way of life he has entered into, and consider, that it is not as the
generality of people vainly imagine, learning a little of the
exercise, saluting gracefully, firing his platoon in his turn,
mounting a few guards (carelessly enough) and finally, exposing
his person bravely in the day of battle; which will deservedly, and
in the opinion of judges, acquire him the character of a good
officer: no, he must learn chearfully to obey his superiors, and that
their orders and his own be punctually executed.146
So opened General James Wolfe’s “Instructions for Young Officers,” a work later
compiled with his other writings and orders and published in a hagiographic volume
after his glorious death upon the Plains of Abraham. And Wolfe was not alone
among senior officers and military writers in his repeated admonitions to young men
desiring military careers to take note of the importance of obedience, not only for the
enlisted soldiers of the army, but also for the officers themselves.
In regard to this latter group, writers seemed to assume that even the most
obvious principles of military subordination were not readily apparent to the aspiring
officer. “Orders must be obeyed,” one treatise on military discipline advised, along
with an explanation that a military force could not function without “A due deference
to our Superiors” and showing the proper “attention, submission and respect to all
those whom his Majesty shall think fit to place above us.”147 This treatise then went
on to warn officers against entering into conspiracies against their commanding
officers.148

146.Wolfe, General Wolfe's Instructions to Young Oﬃcers Also His Orders for a Battalion and An Army, 1.
147.Richard Lambart, A New System of Military Discipline, Founded Upon Principle (London, 1773), 29-30.
148.Lambart, A New System of Military Discipline, 252-253.
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Such entreaties for officers’ obedience in prescriptive works suggest an army
which had considerable difficulty enforcing a military hierarchy of subordination and
obedience, not only (or even primarily) between the officers and the enlisted
soldiers, but among the officers themselves. And this suggestion is confirmed by
army and government records demonstrating that junior officers were insubordinate
to their seniors, and senior officers were insubordinate to the crown.149 Similarly,
records of officers’ courts-martial are replete with examples of officers’ gross
insubordination, disobedience of orders, neglect of their duties, and violent quarrels
with each other.
These problems with subordination were the consequences of borrowing existing
frameworks of deference and hierarchy to support military authority. Linking (as
shown in the previous chapter) subordination and obedience to being lower-class and
un-masculine had allowed the army to support a rigid class divide that allowed the
officer class to consolidate their power over the enlisted soldiers under their
command. However, it came at the cost of greatly weakening the army’s power to
extract obedience from the officers themselves, as these men now considered
subordination and obedience to be lower-class and un-masculine.
Thus, there was need for a compromise, some way to make subordination
palatable to the officer class. Officers claimed that they were deserving of particular
powers and privileges because of their innate status as gentlemen. This appealed to
many officers because it had the advantage of putting junior officers on a level of
social equality with their superiors, and subtly undermined the the ability of the
officers at the top of the military hierarchy to exercise authority over officers lower
on that hierarchy. The compromise proposed was that officers had two characters:

149.Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline: Oﬃcership and Administration in the British Army, 1714-63, 37-42.
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that of the military officer, which was public, subject to military regulation, and
dependent on the needs of the service; and that of the gentleman, which was
private, not to be exposed to public view against his will, and an area into which the
military had no rights to intrude.150 Even military authors who insisted on the
supreme importance of obedience conceded this distinction: “The private and the
public man must ever be distinguished,” one wrote, in a section otherwise devoted to
insisting on officers’ proper subordination to their superiors.151 Yet conceding that
gentlemen had the right to have unregulated private lives did not resolve the
conflict; it merely shifted its terms, displacing the dispute over subordination into a
dispute about whether or not an officer’s insubordinate behavior was public or
private.
Junior officers naturally insisted that their often unmilitary and insubordinate
behavior only occurred while they were acting as private gentlemen, and their
superiors countered with arguments that officers’ actions did in fact affect the wellbeing of the regiments, and thus ought to be subject to military regulation. But
junior officers argued strenuously for their immunity to regulation on the grounds of
their high social class. Being subject to rules and orders, they suggested, was
tantamount to oppression or even slavery; such treatment was perhaps fit for the
men of the lower classes, but an officer ought to above such petty regulation. In
fact, they claimed, being above the law was an essential marker of their high class
and their gentlemanly status, and when their superiors insisted on their cheerful

150.See Louise Carter, "British Masculinities on Trial in the Queen Caroline Aﬀair of 1820", Gender &
History 20, no. 2 (2008): 248-269, on the separation between public and private life as a particularly
aristocratic claim; at the end of the eighteenth century and especially in the nineteenth century, the
rising middle class sought to strengthen their own cultural power and reverse the trend of the 17th and
18th centuries that saw the privileges of manhood increasingly concentrated in the upper class by
asserting that there was no such divide, and that private vice made a man unfit for public oﬃce.
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obedience to orders, they were undermining officers’ status as well as the class
divisions on which the army depended.
Essential to these claims of being above the law was a strict distinction between a
man’s two roles: he was both an officer and a gentleman, but rarely both at the
same time. This was the basis of the protest made by Captain Patrick Wauchope and
Captain James Higginson of the 50th Regiment when they were court-martialed in
Plymouth in 1781 for “Sowing the Seeds of disunion in the Regiment, and Spiriting
up Officers to revolt against their Commanding Officer,” Lieutenant Colonel John
Gordon. Unhappy with Gordon’s orders regulating what times of day the officers
were permitted to leave the camp, as well as Gordon’s insistence that the officers’
personal servants (who were also enlisted soldiers in the regiment) attend military
drills instead of waiting on their masters, the two captains had supposedly acted as
the ringleaders in forming an agreement among most of the regiments’ officers to
“send Col. Gordon to Coventry” in protest—shunning the colonel by refusing to speak
to him off duty or to dine with him socially.
In their defense, Wauchope and Higginson claimed that the court had no right to
censure or even inquire into their behavior, because these actions towards their
colonel were merely the actions of “private gentlemen” choosing not to associate
with Colonel Gordon in his character as a private gentleman. Socially shunning the
Gordon did not involve "the most distant Idea of opposing him in his Command, or
behaving disrespectfully to him, or of obstructing the Duty of the Regiment in any
respect whatever," but was "merely not being upon speaking terms with the Lieut.
Colonel as a private Gentleman."152 Other officers of the regiment concurred: Ensign
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Robert Patrick claimed that when he agreed to send the colonel to Coventry, "he had
no other Idea then [sic] that of not speaking to him as Mr. Gordon.”153
Other officers accused of disrespect to their superiors made similar claims.
Captain John Rutherford, charged with writing an insulting letter to his commanding
officer, defended himself by claiming “I wrote to the private Gentleman and not to
the Officer, and therefore could have no intention of offending against Military
Authority." Rutherford claimed that the source of his dispute was a matter in his
personal life, and one which his commander had no right to interfere with. While he
would put up with any military inconvenience the Colonel might impose, he could not
countenance "a personal degradation," which would, presumably, be an unbearable
insult to his character as a gentleman.154
Captain Benjamin Chapman, called upon by Captain Benjamin Charnock Payne
to testify to the latter’s excellent character, made clear the perceived difference
between the two roles, officer and gentleman, and the distinct attributes of each: “As
a Gentleman,” Payne possessed “the Strictest Integrity and Honour, and [was] of the
most Humane and Benevolent disposition.” As an officer, Payne was known for “the
most unshaken Zeal for the service, and the most exact attention to every point of
his duty.”155 Therefore, it was possible that one could object to a man’s behavior as
an officer, but have no quarrel with his behavior as a gentleman, or vice versa. For
example, one officer reported that Lieutenant Nathaniel Fitzpatrick’s “behaviour as a
Gentleman has been very exceptionable”—that is, extraordinarily poor. (Fitzpatrick
had slept with the acknowledged mistress of another officer of the regiment while
suffering from a venereal complaint, thereby infecting both her and her original lover
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with the disease.) But “as an Officer in action,” Fitzpatrick had “behaved remarkably
gallant.”156 Major Edward Drewe, court-martialed for his various neglects of military
duty and for being absent without leave, had the opposite problem: when an officer
was asked if he had “ever declared at any time, that Major Edward Drewe had not
acted as an Officer and Gentleman,” he replied, “As an Officer I have said so! As a
Gentelman [sic] I never did.”157
The statement that Captain Wauchhope and Captain Higginson offered in their
defense suggested that as military officers, they were obliged to obey their colonel,
but as gentlemen, they were naturally allowed to interact with Gordon on whatever
terms they pleased:
we have ever been taught to think that if an Officer in the British
Service supports in private life the Character of a Gentleman, and
in his public capacity, discharges his duty with zeal and attention;
he is placed far beyond the reach of censure, and that it is
perfectly immaterial what footing he is on with his Commanding
Officer in his private capacity, as a Gentleman or any other
whatever.158
Gordon had no possible grounds to object to his officers’ ostracization of him, for
military law could not be presumed to "restrain the private Conduct of an Officer, as
to direct to whom in the Mess room his conversation should be addressed, with
whom he should live in habits of Friendship or intimacy.” No officer had the right to
order his subordinate officers to associate with him, and he could not deprive an
officer of “the choice of his friends and associates.”159
The officers’ dispute with Gordon demonstrated how the life of the officer and the
life of the gentleman commonly came into conflict in the 18th-century army, as
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officers tried to reconcile their positions as officers—defined by military hierarchy—
with those of gentlemen, a position which carried with it a presumption of equality
with all other gentlemen.
One’s status as an officer was undoubtedly predicated on military rank: the
hierarchy was explicit and accepted by all. Just as a lieutenant could give an enlisted
soldier an order and expect it to be obeyed, no one disputed a general’s right to give
orders to a colonel, a colonel to give orders to a major, a major to a captain and so
on down to the lieutenants and ensigns.
However, many officers—junior officers especially—maintained that this hierarchy
applied only to military matters. Commanding officers might give their subordinates
all manner of military instructions—who was to mount guard and when, who was
allowed a leave of absence and who must stay, how the companies of the regiment
were to be paraded, and so forth—but the loftiest general officer had not the
slightest right to concern himself with the off-duty conduct of the lowliest ensign.
Off duty, officers were private gentlemen, and there was no rank in the private
sphere: one was either a gentleman or not a gentleman, and that was it; no man
could be more of a gentleman than another.
This was the root of the officers’ problems with Colonel Gordon’s behavior: By
seeking to regulate actions unconnected to their military lives, he undermined the
idea of the fundamental equality of all gentlemen. Ensign Francis Kirkpatrick
testified that a meeting was held among the officers of the 50th, during which they
agreed to shun Gordon, because “The officers of the Regiment found themselves
very much hurt and distressed in consequence of some very disagreeable Orders
given out by Lieut. Col. Gordon,” and “had found from the tenor of his Conduct he
was determined to give the Officers every uneasiness in his power." These
“disagreeable orders” were the ones specifying that “no Officer [was] to leave Camp
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till he has seen the Orders of the day.”

This meant, in practice, that the officers

couldn’t “go the smallest distance from Camp till three or four o'Clock in the
afternoon” without violating those orders, and therefore were extremely unpopular
among the officers because it restricted their social lives.160
Drinking, whoring, and other forms of pleasure-seeking social activities were
seen as an officer’s right. Unlike enlisted men, who found their movements closely
controlled in large part to prevent them from social activities their officers found
harmful, for a commander to restrict officers’ freedom of movement was considered
(by officers) tyrannical and oppressive, and a violation of their rights as gentlemen.
The military governor of Minorca was called upon to defend himself upon the floor of
the House of Commons for the outrageous abuse of prohibiting the officers stationed
there from “the social pleasure of making an afternoon visit above two miles without
special licence.”161 Similarly, Lieutenant George Evans Bruce found his commander’s
demands that he actually supervise the picket guard on the nights that he was
assigned to supervise the picket guard to be an intolerable infringement, for in
having to spend the night away from the assembling halls and dining rooms of the
town, he “was debarred of the happiness of Society.”162
Gordon’s subordinates shunned him for insisting that no officer was to leave the
camp until the orders for the day had been read, a measure they found
“disagreeable” and oppressive because “As the orders of the day were Seldom given
out before three or four o'Clock, sometimes later, they found they were debarred of
dining out of their own Mess, or enjoying any Society, it likewise debarred them of
Morning Amusements, which Officers are naturally to expect." When Gordon claimed
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that these were purely military instructions, his subordinates retorted that his rank
allowed him much unofficial and tyrannical power over subordinate officers, should
he choose to exercise it: "a Commanding Officer must be possessed of very little
ingenuity indeed, who cannot by the tenour of his conduct, make the lives of those
under him very unpleasant, and yet in his public Orders bear the appearance of
having only the good of the Service in view.”163
By claiming that military orders were interfering with their social lives, and that
their right to have a social life took precedence because it was inextricably linked
with their status as gentlemen, officers cordoned off a great part of their lives from
the oversight of military authority and the duty of obedience. In contrast to the
regulation of enlisted marriages, no one regulated the sexual behavior of officers.
Visiting brothels, keeping mistresses, and having sex with other men’s wives were all
unregulated by the military law and also by any sort of social disapproval from their
brother officers—officers openly and unashamedly testified about these activities
seemingly without any concern that it might harm their reputation amongst their
peers.
The testimony given in the trial of Ensign McDermott for the rape of another
officer’s child in 1773 reveals how nonchalant officers were about their extramarital
sexual behavior, as well as their general unwillingness to regulate or disapprove of
each others’ behavior. A portion of McDermott’s trial for hinged upon whether he
had previously shown an irresponsible character by visiting a brothel in Ireland when
he was being treated for a venereal disease. One witness, Captain Craig, reported
that “About four o'Clock the Morning after they arrived at Cork he met him
163.WO 71/55, p. 80. Note also Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement; Comprehending the
Tactick, Exercise, Manoevres, and Discipline of the British Infantry, 10, who wrote that the colonel, with
his power to grant or deny leaves of absence, recommend oﬃcers for promotion, or allow oﬃcers to
sell out, "has it frequently in his power to thwart such of his oﬃcers as may have rendered themselves
obnoxious to him, and to favour others."
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[McDermott] in the Street very much in Liquor and afterwards in a Bawdy house.”
Later that morning, Captain Craig spoke to McDermott about “the great impropriety
of going to a Bawdy house and laying with a Girl when he knew that he was
disordered, that he mentioned in very strong terms as strong as he thought he
could, without affronting him; that Mr. McDermott acknowledged it to be wrong but
that being in Liquor he could not avoid it.”164
If there was anything improper in merely visiting the “Bawdy house,” the
obvious tactic for McDermott at this point would be to ask Craig just exactly what he
was doing there when he saw him. Instead, he admitted being there, but claimed
that Craig misremembered the conversation later that morning, when he reminded
Craig that he had only been there because Captain Craig himself had asked
McDermott to show a captain from another regiment “to a Bawdy House.” And Craig
had asked McDermott specifically because he was known to be acquainted with the
town “and particularly so with those houses.” When asked if he could deny this,
Craig could only testily reply that, “As he has already declared that he was very
much in liquor he cannot remember particulars.”165 Nowhere was there a suggestion
that either officer had done anything the least bit shameful by getting drunk in a
brothel at four o’clock in the morning, one indication of the near-complete
unwillingness of the officer class to regulate their own sexual behavior.
Except for the case of Lieutenant McDermott, who was brought before a courtmartial because he was accused of raping an officer’s child, no other officer in this
period was charged with a sexual crime. Furthermore, it is important to note that
even McDermott’s case reveals the primacy of class in the military culture of the
period: his alleged behavior was considered a serious crime not because the victim
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was a child, but because the victim was of the upper class, the young daughter of an
officer, and therefore any violation of her was also an insult to her father’s honor.
Contrast this to the behavior of Ensign Johnstone in Michilimackinac in the 1770s,
who tried to rape the daughter of a sergeant and never faced any consequences
more serious than a damning indictment in the fort surgeon’s private diary.166
Disapproval only ensued when one officer’s sexual behavior infringed on the
perceived rights of another officer. The other subalterns of the Queen’s Rangers
refused to do duty or mess with Lieutenant Nathaniel Fitzpatrick because of “His
laying with Capt. Murray’s Girl and thro’ her disordering him.” Murray had kept a
mistress, Mary Duche, and when the regiment was ordered on an expedition to
Salem in March 1778, Fitzpatrick had applied to his commander, Colonel Simcoe, “for
leave to remain behind, being incapable of doing his duty from a Violent Venereal
Disorder.”

Mary Duche had stayed with Fitzpatrick and was under his protection

while Murray was away on the expedition, but when Murray returned and resumed
sexual relations with her, he soon discovered that both Mary Duche and himself were
now “disordered.” This behavior was considered dishonorable because the girl was
“look’d upon in the Regiment as kept by Captain Murray” and Fitzpatrick himself had
told another officer that “she belong’d to Captain Murray.”167
By refusing to be ashamed of their off-duty behavior, or to censure other officers
for theirs, these officers linked the regulation of the non-military aspects of their
lives with degradation: they were gentlemen, therefore their private behavior did not
to be regulated and supervised like that of the lower classes. To regulate an officer’s
behavior was to imply that he needed regulation, and thus was not of gentlemanly
status.

Captain John Rutherford considered it a grave insult when he was told that
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he would not be given the money needed to pay the men of his company, unless he
were actually present with his company and able to pay them immediately: “The
Articles of War provide ample remedies against embezzlement of Regimental
Money,” he stated indignantly. “All ungentlemanlike precautions are therefore
unnecessary.” Indeed, putting such precautions in place would “injure the Credit of
Officers, and place them in a point of view scarcely equal to Journeyman
Carpenters.”168 Rutherford was suggesting that the very act of regulation was
dishonorable, and thus was only fit for the lower classes.
Because officers insisted that it was an insult to regulate their behavior, they
claimed to have actual private lives and a concurrent right to privacy. The army’s
control over enlisted men’s clothing, location, access to alcohol, food choices, pay,
physical discipline, and hours were all aspects of both military discipline and social
control.

Thus, officers had great reason to reject this sort of interference in their

own lives, as it was also an assault on their status. Therefore, in contrast to enlisted
men, officers’ conception of their own rights included a strong component of privacy.
They insisted that their own bodies, words, letters, and conversation ought not to be
“exposed” to public view, because of their class. For instance, Major Edward Drewe
protested that the very act of his commander’s public censure of him by prosecuting
him at a court martial was an outrage, because it denied his status-based right to
privacy. While Drewe acknowledged that he had made some minor misdemeanors,
they were “not of a Nature Sufficient to require less'ning Authority, by Exposing a
Man of my Rank to the Publick as a Culprit”.169
The social conventions of gentlemanly behavior required officers to defend each
others’ privacy. Officers had private conversations and private letters, and exposing
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them to public view was denounced as an ungentlemanly activity. Lieutenant George
Quin of the 35th Regiment of Foot was called to account for his behavior at a court
martial after he was caught standing on a table in the room of another officer,
Lieutenant Eyre, listening to the conversation taking place in the room above. When
Eyre discovered him, he claimed he told Quin “of the great impropriety” of his
conduct, and Major Chester, who had been one of the group overheard, asserted
that Quin had wounded the honor of the whole regiment after he had been
discovered atop a table “for so shameful a purpose as to listen to our
Conversation.”170 (This case also gives some indication of the comparative
magnitude of various breaches of conduct in officers’ minds. At the exact time he
had been discovered on the table, Quin was supposed to be on guard duty. But the
neglect of his duty was clearly seen as an inconsequential side note compared to the
enormity of his improper behavior in eavesdropping on his fellow officers.)
Quin’s behavior was so shameful because the “private Conversation” of officers
was supposed to be inviolate. Officers refused to reveal information they had
acquired through this method to the court, and often the court (also comprised of
officers) agreed about the impropriety of these inquiries. In the trial of Lieutenant
Thomas Hardyman, when the parties disagreed about whether certain questions
about what officers had said to each other in private should be allowed, the court
declared that they were “of opinion that nothing exposing private Conversation
should be asked.”171 Lieutenant Glenie, accused of making scandalous and insulting
remarks about his commanding officer, vigorously protested the accusation, on the
grounds that anything he had said about his commander had been said in private,
and furthermore, that people who revealed what a gentleman said in private “must
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have some mean & self interested Views” in doing so, “or wish to become Promoters
of Mischief.” Nothing said in such a conversation ought to be of interest to the court:
“Private Reports of private Conversation, supposing them even to be true, are never
carried by any Person who has not some or dishonorable Motives for doing so, & are
seldom, I believe the Subjects of Discussion, before General Court Martials.”172
When Gordon tried to elicit testimony related to the defendants’ and other
officers’ opinion of him to support his contention that Wauchope and Higginson had
conspired to undermine his authority by organizing the officers to shun him, he
found himself constantly thwarted by the officers, who refused to give any details
about the various meetings of the dissatisfied officers on the grounds that it was
private conversation. Ensign John Lucas was present at a conversation between
Lieutenant Rowe and Ensign Kirkpatrick which related to Gordon, and both the court
and Gordon asked him to repeat it. Lucas replied that he was "exceedingly sorry to
incurr the displeasure of this Court, but as an Officer and a Gentleman he cannot be
persuaded to betray private conversation, which has no relation to the Prisoners or
to the Charge, the Court must therefore excuse him.”173 Major Henry Oglivie, when
asked if he had any conversation with the defendants about the matter, responded
that "it was a matter of private opinion only.”174 In the defendants' statement, they
refused to give detailed public reasons for their behavior, because “there may be a
thousand reasons for not chusing to associate with a Man in private, which this Court
cannot enquire into, or possibly be informed of, the Tenor of a persons Conduct may
be sufficiently disagreeable to justify a resolution of [shunning him] and yet those
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who form that resolution, may not chuse to point out to a Court Martial all their
reasons for so doing.”175
The trial further revealed the social necessity of respecting officers’ privacy as
Lieutenant Rowe, who had found himself in the middle of the conflict between
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon and his subordinate officers, became increasingly
concerned about the other officers’ suspicion that he was a “tale bearer” who had
violated social convention by alerting Gordon that the officers had held a meeting at
which they had resolved to shun him. Rowe wanted to make it clear that it was
some other person, not him, who had informed the first informed the colonel, for a
reputation as a tale-bearer made an officer despised among his peers.
Other officers defended their silence about other officers’ misdeeds by claiming to
detest tattle-tales. When Colonel Cosmo Gordon suspected that Major Collins knew
the identity of the officer who had been aspersing his character, he demanded that
Collins supply the man’s name, but Collins “seeming very uneasy, said it would be a
very ungracious and disagreeable thing to him, to be oblig’d to be the informer.”176
Dr. James Barton responded to another officer’s reporting his poor behavior to the
general calling him “tattling Schoolboy” and castigating him for being willing to “blab
my Conduct” to the general about Barton’s neglect of sick men in the hospital and
his alleged medicine-pilfering.177 While the mistakes of the lower ranks were to be
publicized, corrected, and punished as an example and deterrent to others, exposing
an officer’s error was seen as illiberal, unjust, and proceeding from sinister motives,
such as a desire to promote discord in the regiment: “I did refuse to tell my author
and do still,” Ensign Cole insisted, “as I detest the Name of an Incendiary.”178 When
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one officer demanded to know of another whether he had reported his neglects to do
his guard duties to the commanding officer, the other replied that it was “never in
my recollection that I have ever reported an Officer’s mistake in my life.”179
This was, of course, a privilege reserved exclusively for officers. In sharp
contrast to their own prerogatives, officers did not acknowledge that enlisted men
had any right to keep secrets, or to have any aspect of their lives free from
interference by officers if the officers thought such interference necessary. Officers
took it as a personal affront when they discovered that one enlisted soldier had
concealed the crime of another enlisted man.180 Military treatises emphasized
importance of noncommissioned officers reporting the faults of enlisted soldiers and
not concealing them from officers; in fact, a willingness to inform on one’s fellow
soldiers often seems to be the primary attribute that qualified a man to be promoted
to corporal of sergeant, while non-commissioned officers who would "overlook many
un-soldier-like practices on Guard, or other duties, by way of keeping in favour with
the men" were to be dismissed immediately.
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And these non-commissioned-

officers themselves were not free from oversight and correction, for “as [the
Sergeant Major] has frequent opportunities, of closely attending to the morals and
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behaviour of the Serjeants and Corporals, he should be quick in discovering their
faults; and as ready in communicating them.”182
Wauchope and Higginson were on trial not only because they were suspected of
leading the regiment’s officers in shunning Lieutenant Colonel Gordon, but because
Gordon insisted that he had a perfect right to issue his unpopular orders regarding
the regiment’s servants. Higher-ranking officers and the army administration often
claimed that officers’ claims of privilege were interfering with the working of the
military and therefore an officers duty to obey his military superior took precedence
over these private privileges. Officers’ privileges could end up interfering with the
welfare of the regiment as a whole, and this was a constant source of discord.
Officers’ rights regarding servants were an area in which officers’ privileges and
regimental needs often came into conflict. As each officer was a gentleman, he
required the services of a manservant. But wages and the other costs of keeping as
servant were not just one more item on the extensive list of an officer’s expenses.
Rather, this expense fell to the army, because every British officer had, by longestablished custom, the perquisite of requisitioning a private soldier from the ranks
to employ as his servant.183 Commanders protested that officers’ servants weakened
the regiment by taking able-bodied men out of service in the ranks and away from
regular duty. As Captains Wauchhope and Higginson revealed in the course of their
trial, Gordon’s orders restricting officers from leaving camp before hearing the orders
of the day was not the only source of his unpopularity with his subordinates. Gordon
"frequently complained...of the Regiment Parading very weak, and
recommended...some Method by detecting Malingrers [sic], and others who were
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sculking, that the Regiment might appear stronger.”184 Alas, one of his methods for
strengthening the regiment was to order the servants who attended and served the
officers’ mess to attend military parades and training instead of serving the officers’
meals. But denying an officer the use of a servant was an affront. Gordon’s
subordinates maintained that he had done it deliberately to “distress” them, as
Gordon’s orders had disturbed their mess arrangements: Ensign Elliot claimed that
“the Mess was very near broke up in consequence of that Order," and related that
one day he “sent for some supper into his own Tent, having a companion there,
when he received for answer that he could not have any, as there would not be
enough for Dinner the next day."185 This was because the mess sutler and other
mess servants, despite being “old Soldiers & perfect in their Exercise,” were refused
permission to go to several miles to Plymouth to buy supplies, the markets in camp
not sufficient to “afford provision proper to Mess a Corps of Officers.”186
After the mid-Georgian reforms of the army, the privilege of requisitioning
servants from the ranks was one of the few privileges that officers still retained, and
thus was defended fiercely. When commanding officers demanded that they give up
these servants “for the good of the regiment,” officers’ privileges and military service
became set against one another, and officers suspected that commanders’ pleas to
do their duty in spite of personal inconvenience was just a way to deprive them of
their privilege and status.187 Furthermore, because of officers’ lack of pay and
general inability to support a household, the lone servant that came as a perquisite

184.WO 71/58, p. 8.
185.WO 71/58, p. 24.
186.WO 71/58, p. 9, 27.
187.For another conflict between oﬃcers over the question of servants, see WO 71/82, 116-127, in which a
lieutenant protested a situation where “I was refused the Indulgence of having my black Servant
excluded from labour” while another oﬃcer had “3 Taylors, 2 Barbers, 2 Ladies of the bed chamber” to
attend to him.

85
with their commission might have been the only person with whom they were in
relationship of personal subordination and their last link to any patriarchal status
deriving from personal authority over a subordinate. Resisting their commanders’
demands regarding servants was a way to protect their gentlemanly status, and
thus, status and therefore masculinity now became linked with insubordination.
Gordon’s other main charge also indirectly assaulted his subordinates’ status
when he accused them of violating military discipline by refusing the show him the
customary respect and courtesies due to him as their commanding officer. The
captains insisted that they had never encouraged any of the officers to show "the
smallest disrespect" to Gordon, and certainly never "spirited up any other Officer or
Officers of the Regiment to revolt against the Commanding Officer," nor did they
"ever sow the Seeds of disunion in the Regiment." Colonel Gordon (and, ultimately,
the court-martial board) disagreed, asserting that the officers’ behavior had in fact
crossed the line into military disrespect. The regiment’s major, Thomas Baskerville,
reported that Gordon had complained to him "that some of the Young Officers in
delivering in their Reports have not done it in the stile he thought they should have
done it, when delivering a Report to their Commanding Officer.”
Gordon’s primary complaints were hat-related: Ensign Samuel Swinton said that
when he “gave in his report of the Quarter Guard about three weeks ago, he took of
[sic] his hat in the most respectful manner to the Lieut. Colonel; as some time was
taken up in reading the report, and the Lieut. Colonel having put on his hat, the
Evidence did not stand with his off, but put it on likewise, for which the Lieut. Colonel
reprimanded him."188 Ensign Edmund Tyrewhitt was returning to camp and met
Gordon "on the road, and passed him without touching his Hat." A few days later
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Gordon asked him what he meant by such behavior, "told him if he ever passed him
again without paying him the Compliment of the Hat, that he would put him in
Arrest, that he was but a boy, and not to be too consequential.”189 Gordon also
issued numerous orders relating to proper hat behavior when guards or detachments
marching from one post to another passed the lieutenant colonel, and reprimanding
various officers whom he thought had not carried out the proper hat courtesies
towards him.190
By stressing that the officers were neglecting courtesies due to the military
officer, rather than to the private gentleman, Gordon attempted to demonstrate that
their behavior was a violation of military law. He further claimed that the officers’
inadequate attention to these courtesies due him were directly harming the
regiment. “[W]hen examples of this nature are daily shown to the Soldiers,” he said,
referring to the officers’ insubordinate hat behavior, the enlisted soldiers followed
their example, “the effects of which are frequent punishments in the Regiment.”
Even worse, Gordon complained, these punishments “I am told are constantly
imputed to me as so many acts of cruelty,” damaging his reputation and his
authority as the regiment’s lieutenant colonel. “[I]f instead of forming cabals and
associations against their Commanding Officer, every Captain of a Company
attended strictly to his charge in preserving good Order and Discipline, which he is
bound by every tye of honor and principle to do, punishments would be less
frequent, I should hear less trouble, and the imputation of cruelty would be taken off
my shoulders.”191 In other words, Gordon was suggesting, the good of the regiment
required officers to show him properly subordinate behavior.
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But displaying subordinate behavior did not appeal to junior officers, who thought
that it threatened their high social position as gentlemen, as well as betraying a lack
of manhood.

Once the army had convincingly linked subordination with

unmanliness and low social status, the complementary association of insubordination
with masculinity and high social status could not be far behind. Resistance to orders
demonstrated spirit, courage, manliness, and independence; obedience was servile,
passive, feminized, abject, and carried with it the suspicion that it ultimately
stemmed from fear.
Here, then, is some explanation for the military manuals’ constant pleas for
officers’ obedience. Some even touched upon the problematic unmanliness of
submission and tried to combat it: “It is a false notion,” Simes wrote, “that
subordination, and a passive obedience to superiors, is any debasement of a man's
courage; so far from it, that it is a general remark, that those armies which have
been subject to the severest discipline, have always performed the greatest
things.”192
Yet authors seemed to be blind to the status implications of their instructions.
The system as proposed by military theorists and defended by senior members of
the military not only put enlisted soldiers in a dependent position, but did the same
to lower-ranking commissioned officers. In urging officers to think of their military
duty first, Cuthberson used particularly unfortunate language in his attempt to
persuade: Cuthbertson’s ideal corps was modeled on the family, with the commander
in the role of the “fond Parent” and the officers “like obedient Children, sensible of
his Experience and Judgment, and anxious to oblige.”193 But Cuthbertson did not
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seem to consider that officers might resent and resist a system that put them in the
subordinate role of the “obedient Children” of the commander.
In its ideal form, the patriarchal military hierarchy was presented as a
harmonious pyramid of increasing authority: the enlisted men were to obey the noncommissioned officers, who were in turn supposed to obey the company’s subaltern
officers (ensigns and lieutenants), who obey the captain. The regiment’s captains
were to be under the authority of the major and the lieutenant colonel. Obedience
was to flow smoothly up the pyramid, and orders were supposed to flow back down.
But many junior officers found little personal benefit in such a system. Uncritically
accepting the legitimacy of their superiors’ authority over them was not only a threat
to their class status and masculinity, but also had the potential to interfere with
many of the enjoyable aspects of their lives, if a conscientious attention to duty took
precedence over social outings or gatherings with friends. And properly playing their
own patriarchal role brought few benefits they valued.194
In theory, officers’ own authority over enlisted men was supposed to assuage the
resentment they might feel about being subordinate to their own superiors. In
practice, however, many officers found their authority over the enlisted to be deeply
unsatisfying. This was the alternate side of the regime of constant supervision
detailed in the previous chapter; the consequence of asserting enlisted men’s
incompetence and inability to properly feed themselves and manage their money
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was to demand that their officers spend much of their time supervising and
inspecting their men.
Military manuals warned that supervision must be the officer’s constant duty; one
claimed that each time he encountered his men on parade, the officer was to
“observe, that there are none of the detachment sick, lame, or drunk: that each man
is provided with a loaf, canteen, two flints, sixty rounds, and firelock in good
order.”195 This supervision and inspection, the manuals warned, were essential to a
functioning army. Bland claimed that ensuring that soldiers used their pay to buy
food and not liquor was “a Duty incumbent on every Officer to be more than ordinary
careful in this Particular, and not to think themselves above looking into these
Things,” because “when it is neglected, great Numbers” of their soldiers would “fall
sick and die” from the resulting malnutrition.196
Because the ideological framework that justified officers’ control over enlisted
men relied on presenting the enlisted as childlike and incompetent, constant
supervision and minute observation was considered the only way to regulate their
behavior. “Nothing animates soldiers so much as the constant presence of the
officers, upon all duties,” one author wrote.197 And after time, it was hoped, “the
Soldiers will soon perceive, that as the smallest omission in point of Dress, cannot
escape observation, the sooner it becomes satisfactory to the Officers, the happier
must their time be, when reprimands or punishments are no longer necessary on
that account.”198 Meanwhile, improper supervision would inevitably “bring the men
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to disorders and crimes, and consequently to punishment, which would be avoided
by a proper care of them, and watch upon their conduct.”199
Manuals and orders emphasized that officers were to supervise rather than
entertain themselves: “An officer upon service, that indulges in a disposition for
wine, women, for play, will neither gain reputation or honour,” one wrote,200 while
Colonel Wolfe's instructions for young officers insisted that they were to make
themselves useful in mundane training tasks, not occupying their time socializing
until an opportunity for wartime glory presented itself.201
But in arguing for the importance of these supervisory tasks and more mundane
aspects of military duty, commanders were contending against a general culture of
anti-military behavior by the military’s own officers. The army was seen as a
fashionable profession for a wealthy young man, one which provided him with ample
opportunities to wear a splendid uniform, attract the admiration of ladies, and enjoy
a robust social life of dinners, balls, drinking, and gaming. An officer stationed near
the enemy during wartime might be castigated for staying up all night drinking, but
officers’ late hours were of little concern in other regiments, especially if they were
stationed in Britain or other areas where enemy attacks were considered vanishingly
unlikely. The officers of the Hertfordshire Militia seem to have been regularly out
dining and playing at cards in local assembly rooms until the early hours of the
morning without garnering any censure from their commander unless it directly
interfered with their duties. This was the fate of Lieutenant George Evans Bruce,
who was seen one night returning not with the picket guard he had been ordered to
supervise, "but in a Phaeton [a light, fast carriage often favored by dashing
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gentlemen] about Breakfast time.” The commander’s insistence that Bruce be more
attentive to his duty was apparently found restrictive enough for Bruce to reply with
a demand to be allowed to resign his commission, claiming that he found his
commander’s “Rules to be illiberal” and that he consequently found it “impossible…to
comply with your Lordship’s strict Discipline.”202
That a commanding officer insisting that his subordinates do their duty when they
were assigned to do duty could possibly be considered overly “strict Discipline”
seems strange to modern sensibilities, but the eighteenth-century British army could
be surprisingly lax for officers. In peacetime, up to half the officers of a regiment
stationed abroad might be away on leave in more congenial places, usually visiting
family or friends in Britain, at any one time.203 It was thought unnecessary for the
whole complement of officers to be present in a peaceable garrison, and duty was
easy and undemanding for those who remained. An officer might find himself called
upon to mount guard or serve as officer of the day perhaps twice a week, and, other
than an occasional appearance at evening roll call, generally had the rest of the day
to do as he pleased.204 And there is evidence that even these light duties were
perceived by officers to be more in the line of suggestions or polite requests from
their commanding officer rather than non-negotiable orders.
Anti-military behavior was common, widepread, and unremarkable. Wolfe, when
he was the commander of the 20th Regiment in Scotland in 1750, repeatedly scolded
his officers for neglecting to oversee how their men spent their pay, which, he
claimed, had led to “shameful drunkenness observed among the men, on pay-days
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in particular,” and reminded them that “there is a standing order in the regiment for
frequently visiting the quarters and messes.”205 The majority of officers in the
Gibraltar garrison casually ignored orders that they were to attend the evening
parade every day throughout the 1770s.206 Stationed at St. Lucia in the West Indies
in 1780, Major Edward Drewe vowed to never show up to parades unless a general
officer was there to see him, and once absented himself for several weeks to visit a
friend stationed on a ship nearby.207 In military garrisons throughout the empire,
officers sent NCOs to command guards in their place or left their guards a few
minutes after arriving so they could go drinking, and the repeated pleading orders
commanders issued for their officers to do their assigned duty and the records of
courts-martial for neglects of duty make it clear that officers could generally ignore
the duty roster with no official sanction until those neglects became truly
egregious.208
Officers defended their claims to gentlemanly status by enforcing sharp contrasts
between themselves and the men in the ranks. Officers and enlisted men were
judged by different standards; identical behavior resulted in different responses
according to rank. Whereas a soldier was commonly enlisted for life, and only
discharged if the army could find no more use for him, an officer could resign his
commission at any time. When George Evans Bruce encountered delays when he
was trying to attempt to resign his over differences of opinion with his commander
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and found the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland disobliging, he was outraged, asking, “for
what can be more introductive of Slavery in the Military that the [Lord] Lieut. of a
County refusing Officially to apply to His Majesty” to release an officer from his
commission? Captain William Barry made a similar comparison when he defended
his right to resign his commission so he could make insulting remarks about his
commander without any fear of offending military propriety: “I lay it down as a
Principle, that an Officer in the British Army is not compellable to Continue there
against his Inclination, and that he has a Right to resign whenever he pleases”; if he
were compelled to “continue in it for Life…he is no longer a Freeman but a Slave.”209
A private soldier who did not report for duty and who was found more than a mile
away from camp was automatically considered a deserter and might be convicted
and executed, while an officer who did the same might be charged, at most, with
being absent without leave.210 Major Drewe left his regiment to visit a friend on
board ship for weeks at a time, didn’t show up to a court martial he was supposed to
be on the board of, and constantly neglected to appear at regimental parades, but
when called upon to defend his behavior, he blithely observed that "tho' I miss'd
some Parades,” they were those “where I had no Command, and was of no
Consequence,” and claimed that his long shipboard visits were “To relieve my mind
by Changing the Scene; of Course conceiving some Indulgence due to my Rank.”211
Officers demonstrated their class status by deliberately flaunting insubordinate
behavior and displaying their immunity to the rules and regulations that governed
enlisted men’s behavior. One humorous guide for officers advised:
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Whenever you mount guard, invite all your friends to the guardroom; and not only get drunk yourself, but make your company
drunk also; and then sing, and make as much noise as possible.
This will shew the world the difference between an officer and a
private man; since the latter would be flayed alive for the least
irregularity upon duty.212
Though satirical, this advice was borne out in reality. Enlisted men were
frequently confined for drunkenness or bad behavior while drunk, whereas no one
seemed to care about officers’ drunkenness until it reached truly egregious levels,
such as when Lieutenant Charles Bernard Warde was tried “for being Drunk at Roll
Calling and speaking obsencely [sic] on Parade." Warde had come to a parade
appearing to be “in Liquor,” then “fell into some Wild Discourse with Mr. Sidney the
Surgeon of the Regiment,” and “among other things talked of a Bolus to cure an
ulcer in the Leg of a Wench whom he kept, and concluded by saying with an
Execration that she was a Damned good F__k.”213 Captain Hamilton got drunk and
stumbled into the enlisted men’s barracks and started beating the men asleep in bed
with his cane, but was never tried or even censured for it; instead an enlisted man
was tried for resisting his assault. This was reflective of a larger cultural shift in the
perception of drunkenness in the eighteenth century, from a universal sin to an act
which was unfortunate but pardonable when done by the rich, but something to be
controlled and regulated when done by the poor.214
The role that insubordination played in establishing upper-class masculinity was
generally masked in the more serious military works, confined to remarks like those
of Cuthbertson, who claimed that a regiment marked by disorder and discontent was
212.Williamson, Advice to the Oﬃcers of the British Army with Some Hints to the Drummer and Private
Soldier, 74-75.
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often the fruit of a commander who attempted to enforce his rules “by the most
severe Austerity, without the least Endeavour to soften the Appearance of it's being
so, by occasionally throwing in gentle, persuasive Arguments, by which alone,
Gentlemen (particularly those of British Constitution) are to be governed,” thereby
obliquely acknowledging that it was a mark of gentility to be insubordinate in the
face of strictness.215 The status conferred by defiance to orders was openly
acknowledged in humorous publications: “Evening roll-calling, which drags one from
the bottle, is a most unmilitary custom: for drinking is as essential a part of an
officer's duty as fighting.” If the colonel was so unwise as to “insist on the
attendance of the officers, they should not fail to get a little mellow first, to shew the
world that they are no milk-sops.” Of course, this spirited insubordination was a
particular privilege of the upper class; “if any of the soldiers should presume to
imitate their example, they must be confined and brought to a court-martial; for
what is commendable in an officer, may be in the highest degree reprehensible in a
private man.”216
By setting up military duty and gentlemanly status in opposition to each other,
insubordination became linked with high status. The separation of the public sphere
of the officer and the private sphere of the gentleman allowed men to assert their
status by refusing to act properly as officers while often avoiding censure. It also
allowed them to uphold their masculinity by only showing obedience in certain very
circumscribed contexts; they based their claims to status on the idea that their
behavior did not need to be regulated, so of course they tried to put as much of their
behavior as possible into the non-regulated ‘private’ category. Furthermore, the
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ability of insubordination to convey masculinity took on greater importance in the
army because, in the eighteenth century, older forms of gaining and displaying
masculine status were losing their potency and becoming more difficult for officers to
obtain as the benefits and privileges associated with manhood accrued in much
greater proportion to those of high rank and wealth, rather than being available on
more egalitarian terms and granted with age and marital status.217
Examining officers’ perceptions of the relationship between masculinity and
subordination demonstrates why there was constant tension between officers of
different ranks. Senior officers were anxious to exact subordination and junior
officers were anxious not to give it, and both groups were anxious to characterize
this behavior in terms favorable to them: those in authority insisted that the
subordination of the officers under them was nothing more than the “respect” due to
them, while those primarily asked to obey denounced it as “servility.”218 Even
Cuthbertson suggested that pleas for officers’ obedience must take into account the
needs of their status. Yes, the junior officers ought to cheerfully obey their
commander, but it was also the commanding officer’s duty to behave with
“Judgment, Coolness and Affability” to his officers, without which it would be
impossible for his subordinates to obey him happily.219
Officers made a distinction between the ‘public officer’ and the ‘private
gentleman’ as a way of trying to reconcile military subordination with their class
privilege. But when military duty and private status came into conflict with each
other, there was a growing perception that it was more important to be a good
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gentleman than a good officer. Major Drewe certainly thought so, wanting to publish
the proceedings of his own court martial (in which he was found guilty and
cashiered) in order to vindicate his character. In his opinion, he could publish the
record of his trial without any shame whatsoever, for although the trial showed him
to be “neglectfull, perhaps in Some of the forms of Service,” his “Character was
unimpeached in the Essentials,” for it had not been proven that he had ever acted
unlike a gentleman.

220

Even Lieutenant Colonel Gordon ultimately prevailed by

arguing that his character as a gentleman was more important than his character as
an officer. In the trial of Captains Wauchhope and Higginson, Lieutenant Colonel
Gordon again and again elicited information that the quarrels his subordinates had
were with the orders he gave as a military commander only; they had found no fault
in him in his “character as a gentleman.” Gordon used this as the foundation of his
claim that the officers' behavior was unjustifiable because all of them stated that
they had no problem with him as a private gentleman and that he had not done
anything ungentlemanlike. This was a tacit admission that had he not upheld the
proper character as a gentleman, his subordinates would in fact have had the right
to shun him and to eject him from the army.
Officers lived in constant fear of showing an unmanly submission that would
betray their lack of gentlemanly status and therefore their unfitness for military
command. Ironically, one of the most reliable ways to counteract any suspicion that
they were not autonomous, independent, and masculine was to disobey the orders of
their superiors and position themselves as men who were above the law. Thus,
junior officers were increasingly at odds with higher-ranking officers and military
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administrators who wished to uphold the army’s hierarchy, seeking to undermine the
hierarchy in order to defend their personal claims to masculine status.
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Chapter 4: The Cult of Courage

The military career of Edward Drewe, a major in the 35th Regiment of Foot until
he was court-martialed and dismissed from the army in 1780, reads almost as a
parody of Wolfe’s description of an unsatisfactory officer that opened the previous
chapter. Drewe had joined the army as a young man in 1769, and his wealth
enabled him to rise quickly in ranks, so that he was the major of the 35th Regiment
by 1779, despite his commanders’ reports of his many “Neglects, and Inattentions”
to their orders. Drewe had, in fact, “bravely exposed his person” in battle, having
led the 35th’s light company at the Battle of Bunker Hill, and he clearly considered
the wounds he had received there the crowning achievement that would indisputably
and irrevocably “acquire him the character of a good officer.” However, his career
ended after he was tried at court-martial by his commander, Lieutenant Colonel
Cockburn, who accused him of a litany of crimes including “frequently Absenting
himself from the Service of the Regiment for Weeks together,” and “disobedience of
orders.” Furthermore, Drewe had indulged in “Repeated Neglects of duty,” the most
notorious of which was publicly revealing that he had not even lived up to Wolfe’s
sarcastic standard of “learning a little of the exercise,” but rather had so little
experience of the manual exercise that he was completely unable to drill the
battalion.221
Drewe did not dispute the substance of Cockburn’s accusations. He had, in fact,
skipped parades, made extended visits to friends, and stayed in bed late into the
mornings rather than performing his administrative duties as one of the regiment’s
field officers. On the day that Cockburn had demanded that he drill the battalion,
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Drewe testified, he had in fact declined to do it: “Taken Unawares, Several Strangers
Present, not having seen that Exercise Practiced for above two Years: I excused
myself,” he said, adding that he could “honestly…Confess that I am no Parade
Officer.”222 But if Drewe lacked military knowledge, could not properly perform the
duties of his rank, and was spending most of his days drinking in hovels late at night
and then lying in bed until noon, then just what qualities in himself did he propose as
justifications for his continued service as an officer?
Yet Drewe had little problem speaking in his own defence. His early history in
the army, he thought, proved his fitness to be an officer beyond all doubts. He had
“wished to be Early Distinguished” in his army career, and the opportunity had come
within two days of the 35th’s arrival in Boston on June 17th, 1775, when the 35th was
part of the force ordered to attack the fortifications that the rebelling colonists had
hastily erected on Bunker Hill. Drewe, who had gained command of the light
company only the day before, led it into action, with devastating results: ”my
Company was Cut to Pieces, to six Privates, almost in my Sight. I received that day,
Three Wounds, two Contusions; and had my Shoulder dislocated.”223 Drewe
suggested that he may have had his faults in his lack of care and attention to his
company, his constant absences from parades, and his neglect of the duller
administrative duties of an officer, but all that was immaterial in the larger scale of
things, for he undoubtedly possessed the one true absolutely necessary quality for a
British officer: unmatched physical courage. In Drewe’s eyes, the events that led to
his dismissal from the army were completely counteracted by his battlefield valor.224
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He had shown courage, so his ignorance and inattention to the less important
aspects of a military career were immaterial.
Colonel Cockburn saw things differently. In his reply to Major Drewe’s
statement, he acknowledged the basic facts of the situation as Drewe had laid them
out: “The Prisoner did March that Light Infantry Company as their Captain into the
Field, at Bunker's Hill. He had the Misfortune there, to be Wounded in the Multitude,
and had the good Fortune, to recover from those Wounds.” But, Cockburn
continued, “Did he there display any Judgment, as an Officer! No. Does a Wound
mark the Merit of an Officer? no! Yet ever Since that day it has been rung in our
Ears, the Military Atchievements [sic] and Exploits of that Captain Drewe.” Yes,
Drewe had in fact been wounded, Cockburn suggested. He had perhaps even shown
great physical courage in battle. But Cockburn ridiculed the idea that all an officer
needed was courage: “Thank God every British Soldier Possesses true Courage.
Something more I conceive is required for the Officer.”225
On the surface, this dispute between Cockburn and Drewe appears to be a
straightforward conflict about the foundations of military virtue, with Cockburn
insisting that no man was fit to be an officer if he was not competent at the various
duties that were an officer’s lot, while Drewe argued for the ultimate primacy of the
virtue of courage. But the two men actually represented the two sides of a more
veiled debate about the proper sources of masculine status for army officers: the
wealthy Drewe considered his high rank no less than his due because he had money
and social prominence, while Cockburn had spent many years resenting the
promotions of younger, well-connected men over his head while he loyally did his
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duty in a remote Florida garrison and consequently thought that age and experience
ought to be the primary qualifications for high military rank.
But the two officers also placed these rather self-interested arguments about
individual rank and status within a framework of concern for the national interest.
Britain’s various imperial wars of the eighteenth century had frequently stimulated
anxieties about British martial masculinity; every lost battle had unleashed a new
round of fretting about whether British soldiers had lost the manly qualities
necessary for battlefield success. Cockburn’s insistence that officers be experienced,
dedicated, and knowledgable about the technical aspects of fighting with muskets
made him the natural ally of commentators such as Major Robert Donkin, who
argued that Britain’s burgeoning culture of luxury, refinement, and gentlemanly
politeness was imperiling British masculinity, and, consequently, the nation’s ability
to wage war effectively.226 Donkin worried that a desire for wealth and pleasure
rendered a man incapable of waging war and therefore unmasculine, writing that the
“insatiable desire of making money, and that mean dispiriting passion, love of
pleasure, renders us at times incapable of conducting either a sea or land war!”227
Drewe, on the other hand, wrote numerous essays claiming that the strictures of
linear warfare itself were emasculating, and dangerously feminizing the soldiers
forced to practice it, because they restrained soldiers from exercising the manly
courage that was fundamental to proper martial masculinity. Furthermore, he
claimed, the savage discipline associated with linear warfare threatened the very
foundations of the state by being inimical to British liberty. As this chapter shows,
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the case between Drewe and Cockburn highlighted the tensions that were evident in
the British army at this time, as it sought to uphold two increasingly contradictory
goals: the value of courage—which had immense cultural prestige as a key
masculine virtue in both the military and civilian worlds—and the needs of the British
army itself, which was struggling to adapt to the increasingly technical demands of
early modern warfare.
Cockburn’s case against Drewe was a testimony for the importance of officers’
behavior off the battlefield. Any true British soldier, Cockburn had suggested, had
the ability to show courage in battle. But the modern British army had need of
officers who were capable of more than merely braving the enemy’s shots on the
field of battle: it was their job to ensure that the enlisted soldiers of the regiment
were well-disciplined, to train the soldiers in the various formations and maneuvers,
to inspect their clothing, weapons, and food, and many other administrative tasks
essential to maintaining a functioning infantry regiment. Thus, Cockburn argued,
Drewe’s disinterest in these non-combat duties was actively harming the regiment.
Cockburn blamed the way that promotion and rank were distributed in the army:
Drewe had achieved a high rank at a young age not because of his exceptional
military skill, but because of his wealth and connections, which allowed him to
purchase promotions.
Describing himself as “the only son of a Gentleman of Family; my Fortune
independent of a Profession,” Drewe noted that he “did not rise Unexpectedly” to the
rank of major of the 35th Regiment, but that “my Birth, my Indulgent Parents, and
my liberal Command of Money, entitled me at least to expect this Step.”228 Drewe
was in the fortunate position of being able to buy high status in the army. His
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military career started with his purchase of an ensigncy in the 35th in 1769, and by
the time the regiment arrived in Ireland in 1773, he had also purchased his
promotion to lieutenant. When derided by Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn for
unmilitary behavior rendering him unworthy for promotion, Drewe defended his
purchases, noting that when he purchased his promotion to captain in 1774, he had
been recommended for that promotion by Cockburn.229
But Cockburn furiously refuted Drewe’s implication that he gained his promotion
from any merit whatsoever. “I perfectly agree,” he stated, “that a liberal Command
of Money, procured him his present Rank. That, and that only has.”230 Another
officer remarked that it was “well known Mr. Drewe gave an Uncommon great Sum
for his Commission.”231 Although the government had established set prices for
commissions for various ranks, and made intermittent attempts to enforce them, the
actual prices paid for commissions fluctuated widely depending on the availability of
commissions, the fashionability of the regiment, the current location of the regiment
(regiments stationed in or near London commanded a substantial premium over
those assigned to distant, unhealthy, or unpopular places), and supply and
demand.232 They might go for far less than the regulation price, or for far more.
Drewe reportedly paid 4000 guineas (£4200) to be promoted to major of the 35th
Regiment, a substantial premium over the established price for a majority in a
regiment of foot, which was only £2600.
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Cockburn claimed that he found Drewe to be an inadequate and incompetent
officer and his recommendation of Drewe for promotion to captain occurred only
because the peculiarities of the system of promotion by purchase or influence had
created an unfortunate collision of circumstances that resulted in Cockburn’s
reluctant acquiescence to the promotion of the wealthy but undeserving Lieutenant
Drewe: As Cockburn explained, when the 35th was stationed in Ireland in 1773,
a Succession in the Regiment was Recommended, by the (then)
Lieut. Colonel Allen, from the Majority down; in which Succession
Lieut. Massey…declared himself a Purchaser of the Company; but
on the Commission coming over to Ireland, Mr. Massey, found he
could not raise the money.233
This situation reflects the complex maneuvers surrounding officers promotions:
the Regiment’s Lieutenant Colonel, Richard Allen, had a vacancy for the rank of
major of the regiment. That rank would be offered to the most senior Captain, if he
was willing and able to pay the £700 required to purchase that promotion. If he was
disinclined or impoverished, the offer would pass to the next most senior Captain,
and so on down until a purchaser was found. But this promotion would, in turn,
create a vacant Captaincy in the regiment, and an opportunity for one of the
lieutenants to be promoted into it. As related by Cockburn, this opportunity was
seized upon by Lieutenant Massey, and he secured the promotion to captain.
But Massey proved to be short of funds when it came time to actually pay for his
promotion, and asked his commander to use his influence with the Lord Lieutenant of
Ireland “not to Publish those Commissions, for if they had been Published, he would
of Course been out of the Army, by being Obliged to put up that Company for
sale.”234 That is, if Massey’s new promotion to captain were made public, Massey
would owe the government £700 for it, and—not having the money he owed—he
233.WO 71/55, p. 240.
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would be forced to raise it by selling the Captaincy again right after he obtained it.
Massey proposed instead that his superiors discreetly ignore his previous request
and allow him to remain a lieutenant.
But just as the captain’s promotion to major opened up a spot for one of the
lieutenants to be promoted to captain, the promotion of Lieutenant Massey had
allowed for a promotion of one of the regiment’s ensigns to his newly-vacated
lieutenancy, which then allowed an entirely new man to be commissioned as an
ensign. If Massey did not take up his promotion to captain, he would destroy the
promotion chain for everyone below him.235 Thus, this was not a feasible solution:
the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland had already promised these two promotions to other
men, and was not about to revoke them and disappoint two officers with important
political connections merely because Massey was insolvent. If the 35th wanted to
keep Massey from having to sell out, the only solution was to find another lieutenant
in the regiment to purchase the captaincy, at which point the new lieutenant and the
new ensign could just take the spots opened up by his promotion instead.
Here the well-heeled Lieutenant Drewe eagerly stepped in to save the situation.
He had the money, and Cockburn claimed that he was forced to recommend him for
promotion and did so only to save Massey from being forced out. He did so with
much resentment, having observed many “Neglects, and Inattentions” in Drewe’s
behavior as lieutenant. But the perquisites of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland gave
him no choice. Although having, as Drewe described it, a “liberal Command of
Money” was the quickest and surest path to promotion regardless of military merit, it
was not the only path. Contemporary records make numerous references to the role
235.The deeply contingent nature of military promotion was well known at the time; see, for instance, the
example warrant for a promotion in Simes’ Military Medley, which specifies, after the retirement of the
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the way down through the ranks to "..and I. Gentleman, to succeed to the said H. as Ensign" (Simes,
The Military Medley, 180.).
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of “interest” in gaining commissions or promotions—that is, their tendency to go to
people with parliamentary connections, to relatives of peers and people who
controlled parliamentary seats, and so on.236 These commissions gained from
“interest” often did not have to be paid for, and the men with the power to issue
commissions—the Secretary at War, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and the
Commanders-in-Chief of Britain and North America in wartime—found themselves
continually deluged with letters from commission-seekers and their patrons.
Patronage and using one's influence to secure plum positions for one's relatives
and friends was a normal and acceptable part of a high-ranking officer's duties. For
example, in Lord Loudoun’s list of men who were to be provide ensign’s commissions
and why, he noted that some had been of great service to the army in North
America, others came with recommendations from peers of the realm, and one was
“A Relation of Mine.”237 A satirical advice manual warned generals not to try too hard
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to defeat the enemy, as victory might “put an end to the war, before you have
provided for your relations and dependents.”238
Cockburn was hardly alone in denouncing the role that wealth and interest played
in obtaining promotion. Promotion was hard for men without money or connections,
often only coming after a wartime casualty necessitated promoting an officer to fill a
vacancy without requiring any payment from him. After many years of service,
these men might be lucky enough to rise to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, but it was
far more likely for them to retire still at the relatively lowly rank of captain.239
Meanwhile, it was well-known that officers with connections rose quickly though the
ranks regardless of merit.240 Some satirical instructions to commanders warned
them not to promote an officer, “however brilliant his merit, unless he be your
relation...As you probably did not rise to your present distinguished rank by your
own merit, it cannot reasonably be expected that you should promote others on that
score.”241
These older officers with much military experience but who lacked high rank
inveighed against young, uncommitted officers whose money had bought them
positions of authority, and the numerous detractors among the authors of popular
military treatises, who claimed that it weakened the army. Major Donkin compared
the current British practice unfavorably to the virtuous Romans, who had demanded
that all officers choose between “devoting themselves entirely to the service, or
238.Williamson, Advice to the Oﬃcers of the British Army with Some Hints to the Drummer and Private
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letting them that did their duty, pass over their heads.”242 Donkin was particularly
incensed by the ability of well-connected officers who stayed in London while their
regiments were stationed abroad to use their proximity to the sources of power to
gain promotions at the expense of officers who were actually doing their duty, which
would have put him in sympathy with Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn. When Cockburn
was a mere Captain, he protested the promotions of two other officers in the
regiment, Captain Sherwood and subsequently Captain Gaul, to the rank of major,
noting that while he "was struggling with an unhealthy climate at the risque of his
life to do his Duty" in a Florida garrison, Sherwood and Gaul had "reaped the fruits of
his Labour" by staying home in England, where they were in a prime position to snap
up the vacancies in the regiment.243 Officers proposed various schemes for ensuring
that the men who were actually doing their duty with regiments stationed abroad
were not at a disadvantage, such as Major Donkin’s proposal “for all majors prior to
1773, that are able and willing to purchase lieutenants colonelcy, to give in their
names in order to be transmitted to the war office, that their pretensions may be
considered when any promotions by purchase are going on at home.”244
As Cockburn’s further accusations of Drewe indicated, his resentments of the
officers who had been promoted ahead of him stemmed not only from their literal
good fortune, but also from what he perceived as their military incompetence and
lack of professionalism. Sherwood and Gaul had preferred soft assignments in
London to the arduous duties of a frontier garrison in a remote outpost of empire.
Drewe at least showed a willingness to cross the Atlantic and actually join his
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regiment, but had little interest in the non-combat duties of an officer. As well as his
various “Inattentions” while a lieutenant, after his promotion to captain, “he often
neglected, and Disobeyed Orders, in the care of his Company, and Attendance on
Parades.”245 Drewe’s next promotion to major did not improve his conscientiousness.
Despite written orders obliging "all Officers to attend Parade Morning and Evening,”
Drewe “very seldom, not for Weeks together made his Appearance on the
Regimental Parade.” Lt. Shaw confirmed that he "heard Major Drewe declare, that
he never would attend a Regimental Parade, unless a General Officer was there.”246
And on the rare occasions that Drewe actually did attend the parade, Cockburn
claimed that Drewe made his utter inability to act as a field officer unmistakably
plain. The final straw occurred when ”one Evening on the Parade,” Cockburn
explained, “I did Order him as Major of the Regiment, to put the Regiment thro’ the
Manual Exercise,”—the regiment’s customary musket drill in which they practiced
loading, presenting, and firing their weapons. “The Major's answer to me was, that I
took him then unprepared, and that he was not then Capable of performing it.”
By allowing commissions and promotions to be purchased, wealthy men could
obtain military rank without military experience, which, in the opinion of some
writers, directly affected the fighting ability of the army. For example, General
Humphrey Bland praised the sophisticated tactics of armies of the Dutch Republic,
which he claimed were only possible because of the superior experience of their
officers, who were promoted by merit, “as the Selling and Buying of Commissions is
a Traffick…unknown, or at least not allowed of, in the Republick.”247
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More common were complaints that those who expected to be quickly promoted
to high rank often lacked of knowledge about the more humble aspects of company
and regimental administration, and were uninterested in gaining it, seeing that
knowledge as the provenance of poorer men who expected to spend many more
years as subalterns and captains. “When noble Birth and high Connections give
certain Hopes to a young Officer, of his speedily arriving to the Rank of Colonel, he
may in that case despise the Minutiae of the Service,” Cuthbertson noted
disapprovingly.248 Cuthbertson claimed his instruction manual detailing the basic
military duties of an officer “may in a particular manner be useful to those, whose
Connections hurry them into rank, before they are qualified, by Application, to
discharge the several Duties of it with Honour."249
Simes argued that because influence was so much more reliable than merit in
gaining “Preferment,” fortunate young officers were apt to neglect their duties:
“Money and powerful Relations will always procure them what they want; they have,
therefore, no Occasion to apply themselves to the Knowledge of their Duty.”250 And
it was widely regarded as a commander’s lot to resign himself to “the intrusion of
interest, too often exerted in favour of very improper persons,” because “when by
these means, a man is forced upon a Regiment, there is scarcely an immediate
redress, let his qualifications be ever so improper for the military profession.” All a
commander could do was to try to make sure that the ensigncies that were within his
power went to men “unexceptionable in every respect,” in order to “guard against
the mischief” that would surely be forthcoming from the political appointees.251
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As well as pointing out the negative effects on the service, those without money
decried the purchase system in the language of outraged masculinity, claiming that
worthy officers were passed over for promotion and had to bear the humiliation of
younger, richer men holding higher military rank — and thus authority — over them.
These men repeatedly used the term “mortification” to refer to this violation of the
age-based social hierarchy.252 “[W]hich among us without interest…can expect to be
more than a lieutenant colonel after 40 years service, with probably the mortification
of having seen many younger officers of power and credit skip over out heads in that
period?” asked Major Donkin.253 Captain Alexander Macintosh of the 10th Foot
complained that "nothing is more mortifying to an old Soldier, than to be
commanded by a number of young inexperienced Boys (which is often the case in
our Service)".254 Another wrote of “meritorious Officers” who had the “cruel
Mortification of seeing themselves commanded by young Men of opulent Families,
who came much later into the Service, and whose Fortunes have enabled them to
amuse themselves frequently elsewhere, while the others, continually at Quarters,
have done the Duty of those Gentlemen, and have learnt their own.”255
In Cockburn’s eyes, Drewe was the very picture of a young man of opulent family
who indulged in private pleasures while other officers were forced to take up the
military duties he neglected. Drewe, as the regiment’s major, ought to have been
working closely with Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn in administering the regiment and
issuing orders to the different companies and detachments. But Cockburn
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disapprovingly elicited testimony from his adjutant that he “seldom saw him [Major
Drewe], tho’ he called at his Tent every day from Ten, Eleven, and Twelve oClock,
and his received Information from his Servant, that he was then asleep in Bed.” The
adjutant professed himself “much surprised at his laying in Bed so late,” and could
think of no acceptable reason for it: "I did not Conceive he laid in Bed from Sickness,
as I have seen him walking Out afterwards." The cause of Drewe’s late risings soon
became apparent, as one officer testified, “it was no Wonder it was so, for that he
had heard that the Major was every night drinking" and another claimed that "Major
Drewe had been seen night after night, drinking in a hovel, near the Lime Kiln.” A
Brigadier General told Cockburn “that he was Obliged a Second time to reprimand
Major Drewe, for some Misbehavior he heard him Committ in a Hutt, at an
Unseasonable hour of the night.” And Lieutenant Shaw’s testimony showed that
Drewe was keeping rather different hours and had rather different tastes in breakfast
food from the other officers of the regiment: Shaw "went to Robinson's Tavern to get
Breakfast" and was shown to a room in which Major Drewe was still in bed. "After I
had been some time in the Room,” Shaw continued, “the Major's Servant came in; I
asked him, if he had not better wake his Master to take some Tea; he Answer'd he
believed his Master would rather have Grogg.”256
Cockburn’s claim that Drewe’s late hours and constant drinking constituted
unmilitary behavior were hotly contested by Drewe, who demanded to know
precisely which of the Articles of War forbade him from consuming alcoholic
beverages with his breakfast. As for his late hours, he stated, "I never heard for my
part, that lying a Bed in the Morning was inconsistent with my Rank. I thought it the
Privilege of a great Man.”257
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This refusal to abide by the more sober and dutiful conventions of social
behavior, however, did not make Drewe as much of an outlier as Cockburn might
have wished. Heavy drinking was the norm for most officers, and Drewe’s habit of
taking part in the opulent privilege of lying in bed all morning was, for the time, an
astonishingly mild example of an officer’s indulgence in decadent self-gratification.
Many other officers were notorious for indulging in the whole trinity of luxurious
vices--drinking, whoring, and gambling.
The military culture of womanizing was extremely disreputable in North American
civilian eyes because it normalized not just fornication, but also adultery.258 It was
almost unremarkable for officers to be having affairs with the wives of other officers,
and this culture of adultery extended to—and perhaps was even more prevalent at—
the highest ranks of the army.259 Generals Howe, Burgoyne, and Clinton all had
mistresses who accompanied them during their North American campaigns, and each
of them was another man’s wife. These women’s husbands were all lower-ranking
men who, it was said, had willingly prostituted their own wives in return for lucrative
government appointments or other favors. Most notorious in this regard was Howe,
whose affair with Elizabeth Loring was deeply criticized in the press both in Britain
and in America. Her husband, Joshua Loring, was a prominent loyalist whom Howe
appointed to be the commissary for prisoners of war.260 Perhaps following in Howe’s
footsteps, Burgoyne’s mistress, whom he took on the Canadian expedition which was
to end in disaster at Saratoga, was also the wife of a commissary.261 Clinton's

258.Fred Anderson, A People’s Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years’ War,
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 118-119.
259.Hurl-Eamon, Marriage and the British Army in the Long Eighteenth Century, 169-170. Stephen
Conway, Military-Civilian Crime and the British Army in North America, 58, notes several more
examples of lower-ranking oﬃcers and their mistresses.
260.Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American
Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, June 11, 2013), 97.
261.O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate

115
mistress, with whom he had five children, was the wife of an enlisted soldier,
Thomas Baddeley, who seems to have gained an officer’s commission out of the
affair and was promoted through the ranks to captain before he conveniently died in
1782.262 Tales of wives of enlisted soldiers furthering their husbands’ careers
through adultery were prevalent enough for writers to make references to the
advantages of having “a pretty wife, sister, or daughter” for enlisted men seeking
promotion to a NCO position, or for sergeants wanting to make the grand leap over
the class divide into an officer’s commission.263
British commanders were derided by civilians, especially God-fearing New
Englanders, not merely because of their mistresses, but because their adulterous
affairs were perceived as merely one part of a personal life steeped in the indulgence
of luxurious vice.264 Burgoyne was criticized for spending the days before the
devastating surrender at Saratoga staying up all night carousing with his mistress,
singing, and drinking.265 Broadsides claimed that Howe spent his days playing cards,
his nights in bed with whores, and all of his waking hours drinking, going so far as to
claim that Howe deliberately delayed engaging the rebels so he could continue to
enjoy the charms of his mistress.266 But those who criticized high-ranking military
men for their lives of immoral excess did not cite their need to adhere to the rules
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that governed ordinary men’s social behavior. Rather, they claimed, these
commanders’ indulgences in luxurious vice was harming the nation’s ability to wage
war. Luxury was making these men soft and and unmanly, sapping their appetite for
aggression and attack.
Members of the military disapproved of lack of aggression and connected it to
luxurious living; ideas on martial masculinity were heavily influenced by
contemporary ideas of classical virtue. In Major Donkin’s view, the Romans were the
quintessential exemplar of a warrior race, not only because of their stringent martial
discipline, but because they rejected luxury: “fewer things were necessary for their
sustenance; they were more frugal, their studies and exercises more useful and
manly than ours.”267 He connected manliness with enduring hardship and rejecting
luxury, and was also implying a link between luxury and insubordination. The body
of officers might not have gone as far as Donkin, but in general they were in
agreement that too much concern with commerce and comfort were incompatible
with martial masculinity, proudly enumerating the hardships they had suffered on
campaign and expressing disdain for those who were too concerned with material
comforts. For Donkin, war was the ideal—and indeed the only—antidote to luxurious
vice. The American war, he argued, provided an opportunity to combat the addiction
to luxury that was crippling the country. Suffering physical hardship, especially if it
was done on a military campaign, was a source of pride and masculine status.
But Drewe rejected the idea that he needed to suffer hardship in order to
properly prepare himself for the manly art of war. Rather, he suggested, he had
already proved his courage and his manhood in battle, and therefore he could
indulge himself. Suffering hardships during war not only made men more masculine

267.Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, 3-4.

117
but also seemed to give men some immunity from the charge that they were
unmanly for wallowing in luxurious vice when they were wallowing in luxurious vice.
Drewe clearly seemed to feel that because he had been wounded in battle, he could
lie in bed all day and drink all night without incurring any deserved censure.
This was due to the strong association of violence with masculinity, and the role
that violence played in masculinizing otherwise problematic behavior. Violence was
indisputably a masculine act; a man who talked pleasantly in the company of women
and behaved with unfailing politeness might be thought unmanly, but a man who
killed in battle could then talk pleasantly in the company of women without
suspicion. War was a way to reconcile politeness and luxury—which might otherwise
have problematic effeminate connotations—with masculinity.268 Michèle Cohen
suggests that the concept of chivalry allowed the refashioning of the polite
gentleman into an indisputably masculine character; exaggerated courtesy and
veneration of women and other refined behavior to the weak or unfortunate could
now be cast in this heroic medieval mold.269 However, violently masculine behavior
was necessary to give such chivalrous behavior the proper tint of honorable
masculinity rather than of craven effeminacy; a man could behave generously to a
distressed enemy on the battlefield precisely because his previous violence negated
claims that his good behavior was motivated from weakness and fear.
Courage, as the source of the soldier’s violent battlefield behavior, was therefore
the foundation of all military virtue. By positing courage as the basis for his status

268.On support for the army and imperial conquest as a way to negate feelings of inadequacy and
unmanliness: John Tosh, "Masculinities in An Industrializing Society: Britain, 1800–1914", Journal of
British Studies 44, no. 2 (2005): 330-342. Also, Kate Haulman, "Fashion and the Culture Wars of
Revolutionary Philadelphia", The William and Mary Quarterly 62, no. 4 (2005): 625-662, on how the
connection between ornamental dress and femininity was often severed if the ornamental dress in
question was a military uniform.
269.Cohen, "’Manners’ Make the Man: Politeness, Chivalry, and the Construction of Masculinity, 1750–
1830," 315.

118
as an officer and the heart of the code of military masculinity, Drewe had the
advantage of advocating for a value that was unassailable. No commentator could
possibly propose that courage was a dispensable asset for a military man. Even
officers who spent immense time and effort to arguing for the necessity of strict
military discipline admitted its supremacy. ”No qualification whatever can supply the
want of courage in a military person,” wrote one such author, in a work otherwise
devoted to minutely detailing the ways that soldiers ought to show proper military
subordination.270
In fact, officers who wanted to argue for the the value of discipline and
subordination often had to try to hijack the cultural power of courage by insisting
that the submissive behaviors that they wished to encourage in their subordinates
were actually proofs of manly courage. The soldier’s “natural and laudable passion
for true glory,” one enlisted soldier recalled being told in an officer’s speech, was
supposed to inspire in him “a sentiment of dignity, which leads to cleanliness, and
neatness in dress, to abstain from drunkenness and every other abject vice; it
renders them attentive and diligent on duty, cool and brave in action; on all
occasions they will be patient, obedient, disinterested, and generous. The
approbation of their officers will follow, and from thence many indulgencies.”271 Here,
the officer was trying to convince his men to behave in the way officers found ideal,
by connecting military glory and fame not only to the conventional links with courage
and gallantry, but also the less intuitive attributes of obedience, cleanliness, and
sobriety.
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This sort of rhetoric was a way to try to link the culturally exalted values of
masculinity with obedience by proposing a mutual association with courage. The link
between manliness and courage was longstanding and uncontroversial, and its
counterpart, the link between cowardice and effeminacy, was deployed as an
effective way to punish those who avoided battle by forcing them to wear women’s
clothes and thus taking away their place at the top of the gender hierarchy.272 This
use of the gender hierarchy to shame men for cowardly behavior can also be seen in
this order issued by General Wolfe: “If the soldiers of a company discover a maligner
[sic] at any time, or one of those rascals that shun duty and danger, from cowardice
or effeminacy, they are to inform the non-commissioned officers of the company,
who is to acquaint the captain of it, that such female characters may be properly
distinguished.”273
But Wolfe’s order was also an innovation, because it characterized the refusal to
work, as well as the refusal to fight, as unmanly cowardice. This was in keeping with
a larger rhetorical strategy that attempted to associate courage with obedience to
orders. “[T]he present method of fighting,” one military writer observed, required
not physical strength, but obedience; thus courage “has been found to consist more
in discipline, than in any particular constitution either of mind or body.”274 The
supposed link between courage and subordination was emphasized by several other
writers, many of whom referenced Saxe’s contention that “It is a false notion, that
subordination, and a passive obedience to superiors, is any debasement of a man's
courage.”275 In fact, Simes added, “so far from it, that it is a general remark, that
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those armies which have been subject to the severest discipline, have always
performed the greatest things.”276
But Saxe was quoted so assiduously precisely because the eighteenth-century
mind would not be persuaded on this point. Manly courage was demonstrated not by
subordination but by its exact opposite. Submission to another’s authority could not
be divorced from the suspicion that it ultimately stemmed from fear, and thus
obedience could never have an untroubled and uncontested existence as a primary
value of military masculinity. They thought, with Dr. Johnson, that “insolence in
peace is bravery in war,” and so in spite of military men’s pleas that subordination
was the most fundamental foundation of a functioning army, in the public mind
courage would ever remain more fundamental still, and in any direct contest
between the two the cultural power of courage must invariably triumph.277
Courage, Drewe claimed, was ultimately the only thing a soldier absolutely
required, far more important than learning about musket drills and maneuvers. And
this attitude was a common one. Many officers reacted with bewilderment to the
idea that they ought to educate themselves about military matters, learn their
military duties, and behave with strict adherence to proper military discipline, and,
indeed, often disdained those with technical military knowledge, such as the army’s
engineers and artillery officers.278 Bennett Cuthbertson bemoaned the “indolent
Dispositions” of officers who were unwilling to do the work of properly administering
a battalion,279 and Thomas Simes and Humphrey Bland admonished officers to
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remember the need to “apply ourselves to the Study of the military Art,”280 but
perhaps were not too successful in reforming attitudes towards study. A satirical
book of “Advice to the officers of the British Army” claimed that young officers who
were “advise[d] to learn the manual, the salute, or other parts of the exercise” ought
to reply “that you do not want to be drill-serjeant or corporal--or that you purchased
your commission, and did not come into the army to be made a machine of.”
Furthermore, the author advised, “It will also be perfectly useless for you to consult
any treatises of military discipline, or the regulations of the army. Dry books of
tactics are beneath the notice of a man of genius, and it is a known fact, that every
British officer is inspired with a perfect knowledge of his duty, the moment he gets
his commission.”281 Perhaps even in reference to Drewe’s case, his “Advice for the
Major” remarked on the uselessness of learning how to maneuver the battalion, for
“no other manoeuvres are used upon service, but to march up to the enemy, when
the battalion feels bold, and to run away, when it is not in a fighting humour.”282
But Drewe, for his part, mocked those who emphasized turning out a regiment
with a proper, orderly, military appearance, suggesting that they were fools who
thought that looks were more important that fighting ability. He ridiculed the idea
that the carping of drill sergeants could play any essential role in assuring victory in
battle. "Do you think...that the field of Blenheim was won by the manoeuvres of its
general?” he asked sarcastically. “No; he was entitled to his success by the superior
polish of his boots…can ye think, that the success of an army depends on the genius
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of its leader? Does it depend on the vigour of its troops? No. On whom does it
depend but its drill serjeants.”283
An officer who had too much concern for these matters, Drewe and other officers
asserted, were betraying an officer’s exalted position as a member of the upper
class. They objected to the idea that they should learn the duties of enlisted men,
on the grounds that this was demeaning to their class position as gentlemen.
Training the men, they claimed, was for the NCOs and perhaps the adjutant, not a
task for the commissioned officers.284 In fact, Lambart claimed, when “such minutiae
are dwelt upon by an officer,” it was a threat to the class system as a whole, “by
serving to level and confound distinctions” between the classes. In order "to
preserve a suitable dignity for himself," an officer ought to "leave those littlenesses
to those below him."285 Drewe went the furthest in mocking officers concerned with
“the interior oeconomy of a regiment or company. This concern with “the domestic
duties of a soldier,” was
supposed to be an object of such consequence, that whole
volumes have been written on it, in which the character of a drummajor has been delineated with uncommon exactness, and every
possible method of cleaning the accoutrements ascertained with
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the nicest precision; yet notwithstanding this assistance, the task
has been found so arduous, as to employ half the time of many
able officers, who, by the oath, the cane, the aid of courts martial,
and an unremitted attention, have absolutely arrived at the
perfection of settling their weekly pay bill, and bringing their shoes
and firelocks to a tolerable degree of polish.286
But worrying about these matters of military minutia merely revealed one’s lack
of status. “I confess my deficiency in this great branch of my profession,” Drewe
stated, claiming that this was because he was “born a gentleman, and educated as a
soldier,” and therefore his “intercourse with mechanics has been but partial.” In
fact, he managed to link the neglect of boring military duties with proper upper-class
behavior: “altho' I allow a lance corporal to be of great use in his department, yet I
have perhaps fondly supposed that a commissioned officer was a superior
personage, whose dignity must not be prostituted; that he should command the
troops he is entrusted with, not act simply as the first non-commissioned officer
amongst them.”287
But more importantly, Drewe claimed, the strict discipline and control over
enlisted men that was characteristic of linear warfare was an active threat to the
nation. To control each minute aspect of the soldier’s life, to reduce him to the most
wretched submission, to make manifest the officer’s power of life or death over
him—this was, in the British imagination, the glory or the shame of the Prussian
system of military discipline. As Drewe described it,
The genius of the King of Prussia combines the most minute
attentions to trifles, with the sublimest depth of military tactics;
and he has won victories. But some of our commanders
overlooking, or rather not comprehending, the elevated scale of
war, have fixed all their attention on these trifles, hoping also to
win victories by the assistance of hatters, cordwainers, and
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taylors. But this would rather excite the smile of pity, than call for
the scourge of satire. The evil is of a deeper root. Frederick's
rigour is excessive, and his troops are amongst the best in the
world. We have therefore adopted this rigour, in all its force,
judging little of different situations, and still less of that attention
which should be paid to national character.288
The armies of each nation were thought to have a distinct temperament. The
French were thought to be in general indisciplined, but superior to all other nations in
art of sieges and fortifications, whereas the Germans (the Prussians in particular)
were thought to be naturally obedient and pliable. The English were praised for their
courage and eagerness to enter battle, but they were also thought to be
undisciplined and insubordinate.289

Rigorous discipline, Drewe argued, might work

for Frederick’s troops, but it was not suitable to the British character:
The Prussian armies are chiefly composed of native Germans,
slaves from their birth; and soldiers of fortune, without home or
connexion. Deprived of these social ties, which call forth the finer
feelings of the mind, they are patient, submissive, and indifferent
to all worldly matters. Unaccustomed to lenity or comfort, with
them battle is vacation from punishment, and holds forth the hope
of relief from a painful existence. But far different is the high-born
spirit of the British soldiery. Active from the love of fame, and their
country; for these they risque all the comforts of our genial
government. In general, independent, accustomed to the freedom
of reasoning on the conduct of others, and of judging for
themselves, how impolitic is it to introduce this discipline amongst
them!290
Britons, Drewe argued, naturally possessed a tendency to be liberty-loving and
courageous, and attempts to impose German methods of discipline merely
squandered this priceless national asset. Bland tried to counteract this claim,
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asserting instead that the English lack of discipline stemmed from officers' neglect,
not some inherent property of national character. Although conceding that “It is
allow'd by all Nations, that the English possess Courage in an eminent Degree,”
Bland denied that insubordination was an essential part of the British national
character:
We have a common Notion, that this Sang Froid, or Obedient
Quality in the Dutch, is owing chiefly to Nature, by their having a
greater Proportion of Phlegm in the Constitution than the English,
by which their Minds are not so soon agitated as ours. But I look
upon this way of Reasoning, to be rather a plausible Excuse for our
own Neglect, in not bringing our Men to the same Perfection of
Discipline, than the Production of any natural Cause in the
Dutch.291
Bland opined that “a natural Love of Independancy…reigns in all Mankind,” and
that officers must forever be on their guard against it; when troops became used to
having their own way, it would require “Time, infinite Pains and Severity, to reduce
them to their proper Obedience.”292 But those who concluded that the English could
not learn discipline “are certainly mistaken in that, since none are more capable of
Instruction than the English; and when proper Means are used, neither Patience, nor
Obedience are wanting in them.”293
But Bland’s view was not widely adopted; instead, most continued to assert that
it was not possible to bring English troops to the same discipline of a Prussian
regiment. Nor was it wise to attempt it, for English indiscipline was the inevitable
result of English courage.294 Furthermore, they claimed, indiscipline was merely the
price to paid in a country which placed such emphasis on liberty. Although the harsh
291.Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 147.
292.Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 195.
293.Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 147.
294.Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763, 72; Starkey, "War and
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126
methods favored by Frederick the Great became popular among some British
regiments after the Prussian successes during the Seven Years' War. However,
commentators generally argued for the unsuitability of German methods for libertyloving Englishmen, who would not submissively accept beatings like the downtrodden
wretches of Frederick's armies.295 Drewe himself made a ferocious critique of
admirers of the Prussian method, denouncing the foolishness of those who focused
on “trifles” and ended by directly blaming the fad for the majority of the army’s
problems: it encouraged tyranny; its “uncontrouled oppression” would “sink the
tender spirit in despondence, or rouse the more active one to revolt”; and it caused
disharmony among the officer class. In his view, the army ought to encourage
spirited, high-minded valor, not an excessive concern with trifling matters like
properly cocked hats, perfect lines, or exacting obedience to orders.296
And even more dangerously, Drewe argued, strict disciplinary practices were
destroying the soldiers’ masculinity. The focus on soldiers’ dress and the
overwhelming emphasis on ensuring that they appeared in a proper uniform was
making soldiers submissive and effeminate. Modern scholars suggest that the
soldier's splendid, fashionable, and ornamented uniform led to fears that they had a
too feminine concern with appearance, but this was not precisely the connection.297
Military dress did, in fact, threaten masculinity, but not precisely because of
ornamentation or fashionability. Rather, military dress was associated with
subordination, and subordination was unmanly. The uniform brought fears of
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emasculation not because it was ornamented, but because it was regimented—the
man wearing it had to submit his body to it. This link was understood at the time;
the same regiments that were renowned for their strict discipline were also the ones
most admired for their military appearance. Military commanders’ mania for all
things Prussian in the wake of Frederick’s victories extended not only to desires for
the unquestioning obedience reputed to be the hallmark of Frederick’s troops, but
also a wish to turn out their regiments in the neat, orderly style of a Prussian
regiment.298
This connection between military dress and an unnatural subordination was
understood by both Cuthbertson, who emphasized its importance, and by Drewe,
who denounced it. Cuthbertson claimed that the dress of a battalion was important
for establishing its reputation: “it is often suspected, that a slovenly and irregular
method of dressing, bespeaks a drunken, unregarded Battalion.”299 Furthermore, he
noted the importance of dress for forming a soldiers' character and bringing him to
the requisite subordination: “When once a Soldier can be brought to take a delight in
his Dress, it will be easy to mould him to whatever else may be desired, as it is in
general a proof, that he has thrown off the sullen, stubborn disposition which
characterizes the peasants of most countries.”300
The willingness to delight in dress was the willingness to submit to authority. For
Cuthbertson, then, particularly concerned with reforming the British army on proper
Prussian-style lines, controlling the minute aspects of a soldier’s appearance was
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integral for establishing the necessary military discipline. Drewe, on the side of
proper masculine insubordination, claimed that a concern with appearance made
soldiers unmanly. In a letter to an editor which Drewe wrote in the guise of an old
soldier who had fought with Wolfe upon the Plains of Abraham, who was now sadly
confronted with the pernicious new fashion of the military, he wrote, “I live in a
town, Sir, where a body of troops are quartered; they have what is called a Macaroni
colonel; of course all his soldiers are macaronies. When this regiment parades, the
men are so curtailed in their cloaths, that they appear like a set of trimmed game
cocks.”301
For Drewe, the limited movement allowed by tightly tailored uniforms made the
man who wore it “ridiculous,” and “a man turned into a monkey.” The problem with
military dress was that it prevented proper manly violence; it was suitable only for
the drill-sergeant-style uniform firing, not the dashing, aggressive, personal violence
proper to a man. In another fanciful writing imagining a confrontation between the
300 Spartans of Thermopylae and a British regiment following the new system, he
described the dress and fighting methods of the latter as so emasculating that a
proper army would be dishonored by fighting them:
Each figure was screwed into a jacket of such excessive tightness
that not a sinew had room to play, and the whole body resembled
much the form of a trussed rabbit...its head was loaded with a
quantity of flour, and dragged back upon its shoulders by the
weight of an enormous queue made of sheep's wool, and on the
head was perched a hat which seemed to be the manufacture of
Lilliput...there strode out from the ranks a form clad nearly in the
same vestment, but whose shoulders were so broad, and whose
face was so terrific, that I doubted not his being the champion of
the army, who had advanced to defy the boldest Spartan to
combat. He appeared conscious of his superior strength, since he
had no other arms, than a small rattan in his hand…[He]
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129
pronounced [the commands] in a shrill and delicate voice…After
which he strode back, and again sheltered himself amidst the
ranks.…[T]wo orderly corporals rushing from the ranks, armed
with hair brushes, began dusting of coats, settling of hats,
straitening of queues....Now had the Spartan phalanx reached the
opposing foes...and to all appearance would have entirely routed
them...when, wonderful to relate! I beheld them face to the right
about, and, marching back, take their way to Sparta, leaving the
pass undefended....I was thunder struck, that Leonidas, who had
so bravely opposed the united powers of Asia, should tamely give
up so important a pass to an army that scarce seemed women. I
thought in my dream that I saw him march off with shame and
indignation in his countenance, and I determined to enquire the
reason: he gloomily replied, the spears of my Spartans have been
embrued in the blood of men, and shall not be stained with that of
monkies.302
Military dress did have a level of ornamentation that could be perceived as
suspiciously feminine, but those associations ought to have been wholly nullified by
the uncontestly masculine acts of battlefield violence that soldiers performed. But,
as this passage by Drewe suggests, the emphasis on tactics that required soldiers to
robotically follow the instructions of drill sergeants (who, in Drewe’s account, were
also derided for giving the commands of war in “shrill and delicate” voices), as well
as the increasing confinement required by the new military uniforms, did not allow
soldiers to perform proper violent masculinity. Their tactics did not allow it, and
even if the tactics were dispensed with, the clothes they wore was too confining to
wield swords and attack the enemy directly. And furthermore, the desire to exercise
masculine violence must have been utterly trained out of an army that displayed
such a feminine concern with making a neat and ornamental appearance—why, to
rush upon the enemy ranks, sword in hand, and deliver glorious death might result
in some dirt settling upon their coats, or set their hats askew, or disarrange their
hair!
302.Drewe, Military Sketches, 56-58.
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Drewe bemoaned this current effeminate trend, which made soldiers unworthy to
be the successors of the men who had fought at the great British victories of the
Seven Years’ War at Blenheim, Minden, and Quebec: “Where is now the manly look,
the vigorous form, that iron body which alike defied the deadly engines of the foe,
and the bitterest inclemency of heaven? Alas, they are fled to the Russian or the
Turk. In Britain they are found no more. Hence then ye less than women in the form
of men. Resign the sacred name of soldier.”303 For Drewe, these changes in military
dress and tactics so feminized soldiers that they would find it impossible to exercise
proper martial, masculine courage, which he considered the fundamental basis of all
military virtue.
Even those who wanted to insist on the absolute necessity of obedience in a
military context had to contend with the adoration of courage. Military authors
conceded that disobedience of orders that proceeded from rashness and eagerness
for battle was “more excusable than the other [disobedience from cowardice],
though the Consequences may prove as fatal, since it proceeds from a mistaken
Zeal; but the other from a want of Courage.”304 When strict military duty clashed
against manly courage, at the highest levels of government, in the opinions of the
men most concerned with maintained discipline and subordination in the officer corps
as well as the army as a whole, military duty won, but only very reluctantly.

It was

difficult to believe that a man who had shown conspicuous courage could be wholly
wicked. Having shown courage in battle, or, even better, having been wounded in
action, had great value for enlisted men as well as officers. Private Thomas Bartley
of the 47th had been convicted of desertion in New York in 1779, a crime that carried
a death sentence, but upon an officer’s testimony that he had previously “behaved
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very bravely in action” and “been wounded, once or twice,” the court took notice of
these “favourable circumstances” and chose to “recommend him as an object of
mercy.”305
Drewe received some similar consideration. When Drewe’s court-martial
proceedings were forwarded on to London for review by the Judge Advocate General,
Charles Gould, they came with a note from the commander in the West Indies,
General Vaughan, cataloging “several circumstances…favourable to Major Drewe.”
Gould then related these circumstances to the king, who wanted further details of
the proceedings. He had then “taken into his Royal Consideration the several
Matters produced in Evidence, wishing to have discovered some ground for a
Mitigation of the Sentence.” Alas, Drewe’s behavior had been proved beyond a
doubt to be unmilitary and unprofessional and the king could not continue to allow
him to serve because it was “indispensably necessary, in point of Example and for
the inforcing of a Strict observance of discipline,” to dismiss him. Yet the king came
to his decision only “with much regret, having been informed of [Drewe’s] Spirited
behaviour and the wounds sustained by him in the Service of his Country” at Bunker
Hill. Furthermore, the king wished to have it known that he remained convinced
that, whatever failures Drewe had displayed as a military officer, he still retained an
“unimpeached Character as a Gentleman.”306
So Drewe was dismissed, but he retained the moral high ground, in great part
because the cult of courage was associated with the aristocracy; it was more
naturally theirs than the mechanized ways of linear warfare.307 This suggests
another important point: in Britain, the methods and practices of linear warfare were
305.WO 71/90, pp. 92-95.
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not compatible with the values and ideals of martial masculinity. Officers longed for
what they imagined were the epic days of medieval combat—aristocratic, chivalrous,
and glorious, with ample opportunities for individuals to distinguish themselves in
combat by performing dashing feats of sword-fighting.308 The realities of linear
warfare, which, when properly executed, allowed an infantry officer no opportunity at
all for engaging in personal violence, were not at all to their taste. (If the battle
proceeded perfectly, an officer would never come into contact with enemy forces,
and would do no more to inflict damage upon them than wave his sword as a signal
for his men to fire their muskets.)
And in their resistance to the orderly and disciplined ways of linear warfare, men
like Drewe promoted a vision of martial masculinity that was actually increasingly
separate from the practice of war itself. In his criticism of linear warfare, Drewe
made the interesting suggestion that the well-regulated battlefield was no longer the
prime place make a display of conspicuous masculine courage, and that battle might
no longer serve as adequate public proof of the masculine qualities necessary for a
military man. This idea, combined with the perception (discussed in the previous
chapter) that officers’ private lives were separate from and unregulatable by the
military hierarchy, led to a military culture in which the private realm of officers’
personal honor became the primary arena for establishing and defending masculine
status. But like the realm of the battlefield, the most important method for gaining
honor and status remained the exercise of violence.
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Chapter 5: No Retreat

Lieutenant Hugh Campbell of the 35th Regiment, on trial in 1783 for the murder
of Lieutenant Boyle of the 27th Regiment of Foot, described “The Melancholy
circumstances that closed a Friendship of long standing” between himself and the
deceased: Campbell, Boyle, and a few other officers from the several regiments
stationed in St. Lucia had gone on a pleasure outing, one part of which involved a
recreational journey by canoe. Whilst in the canoe, Campbell “told the deceased,
who steer'd, (in a Jocular manner without the most distant idea of giving him
Offence) that he knew not how to Steer and that he swayed the Canoe from one side
to the other.” Boyle responded “in a very serious tone, 'don't be a boy’” and “in a
very aggravating and impolite tone, said, I was a Blockhead. I then, vexed at his
reply, told him he was a Fool and told him he shou'd make choice of better Language
when he wished to express himself."309
When the party reached the shore, Boyle demanded to know how the two of
them would make up the quarrel—that is, inquiring whether Campbell was prepared
to issue an apology for his insulting remarks, or whether the two men would have to
fight a duel. As Campbell related it, the two other officers in the party "then
interfered, and endeavoured to make up the difference between us, saying it was
Nonsense for Friends to Quarrell about so trifling a matter.” Both Boyle and
Campbell reaffirmed their friendship with each other: “the Deceased then said
Campbell is the last Man in the World I would wish to quarrel with, I then said Mr.
Boyle is the last Man I would quarrel with.” But, added Campbell, “as I am conscious
of having given no Offence I can make no Apology,” and Boyle “in an outrageous
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manner said I had injured him, and that I must fight him to which I replied I will as
you desire it, the deceased then proposed as I was better acquainted in the Town
than him, I should endeavour to borrow Weapons."
Despite many attempts by Campbell to reconcile with Boyle, the duel took place
the following morning, and Campbell shot and killed Boyle. No one disputed this
fact. Campbell admitted to fatally shooting Boyle. But he by no means considered
himself guilty of murder. “I find myself unfortunate, and unhappy, when I reflect
upon the event, but it is not the unhappiness attendant on guilt,” he told the court.
He had “not been the Aggressor,” he said, and so “I feel myself acquitted, in my own
breast of having acted wrong.” But most importantly, he claimed, no guilt could be
attached to him because he had no choice in the matter: “[T]he disagreeable affair I
have been engaged in, was unavoidable—unless I could submit to be stigmatized a
Coward.”310
And, in the eyes of the officers of the British army, Campbell’s behavior was
proper and justified. They did not consider it morally wrong to kill rather than be
branded a coward. As the previous chapter showed, courageous violence on the
battlefield was a marker of masculinity, and a very appealing one for military men.
But its inevitable corollary was the extreme stigmatization of cowardice. An officer
could not allow the slightest imputation of cowardice to go unchallenged. (In fact, a
lack of reaction to an accusation of cowardice was itself taken as evidence of
cowardice—proof that the man was too frightened to take action to defend his
reputation.) This led, as this chapter shows, to a military culture in which quarrels
and duels were endemic, because officers had no way to honorably retreat from
conflicts with other officers. Too frequently, a conspicuous and often deadly act of
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violence was required to defend one’s reputation as a man of courage and to
preserve one’s honor.
Boyle and Campbell’s trivial quarrel over canoeing skills escalated to a fatal duel
because, as Campbell’s testimony implies, both parties thought they had been
insulted and deserved an apology, and neither party thought they could apologize to
the other without incurring shame. In the final attempts at mediation before the
duel occurred, the officer acting as Boyle’s second reported that Boyle claimed that
"no Apology should be sufficient, except a very abject one, made before the
Gentlemen and the Drummer who were in the Canoe."311 And this “abject” and semipublic apology was precisely what Campbell could not honorably do in the hours
before a scheduled duel. To apologize before dueling, even if one was clearly in the
wrong, might be taken as a sign of cowardice—it might be taken to mean that one
had only apologized because one was afraid to hazard one's life in a duel. One could
apologize, of course, after the duel had concluded.312
Mutual friends of the disputing officers often had the role of trying to determine
on what the terms the two would apologize to each other. Demands that public
offense be paired with public apology, similar to Boyle’s contention that he would
only accept Campbell’s apology if it was made before all those who had been present
in the canoe, were common. To take another example, when Ensign Townshend laid
out his apology requirements in a letter to his commander, he claimed that "As the
insult offer'd to me by Mr. Haines was of the most public nature, if he will in the
most Publick manner beg my pardon for it; On having done so, I am ready to
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acknowledge that I mistook his intentions.”313 Townshend’s letter also alludes to
another aspect of the negotiation over what types of apology were proper and did
not show any unmanly submission: the careful distinction between an
acknowledgment of fault, and begging pardon. After Lieutenant Anthony Allaire and
Ensign Robert Keating got into a fight one evening after they had both been drinking,
the other officers of the regiment tried to reconcile them, but although Allaire was
willing to “acknowledge his fault to Mr. Keating,” he “would not beg his Pardon as it
happened at a Drunken Frolick.” Only if the concessions made by each party were
strictly equivalent would he agree to more: “as it was my Opinion that the fault was
equal on both sides, I could never think of asking his Pardon singularly; This I'll
agree to that as Mr. Keating and I have both been in the wrong we'll ask Pardon
(reciprocally).”314 Alliare was making a further distinction with this proposal of a
negotiated, mutual, simultaneous exchange of apologies, more likely to be
considered honorable than the suspicious and unmanly unilateral offer of an apology.
One officer even had to defend the terms on which he had apologized: “I did not
think it unbecoming my Character to confess myself sorry for any Improprieties I
might have Committed, and therefore made an Apology to Captain Holms with which
he was satisfied. But this I did in such Terms as became me, and he was intitled to,
and not in abject or disagreeable ones.”315
Campbell’s defense suggested that he desperately wanted to reconcile with his
friend, but had no way to do so while retaining his own honor.316 He was ultimately
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acquitted, possibly because he was able to document his numerous attempts to
make peace with Boyle through the mediation of other officers. He and Boyle had
agreed to duel at 6 a.m. on March 22, 1783, but the night before, Campbell had sat
up until 1 a.m. waiting for the visit of another officer, a mutual friend, "expecting by
his assistance to have settled the difference without coming to the extremities
proposed by the deceased.” Alas, Campbell reported, “in this expectation I was
unfortunately disappointed," and so in the morning, Campbell and his second went to
Boyle’s quarters, “where we were confident in finding him in Bed and settling the
dispute in an amicable manner,” but found that Boyle had already left to go to the
appointed dueling grounds. Upon hearing this, Campbell and his friend thought that
they “had then no alternative left, but to follow them, which we did, without
Weapons, still hoping to settle the matter without coming to extremities." But when
they met Boyle at the agreed place, he refused to reconcile, and preferred to lend
Campbell one of his own pistols instead of delaying the duel any longer, and the duel
occurred, leading to Boyle's wounding and subsequent death.
Note again Campbell’s defense: he had no other options; he did not desire the
duel, but he had to fight it—the choice ultimately came down to killing his friend over
an argument about how to paddle a canoe, or being “stigmatized a Coward”
forevermore, and he chose the only honorable course.317 In the perception of the
general public, this behavior was ridiculous but hardly unexpected for a military man.
In the popular culture of the eighteenth century, army officers were notorious for
dueling, especially over relatively trivial incidents that nevertheless managed to
offend their touchy honor.318 And the army’s court-martial proceedings confirm this
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view, recording innumerable duels, fights, quarrels, and other outbreaks of violence
among officers, quite often for rather minor reasons—duels that started over such
incidents as one officer presuming to give another advice on how best to strike the
balls during a game of billiards, or Ensign Gaskell and Lieutenant Dalrymple’s fight,
in which swords were drawn, which stemmed from a dispute the officers had over
which of them was handsomer, who was more educated, and which man most
resembled the regiment’s dog.319
The clear threat that honor culture presented to the military hierarchy (because
officers perceived some insult in their commander’s orders, and demanded to duel),
and the very fact that these altercations were recorded and preserved because
officers were prosecuted for indulging in them, might lead to an expectation that
military authorities made serious attempts to suppress the practice of dueling among
officers and reform the duel’s inevitable precursor—the military culture of extreme
sensitivity to matters of honor.320 Yet even the authors who most emphasized the
importance of officers’ subordination to their superiors endorsed the importance of
honor and the need to preserve it at all costs. “I don't pretend to say, that one
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should tamely suffer an Affront,” Simes remarked. “No! A Gentleman should defend
his Honour, and rather lose his Life than bear an Insult or Spot on his Reputation.”321
Honor was thought to be particularly fragile and easily tarnished. Cuthbertson
claimed that the best officers were “of so refined a composition, that the small stain
is never to be erazed.”322 Donkin compared honor to “the eye, which can't suffer the
least moat [sic] in it, without being blemished! Honor may be called a precious
stone, which the smallest speck makes less valuable! it is a treasure irrecoverable
when once unfortunately lost!”323 Furthermore, Donkin claimed, life had no value if
honor was lost.
Honor was more important than life, worth dying for, and worth killing for.
“[W]hy should he be acquitted who kills in defence of life, yet he condemned, who
kills in defence of his dearer reputation?” one officer asked.324 Campbell appealed to
the court’s “just sense of the dearness of an Officer's reputation, and the delicacy of
his honor,” and was acquitted, suggesting officers’ general agreement on this
point.325 Thus, opponents of dueling had the difficult task of attempting to separate
the duel from the demands of honor, which could not be gainsaid. But this is not to
say that the practice of dueling reigned unopposed in the military. As Campbell’s
own testimony suggests, officers did in fact recognize and lament the high costs of a
dueling culture.
It was common for officers to express regret for a duel, and condemn those of
quarrelsome temperaments who dueled frequently or goaded others to duel, but
these men cannot be properly categorized as opponents to dueling. They were not
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exactly in favor of dueling, but the most accurate way to describe them is anti-antidueling; to them, pro-dueling sentiment was dangerous to good order, the
brotherhood of officers, and life itself, but anti-dueling sentiment was more
pernicious still, for it threatened honor. In this vein, Donkin suggested that
abolishing the duel could come about only if men became so craven as to fear death,
and so insensitive to the claims of honor that fear of some other, lesser social
sanction could override it. Until that unhappy day came to pass, Donkin wrote,
ending dueling was impossible for purely pragmatic reasons: “The extinction of
dueling is become impracticable! for what penalties can intimidate men superior to
the fear of death? or stigmatize what honor approves?”326
Donkin insisted that the price to be paid for officers’ collective honor was a fair
one: “Was a computation to be made of all that have fallen in duels for a series of
years, the inconsiderableness of the number wou'd but ill justify the extravagant
clamour against them.”327 But even officers who were horrified at the wasteful
violence of the duel felt a profound ambivalence about dueling. It led, as in the case
of Campbell and Boyle, to good friends killing each other over a trivial argument over
how to paddle a canoe, but officers refused to consider the dueling a fundamentally
immoral act. Some officers went so far as to concede that a man who deliberately
provoked duels was akin to a murderer, but all recognized the necessary role that
the duel played in safeguarding reputation and restoring honor.
In fact, the role of violence in establishing, maintaining, and damaging masculine
status and reputation, combined with officers’ preoccupation with upholding their
class position within the military hierarchy, made the duel a necessary part of
military life, and is an explanation for why it could not be eradicated. Linking honor
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with the ability to perceive insult led to the belief that the most honorable men were
those who were insulted even by small and accidental slights.328 But protecting one’s
honor was an assertion not only of one’s masculinity, but also a marker of class.
Gentlemen could not be expected to put up with insults or abuse, and that very
unwillingness to put up with insult or abuse was a way of asserting gentlemanly
status in an era when the definition of who was a gentleman was becoming more and
more vague.329 These sentiments were echoed in the words of one officer, who
insisted that if he didn’t “demand the Satisfaction of a Gentleman,” he was
“unworthy of the Rank of an Officer.”330 Dueling was so prevalent not because
officers were too prideful and irrationally concerned with minor points of honor, but
because the culture of military masculinity had left them with no alternative but to
be (rationally) concerned with minor points of honor if they wanted to defend their
class status, upon which their military authority ultimately rested.
Furthermore, dueling was not only the result of honor culture, but also enforced
it; the prevalence of dueling had the pernicious side effect of destroying officers’
ability to retreat honorably from a conflict. An apology could be construed as
cowardice, the desire to avoid the hazard of the duel. Engaging in violence, on the
other hand, established one’s masculinity and honor.
The stereotypical perception of dueling as an expression of chivalry and concern
for women has little basis in fact. It was threats to specifically masculine status that
provoked violence and duels, and protecting women’s interests was only incidental.
Duels that started over women did not stem from the chivalrous defense of a woman
in distress, but only the distress of (or, for that matter, the negligible
328.Banks, A Polite Exchange of Bullets: The Duel and the English Gentleman, 1750-1850, 6.
329.Robert Shoemaker, "Male Honour and the Decline of Public Violence in Eighteenth-Century London",
Social History 26, no. 2 (2001): 190-208.
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inconveniencing of) a woman over whom a man had a proprietary interest—because
his honor was diminished if he publicly demonstrated that he could not protect her
interests.331 When Ensign George Hume beat George Terry with a cane in a Gibraltar
bathhouse in 1770 for insulting Ann Wentworth, he acted not out of a disinterested
concern for Wentworth, but because she was a visitor from Ireland and explicitly
under Hume’s “protection.”332

The 1782 duel between Captain Townshend and

Ensign McKenzie in Jamaica may at first appear to have been caused from the
chivalrous motivations common to romantic fiction—Townshend had objected when
McKenzie had thrown a bottle that struck a black woman—but a closer examination
of the case reveals that the duel was fought not in the cause of the protection of a
woman, but for the honor of a man. The woman had seized one end of Townshend’s
walking stick, and he had been struggling with her to regain control of it when the
bottle struck her. But the deadly insult in this quarrel came not from the fact that
McKenzie had thrown the bottle at a woman, but that Townshend asked McKenzie to
declare upon his word of honor that he didn't throw the bottle with a "design to
strike that black Woman.” Upon hearing McKenzie's reply that "he declared upon his
word of honor and as he was a Gentleman that he did not intend to strike the
Woman with the Bottle" but rather intended to throw it at the "Croud of Negroes"
around the woman, Townshend claimed to be "astonished,” and observed that there
was no crowd around the woman except for some officers. In other words,
Townshend had responded to McKenzie’s declaration upon his word of honor with an
implication that McKenzie had just told a clear lie. Townshend then further escalated

331.Banks, A Polite Exchange of Bullets: The Duel and the English Gentleman, 1750-1850, 58: “One might
react aggressively when one's theatre companion was obliged to rise from her seat by a latecomer;
one did not react if from one's townhouse one could hear one's neighbour beating his wife.”
332.WO 71/77, 278-284.
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matters by announcing to the assembled officers that he was shocked that a man
could make such an untrue statement while wearing the uniform of a British officer.
As the court-martial testimony makes clear, the officers perceived the injured
party in this dispute to be not the woman struck by the bottle, and not Townshend,
who had objected to this treatment of a woman, but McKenzie, who had been
publicly accused of being a liar. Townshend did not challenge McKenzie to a duel,
but the other way around—McKenzie sought the duel after Townshend insulted him
by challenging his veracity, telling acquaintances that "he had been very much
insulted by Captain Townshend,” having been “told by him that he was not worthy to
wear His Majesty's Cloth.” And Townshend and the other officers explicitly denied
that the treatment of the woman was a factor in the duel, as Townshend had
declared “that if he must go out with Mr. McKenzie it would not be for the Cause of a
black Girl,” but because the two officers had each objected to the other’s behavior,
considering it dishonorable—and, more importantly, a personal insult.333
An examination of the numerous courts-martial of army officers for making
insulting remarks, engaging in violent quarrels, and dueling provides a taxonomy of
the fighting words of the late eighteenth century. These generally fell into two
categories: denigrations of the target’s abilities or behavior, and implications of
insufficient masculinity. In this latter category were terms such as “Puppy” and
“Schoolboy,” popular for insulting younger officers. Lieutenant Charlton indignantly
reported that during a dispute Lieutenant Edwards had insulted him, “making use of
the Expressions 'Impertinent Puppy' and 'Young Bear.’”334
“Rascal,” “Scoundrel,” and “Villain” were also popular insults, but as these were
direct reflections on an officer’s moral character they had more serious
333.WO 71/60, pp. 402-404.
334.WO 71/55, p. 61.
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consequences. Because officers were court-martialed not only for inflicting violence
upon each other after being provoked by such language, but also for the
“ungentlemanly” act of uttering the insulting remarks themselves, we can attempt to
reconstruct a hierarchy of insulting remarks from officers’ defenses to these charges.
Lesser insults were followed by officers defending themselves by claiming that the
language they used did not, technically, defame another officer’s character, such as
when Captain Harrington Baudin tried to claim that he was innocent of the charge of
taking “ungentlemanly and unjustifiable liberties with the Character of Lieut. Berks,”
because he had merely called Berks a “Fool” and “stupid fellow.” Unlike terms such
as “rascal” or “scoundrel,” Baudin argued, this species of name-calling ought not to
render him subject to official disapproval because although his words were “a
reflection on his Mental Abilities,” they were “no Impeachment of his Moral
Character.”335 Berks defended himself from the charge of insulting Baudin with a
similar claim: "As for the Words false and Blockhead, I acknowledge that they are
not the most civil that might have been picked out of the Dictionary; but...surely,
Sir, they cannot be worth the notice of the Court."336
The moral judgment implied in such terms as “Rascal,” “Scoundrel,” or “Villain”
frequently provoked duels because they implied that an officer’s character and
reputation as an honorable gentleman was deficient. But because courage was the
virtue prized above all others by soldiers, the acknowledged basis of all martial
virtue, the term “Coward” occupied the pinnacle of the military man’s hierarchy of
insults. A man who had been called a coward could not dismiss it or laugh it off—he

335.WO 71/60, p. 314.
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had to demand a retraction, and, if that was not forthcoming, issue a challenge to
duel.337
Equally damning as accusations of cowardice were accusations of lying, a
situation that might initially appear odd considering officers’ general lack of
appreciation for traditional moral prescriptions. But to call another officer a liar was
a shocking insult not because lying was considered an inherent moral wrong, but
because lying was considered the act of a coward.338 “Calumny is the weapon of a
coward, and his shield the secrecy of others,” claimed a series of military
aphorisms.339 The subtle distinction officers made between privacy and secrecy
illuminate the links that officers drew between openness, candor, and courage, and
the concurrent link between secrecy, falsehood, and cowardice.340 Privacy, as we
have seen in a previous chapter, was an officer’s right. On the other hand, secrecy
was a pernicious fault.
It is important to note, however, that this perjorative use of the term “secrecy”
applied only to interpersonal violence between officers. Officers could have secret
meetings amongst themselves, or keep secrets from other officers, without any loss
of honor; these actions were merely an exercise of their right to privacy. But for an
officer to attack the body or reputation of another officer without making public the

337.Court-martial testimony records that many of these other, less serious insults were not always taken
seriously, but a claim that an oﬃcer was a coward always was. Gilbert, "Law and Honour Among
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oﬃcers’ honor code (1. cowardice 2. insuﬃcient regard for one’s social status 3. accusations of lying
or slander 4. defaming the regiment), acting in a manner perceived as cowardly, or accusing another
oﬃcer of being a coward, were the most serious. See WO 71/92, pp. 76-88 for an example of oﬃcers’
behavior being constrained by fears that it would be perceived by onlookers as “timorousness.”
338.Banks, A Polite Exchange of Bullets: The Duel and the English Gentleman, 1750-1850, 48. on
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information that he was the one who had fired the shot, or first circulated the
insulting rumor, was grossly dishonorable.
When Lieutenant Colonel Cosmo Gordon accused Frederick Thomas of, among
other things, “secretly aspersing his Character,” he pointed to the adverb to imply
particular misconduct. As Gordon related it, Thomas had been spreading rumors
that he had behaved improperly during a recent battle. The defendant, Thomas,
agreed with Gordon’s assessment of the wickedness of making secret aspersions,
remarking on the “Odiousness of the Charge—It implies a secret & assassin like
stabbing in the Dark at Lieut. Col. Gordon's reputation.” Such an action, he stated,
“implies…the want of every human Virtue, for they must be incompatible with that
Heart that is base enough to attempt to undermine a Reputation.” If the court did
find him guilty of such a shameful crime, Thomas said, he would “beseech them in
Mercy to deprive me of Life by the same Sentence.”341 These melodramatic words,
implying that to be judged a man who destroyed reputations by secret machinations
was a fate worse than death to a man of honor, were similar to the dismay
expressed by men accused of cowardice, and quite appropriate when one realizes
that this charge of secrecy was actually a veiled charge of cowardice. By attacking
another’s officer’s reputation in secret, a coward wounded the man without exposing
himself to retaliation, just as an assassin was denounced as a coward for killing his
mark without giving his victim an opportunity to defend himself.
A public attack, on the other hand, demonstrated one’s courage (and also
masculinity—when Gordon first tried to determine the source of the rumor, he called
upon the officer who has been making unflattering remarks about him to be “Manly
enough to declare it” in his presence).342 Thomas’s defense was that he could not
341.WO 71/56, p. 95.
342.See also Wolfe, Instructions to Young Oﬃcers, 20. Faced with anonymous letters complaining about
conditions in the regiment, Wolfe issued orders forbidding the “mean and underhand practice.” The
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possibly be guilty of secretly aspersing Gordon's character, as he "publickly, openly,
and to Colonel Gordon's own Face, accused him on the spot of Neglect of Duty.”343
Thomas avowed that he had made a proper “honest & open Attack” against Gordon—
and, he implied, Gordon was the one truly at fault, for responding with court
proceedings rather than with a duel.344
Even more damaging than verbal insults were physical assaults. To receive an
assault impugned a man’s courage and masculinity, but it was also an attack on his
social position as a member of the upper class. To strike a gentleman (and officers
were—in theory—all gentlemen) with one’s fists or with a cane was a deadly affront.
A gentleman was someone whose person could not be assaulted, and in fact this was
one of the prime characteristics that distinguished a gentleman from other men.
(The distinction that gentlemen made between their public and private characters
also served to distinguish between honorable and dishonorable violence; “wounds
received in fair action” on the battlefield were by no means dishonoring, because
there, the attack was made on the officer’s public character in a military setting.
Dishonorable assaults were those made on a man’s private character as a
gentleman.345)
Only gentlemen had honor. The common perception among the upper class was
that the "lower orders" lacked the fine feelings of honor of a gentleman, and thus
beating them caused them to suffer no shame, but only the physical pain of the
disdain for secrecy as an unmilitary and unmanly virtue existed in the Continental Army as well.
Confronted with the news of Benedict Arnold's treason, General Greene painted the action as
shameful: “Our Enemies despairing of carrying their point by force are practising every base Art to
eﬀect by Bribery and Corruption what they cannot accomplish in a manly way." (General Greene's
Orders, Sept. 26 1780, Showman, Cobb, and McCarthy, Papers of General Nathanael Green, 6:
314-315, cited in Ruddiman, "'A Record in the Hands of Thousands': Power and Negotiation in the
Orderly Books of the Continental Army," 762.)
343.WO 71/56, p. 94.
344.Gordon and Thomas did in fact fight a duel over this dispute four years later in 1784, in London, in
which Gordon killed Thomas and was tried for his murder.
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148
assault. For that reason, a soldier might need a savage flogging of hundreds of
lashes to convince him of the error of his ways, while a single blow to the person of a
gentlemanly officer would permanently dishonor him. To officers, the need for
different punishments based on a criminal's class was unquestioned:
punishments...are peculiarly adapted to the respective ranks; for
what would be an adequate punishment for an offence in one rank,
might be extremely inadequate in another: as, for instance, simple
dismission, which is a very heavy penalty to an officer, might be
esteemed by a private soldier rather a benefit than otherwise;
whereas, a few lashes, which might be inflicted on the latter for a
trifling breach of duty, would be to the former a most irreparable
injury as depriving him of his honour, and rendering him unfit for
the the society of gentlemen.346
In practice, the bodies of the enlisted and the officers were treated with blatant
disparity. After “high words" passed between Lieutenant William Hamilton and
Captain Richard Nesbitt over the pulling down of a hut, a bystander reported that he
“heard Lieut. Hamilton say that he did not care a fart for him [Nesbitt], and that he
would blow a ball through his old head." Nesbitt replied with a threat of disgraceful
physical violence, telling Hamilton that “if he continued to make use of such abusive
language he should be obliged to stop his mouth by gagging him.” Hamilton
responded with an insult and threat of equally disgraceful violence, calling him “a
Rascal, a Scoundrel and a Coward, and said that he would cane him at the head of
the Regiment.” When Nesbitt had Hamilton arrested after making this last remark,
Hamilton protested that his words were quite reasonable under the circumstances,
demanding of an eyewitness, “Had an Officer threatened to gag him, what would he
have done?"347 Meanwhile, gagging an enlisted man or physically confining him was
routine. Ordinary soldiers were kept under lock and key in conditions far worse than
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that of a confined officer, who when under the most strict arrest still had the
freedom of his own quarters. One officer testified that an enlisted man “is apt to get
in liquor and is then so impertinent and noisy that they are often obliged to gag
him.”348 Thomas Bailey, a private, described the wretched conditions of his
confinement in the guard house after he had been accused of assaulting an officerin
Boston in 1775: he found himself “almost perished with the cold not able to walk to
keep myself warm nor seeing a bit of fire for the forty hours I was there Confined
which caused a violent pain in my head.”349 Particularly troublesome prisoners were
confined in the “Black Hole,” a part of the guard room with no regular access to light,
where prisoners were often kept on a diet of bread and water.350
It was certainly not unthinkable for enlisted men, confined in these harsh and
unpleasant conditions, to break their arrest and escape their confinement.351 On the
other hand, such behavior was unimaginable for an officer, so much so that no
precautions were put in place to prevent an officer from breaking his arrest, and,
indeed, it was considered a grave insult to put a guard at an officer’s door, or take
any measures whatsoever to prevent his escape. In 1780, Lt. Fortye of the 75th,
stationed in the British garrison at Gorée, off the coast of Senegal, was put under
arrest by the town major, the latter telling him “that it was his Orders, that he
should go to his room as an Officer and a Gentleman.” But Fortye answered, “I will
go to the black Hole first” and then started walking to the guard house. The enraged
348.WO 71/86, pp. 413-417.
349.WO 71/82, 191.
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town major sent a sentry after him, and only after the intercession of another officer
was Fortye persuaded to “go to his room as a Gentleman” and not to force anybody
to participate in “the Violation of an Officer’s privilege.” The town major noted that
he dismissed the sentry as soon as the lieutenant agreed to go to his room, and
when Fortye was found guilty of “refusing to go to his room when Ordered under an
Arrest,” the court “in consideration of his being put under the Charge of a Sentry,
and afterwards complying to go to his Room, do therefore Adjudge that to be a
sufficient punishment, for that part of the Crime laid to his Charge.”352
Far worse than putting a sentry at an officer’s door was to take measures not
only to alert the arresting officer that the prisoner was escaping (an enlisted sentry
posted at an officer’s door was prevented by the disparate rules of power and bodily
integrity from doing much more than allowing the officer to push past him, and then
informing his commanding officer353), but to suggest that not only the honor of his
word, but also the integrity of his body, was now compromised.
This was done through the implied willingness to use physical force against his
person. Captain William Dussaux of the 6th Regiment of Foot, accused of various
financial irregularities and put under arrest, revealed the conditions he had been
subjected to in tones of outrage: After he had been arrested, the regiment was
ordered to move from their previous quarters to new ones, and during this journey,
the commander ordered that Dussaux was ordered “to be Marched between the
Battalion and Rear Guard with fixed bayonets in an ignominious and disgraceful
manner like a common Criminal.” Dussaux used this incident as proof of the
fundamental injustice of his treatment at his commander’s hands, for this
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“humiliating treatment” for his “pretended Crimes” was “a punishment quite
unprecedented in our Army” and a “wanton violation of the most sacred and dearest
right of an Englishman, which exempts his person from any Confinement, much
more a disgraceful one, without good and sufficient cause.”354 Dussaux’s coarrestee, Captain James Scott, who had endured similar treatment, even more
explicitly claimed that this “disgraceful confinement” was shocking because it
subjected officers to treatment that was normally meted out only to enlisted men
and others who lacked gentle status: “Such treatment to Officers must annihilate
every distinction of Military rank, after this [they] may expect to be put in Irons and
Dungeons.”355
Scott insisted that officers should not and could not be treated with the
harshness that was customary towards enlisted men: “Officers in the English Army
are not to be ruled with a rod of Iron,” he claimed. “Military discipline and
Obedience from inferior towards superior Officers,” should instead proceed “from the
liberal principles of the Officers, from their Zeal for their profession, their love of
their Country and Attachment to their most gracious Sovereign.” Scott based his
appeal not only on the contention that these admirable qualities were sufficient to
motivate an officer to perform his military duties, but also on the claim that using
any other methods to direct officers would only lead to ruin: further treatment such
as he and Captain Dussaux had endured, he said, “must extinguish in [them] all
ardour for their profession and damp the Spirit which is Characteristick of
Englishmen.”356
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The freedom of movement allowed to officers was considered so fundamental a
right that it often persisted even after an officer had been arrested. Officers
distinguished between being under a “close arrest,” in which an officer was confined
to his quarters, and the far more common practice, in which an officer was nominally
under arrest but had few restrictions. He was not permitted to be on duty or bear
arms, and often enjoined from being out of his quarters after a certain hour of the
evening, but otherwise he was free to come and go as he pleased.
These important distinctions in the treatment of the bodies of the upper-class
officers and the lower-class enlisted soldiers were fundamental in upholding officers’
honor. Honor was inseparable from class position. An example of this is found in
the 1777 conflict between Ensigns William Mair and Thomas Smith of the 60th
Regiment of Foot, which stemmed from a rumor going around the regiment that Mair
had “spread reports prejudicial to the Character of Ensign Smith” by “declaring…in
the presence of several people, that he had horsewhipped or Caned Ensign Smith at
St. Augustine.” When Mair allegedly claimed to have beaten Smith, he dishonored
Smith by implying that his body was not immune to physical assault, that he was not
a member of the officer class. And the insult to Smith was exacerbated by the
particular disgrace of the weapons that Mair was said to have used. A cane was used
to beat persons of low status—children, servants, a particularly recalcitrant enlisted
man. A whip was even worse, being used to formally punish enlisted malefactors
and—a fact probably not lost on these officers stationed in the Caribbean—slaves.
Smith’s status was threatened on two fronts: first, it was rumored that he had
been caned or horsewhipped; second, reports were circulating that he had “patiently
suffered” this shameful treatment. Despite the general advocacy of the virtues of
patient suffering and submissive resignation to insult and misfortune in the Christian
writings of the time, no officer concurred with this assessment. In fact, to say that
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an officer had reacted to an insult with “patient suffering” was defamatory. During
Smith’s trial, Ensign George Dennis, whom Smith had named as the man who had
been telling others that Smith had been horsewhipped by Mair, was asked if he had
“ever at any time cast any reflections upon Mr. Smith for or upbraid him with or
insinuate to him that he had patiently suffered any disgraceful treatment from Mr.
Mair?” Dennis denied it absolutely—for if he had ever made such a claim, Smith
would have a had a legitimate grievance against Dennis for aspersing his
character.357 Patience and resignation might be virtues fit for weakly women, but a
manly man responded to an insult, whether in the form of a word or a blow, with
“proper resentment.” This emotion, resentment, was an assertion of not only
masculinity but also class, an emotion elite men reserved for themselves alone. It
was anger that stemmed not from the irrational outbursts of passion and the lack of
self-control characteristic of the lower sorts, but righteous anger, rational anger,
anger that was entirely reasonable, because it was generated directly in reaction to a
threat to a man’s social status or reputation as a honorable gentleman.358
But for army officers, responding with the proper resentment meant not only the
mere expression of emotion, but also action. When Ensign Townshend and
Lieutenant Haines fell to arguing, Haines, “being raised to a great degree of Passion
gave him the Lye,” that is, accused Townshend of being a liar. Townshend replied
that Haines was the liar, and Haines objected to this behavior, saying that “his
retorting the Lye was no resentment shewn at all.” For Haines, and for the British
officer corps more generally, “proper resentment” for a gentleman meant willingness
to inflict violence. Haines went on to demonstrate exactly what he meant, when he
357.WO 71/54, pp. 84-85.
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said that if being called a liar “was not sufficient for him (Mr. Townshend) to resent it
as a Gentleman, desired him to take that; at the same time giving him a Blow with a
Riding Switch.”359 Ensign Townshend’s response to being hit by a riding switch
wielded by Lieutenant Haines was to attempt to strike Haines back, and thus “put the
Can’d Townshend on a footing” of equality with Haines. The actions of both men
suggest the power of violence to repair insult. It re-established his status and
served as a public display of his masculinity and his willingness to use force to
defend his reputation.360
Violence had redemptive power, because violence established one’s lack of
cowardly submission. Behaving “submissively” was not a virtue; Lieutenant Triste
used that very word to condemn Captain Payne’s behavior when the baggage
wagons he was leading were confronted by a New York mob. “[H]e yielded them up
very submissively,” he said of Payne, when called to give evidence that Payne had
“acted a cowardly, pusillanimous, and unsoldierly part” by allowing the baggage to
be taken from him.361 And Payne’s violent propensities were cited by the officers
who sought to defend him: “if I had any reason to Complain of Captain Payne’s
Conduct it was rather for recommending Violent than Pusilanimous Measures,” Major
Hamilton stated when he testified in favor of Payne’s character and behavior.362 A
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tendency towards violence, then, was perhaps a vice, but as it was seen as almost
the exact opposite of cowardice, it was by far the preferable vice.
Not responding with violence—or at least the threat of future violence embodied
in a challenge to duel—demonstrated a lack of “proper resentment” that was fatal to
an officer’s reputation. If an officer failed to display it, he could be suspected of
cowardice—rumors might fly that he had accepted some dishonorable treatment out
of fear—or alternately, that he lacked a proper understanding of his class position.
Being insulted without responding with resentment called into question one’s status
as a gentleman, and were grounds for being dismissed from the army. Officers were
tried for behavior unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman for
allowing themselves to be assaulted or insulted without responding with appropriate
resentment, as was the case with Captain John McKinnon, who was sentenced to be
discharged after he was convicted of “Suffering himself to be kicked by Captain
McEvoy…without properly resenting it.”363
In officers’ understanding, displaying resentment was a virtue.364 But officers
went further in their assessment, claiming that displaying resentment was not only
proper, but inevitable. In the civilian sphere, resentment’s initial claim to being a
proper and exclusive emotion for upper-class men stemmed from its close
association with reason; it was presumed to proceed from a rational assessment of
injury. But in the late eighteenth century, resentment changed from a reasoned
evaluation of insult that led to righteous anger, to the immediate arousal of the
passions and anger from circumstances under which it was reasonable to be angry.365
Military understandings of resentment paralleled its civilian evolution into a less
363.WO 71/87, pp. 173-176.
364.Simes on oﬃcers’ “virtuous resentment” which led to an admirable desire to inflict violence on the
enemies of one’s country: Simes, The Military Instructor, 105.
365.Eustace, Passion Is the Gale : Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 196.

156
controllable emotion, as officers insisted that feelings of resentment at injury were
fundamental to the character of “a Man of honor and sensibility.” The person who
gave him the injury might be his superior, and in direct military command over him,
and the army might in fact work more smoothly if the injured man could swallow his
resentment and continue to obey orders, but officer after officer insisted that this
was impossible. The feelings of resentment were natural and manly, and to try to
suppress them would be to suppress the very characteristics that made a man an
acceptable officer. Not to feel insulted was a sign that one was in some way
crippled: “Unless the senses be palsied, the feelings of nature will operate,” Captain
John Rutherford claimed.366 In this way, they seized hold of the language of
sensibility and turned it to support their own purposes.367
Officers frequently invoked their own sensibility when tried by court-martial,
claiming overwhelming emotion as a defense for their violent and insubordinate
behavior.368 “[M]y mode of acting towards Mr. Cawley, tho perhaps of too violent a
nature to correspond with the Strictest Rules of my profession, was by no means
unmerited,” claimed Ensign Farrell. He described Cawley's behavior as "so cruel and
so unjust an Attack as this upon my feelings as a Man, as an Officer and a
Gentleman” that it “roused my resentment and I was so far led away by passion as
to make use of the Expressions, for the impropriety of which I am now brought
before you." But Farrell claimed that he could not have done otherwise: "my
situation at that time was such as that few Young Men in a Similar one could have
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Commanded their Temper."369 After being insulted, “I could not refrain from an
immediate resentment,” another officer claimed.370
Lieutenant Richard Berks and Captain Harington Baudin of the Nottingham
Regiment of Militia were both tried by court-martial in 1782, Berks for striking his
superior officer and Baudin for using ”language...of a gross and unwarranted nature"
towards Berks—accusing him of being an embezzler and a “Scoundrel” while the
regiment’s officers were gathered on the parade ground—“which produced an Affray
between them.” Berks defended himself with an impassioned speech justifying his
violent reaction, claiming that when Baudin
presumed to make me the public butt of his low Buffoonery, when
he dared before the Corps of Officers to call in question my
Integrity, he Sir who had so often attempted to wound my
reputation in the dark, when this Man, I say, Sir, dared charge me
with the foul Crime of Embezzlement, and in the same breath to
insult me with an opprobrious appellation that includes all infamy,
the appellation of Scoundrel, I confess Sir, my indignation
overpower'd my reason and I struck him.371
Berks’ defense not only cited his overwhelming emotion as a defense for his
violence, but also invited the members of the court martial board to display their
own sensibility by recognizing and affirming the emotions that he had felt upon being
insulted. Could “you Mr. President, or you Gentlemen of the Court…bear without
discomposure perpetual injuries and a constant endeavour to undermine and ruin
your Character by Practices the most dishonest as well as unceasing efforts to turn
your most indifferent actions into ridicule,” he asked. “[A]s I conceive you to be not
only Men of Probity, but of feeling, Men who know the value of a good Name, and are
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alive to what ever might concern your Honor, so I shall confide in your Justice, being
the Justice of humanity."372
Other officers used similar tactics. “I was tortured to agony, irritated even to
anguish, by menace, insults and blows,” one officer explained.373 “I submit to this
Court, what my feelings as a man of honor must have been,” Lieutenant John Heslop
stated, “when I was informed that Colonel Barton had called my Veracity in question,
and accused me of Perjury. This Charge awakened my sensibility, roused my
Passions, and as I was grieved by so base an insinuation, I determined to pursue
every prudent step, to obtain Justice from the Author of so illiberal false and
scandalous an Assertion.”374
Civilian men who claimed to have been overwhelmed by their passions faced the
danger that this lack self-control would mark them with the stigma of feminine
hysteria or a lower-class inability to regulate oneself.375 But this central worry about
male demonstrations of sensibility was far less of a concern in the army, because
officers sidestepped it handily by integrating their displays of sensibility with
violence. When the expression of sensibility was actually an uncontrolled violent
outburst, it masculinized the feeling and immunized it from accusations of a feminine
lack of control.376 Furthermore, the redemptive power of violence, in particular
violence motivated by the treatment of a gentleman in such a way as a gentleman
ought not be treated, affirmed rather than undermined an officer’s claim to belong to
the upper class. Reacting to this treatment with violence—verbal or physical—
enhanced an officer’s status, even if (or especially if) it was violence that violated the
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military’s chain of command because it was inflicted on a superior officer. It was
then further proof of the man’s willingness to defend his honor even at the cost of
risking his career. “[H]aving received a Treatment from Lieut. Col. Doyle while his
inferior Officer, that had hurt my feelings as a Gentleman,” Captain Barry claimed,
had led directly to “my Resentments being warm, my Sensibility awakened by
Insults, & Injuries,” and Barry’s subsequent insubordinate behavior to Doyle.377 In
Barry’s mind, this behavior was natural, justified, and evidence of a proper
gentlemanly sensibility. But it was also an implicit assertion of the supremacy of
private honor over military law.
Self-control and “coolness” were still prized, especially on the battlefield, and
were not incompatible with being a man of sensibility: At his trial, Payne’s friends
testified that he was “sensible, polite, Cool, and Spirited.”378 At courts-martial, it was
common for the opposing officers to each call upon witnesses to testify to his own
"coolness and decorum" in contrast with the other party’s "passion.”379

But although

calmness was advisable for officers to maintain in their day-to-day life, as well as in
battle, such calmness in response to a definitive personal insult was described with
the term “Stoicism.”
In the later eighteenth century, the tenets of this classical philosophy were still
admitted to be a moral ideal, but it was increasingly portrayed as a virtue impossible
for the feeling man to actually achieve, especially a man with the honor-sensitive
temperament that suited him to military life. Berks asked if any men in the court
were “such Stoics as to bear yourselves accused of infamous actions, and insulted
with appellations too opprobrious and too vulgar for either the ears of the lips of a
377.WO 71/92, 295-318.
378.WO 71/81, p. 160.
379.WO 71/82, p. 177. Also WO 71/54, p. 182: “I was cool and determined and…Mr. Smith was
transported with passion throughout the whole transaction.”
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Gentleman without emotions of Anger, or the kindling of any agitating passion,” and
implied that forbearance after such treatment was an impossible standard to which
to hold an officer.380 Captain Payne, accused of “Tyrranical, cruel and oppressive
treatment to Non Commission Officer & Men,” defended his angry beatings of the
soldiers under his command in similar terms: “I must own, Gentlemen, that I have
never considered it as a Crime to resent when provoked, nor can I boast of that calm
Stoicism that can with Indifference turn aside from offered insult.” Brought to
righteous resentment by insolent treatment from his inferiors, he had lashed out at
them, but this was only a natural feeling. Payne did “confess also that from Warmth
of Temper, I may have sometimes carried my Resentment farther than the Occasion
would justify on cool reflextion,” but it was outrageous for him “to be branded with
the odious Epithets of Tyrant and Oppressor” for merely resenting what a gentleman
ought to resent.381 Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel Peacocke objected to being
“prosecuted for the little irregularities of temper” that even the best officer would be
led to if faced with an undisciplined regiment.382
When officers’ righteous rage resulted in violent actions to their enlisted
subordinates, it was often a matter of little concern to military authorities. But
violence to superiors almost inevitably led to a court-martial. During these trials,
some officers claimed that they had heroically controlled their temper so far as to
refrain from attacking their insulter outright, but that they could not be expected to
refrain from “demanding the satisfaction of a gentleman”—a duel. After Colonel
Barton had accused him of perjury, Lieutenant Heslop testified, he had taken the
“prudent step” of speaking to Barton warning him to “be more circumspect in what
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you say of me.” But after Barton replied that Heslop was “a lying Scoundrel” and
threatened to horsewhip him, Heslop claimed that he could hardly be expected to
refrain from demanding gentlemanly satisfaction.383
An officer insulted either verbally or physically by an enlisted man had some
different options for inflicting retaliatory violence. He could have the man arrested
and tried by a court-martial, which might sentence him to a savage flogging or even
to death for his crime, or he could choose the more direct method of beating the
offender on the spot. But the only proper method for using violence to remove the
stain of an insult or an assault from one’s social equal was the duel.
After Ensign Mair had ascertained that Ensign Smith had, in fact, publicly called
him a coward, he wrote out a formal challenge to be delivered to him:
Sir,
The affront you gave me demands immediate reparation and I
insist on your meeting me with a brace of Pistols this Evening at
half an hour past Six o'Clock on the race Course at the Starting
post, bring your friend with you, I shall bring mine. If you have
not Pistols I have one at your Service.
I am Sir Your Humble Servant
William Mair, Ens., 60th384
This letter laid out the basic requirements for a duel: It specified the time and the
place the men were to meet (preferably an out-of-the-way one to minimize the
likelihood of passers-by coming upon the scene and meddling).385 Likewise, it
specified the weapons to be used (swords or pistols were the only acceptable
options). The reference to each man bringing a “friend” with him to the meeting
referred to the seconds, who would negotiate with each other to determine the
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precise terms of the duel—for example, how many paces apart the duelists would
stand, and how many shots each man was to fire—once both parties had reached the
appointed place.386
Mair’s letter also demonstrated one of the other commendable traits in a duelist:
a cool and dispassionate character. It conveyed the information that Mair felt so
injured by Smith’s remark that he insisted on Smith’s coming to some place where
Mair could fire a loaded pistol at him, but it did so in a polite manner, following all
the proper conventions of letter-writing etiquette. Mair indulged in no name-calling
or recriminations that might betray an uncontrollable rage. He courteously offered
Smith the use of one of his pistols. The overall tone was meant to communicate that
Mair had been grievously insulted, that he resented that insult extremely, and that
Smith would have to hazard his life to rectify that insult, but that Mair nevertheless
remained a gentleman in control of his emotions.
Because it satisfied the demand for violence without sacrificing the residual desire
for emotional control, the duel was an opportunity to display the ideal species of
upper-class masculine anger. The ritual required feeling angry, but also required
controlling the expression of anger and resentment until it could be properly
discharged.387

The duel also served as categorical proof of a officer’s courage.

Spontaneous violent behavior affirmed one’s masculinity and was also evidence for
courage, but the duel was a more perfect showcase of the virtue. Inflicting violence
on another person indicated a lack of fear of that person, but standing before a
loaded pistol or naked blade and risking death indisputably established (or reestablished) an officer’s reputation as a courageous man; this was why the duel
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served as a definitive refutation of an accusation of cowardice.388 There was no
moral dispute to be settled by dueling. The purpose of the duel was not to redress
wrongs—one dueled even if one thought one was clearly at fault—the purpose was to
affirm the courage of the participants and to counteract claims that they were
cowardly or dishonorable.389
This was why Lieutenant Campbell and Lieutenant Boyle had chosen to resolve
their argument over the proper way to paddle a canoe through a deadly duel. The
duel was not fought to uphold the superiority of one canoeing method over the
other—nobody thought that because Campbell had triumphed and killed Boyle, his
assertion that Boyle did not know how to steer a canoe had now been proven
indisputably true. Rather, the duel was fought because not fighting it would make
both officers vulnerable to the charge of cowardice. And Campbell’s defense
statement shows that this was a normal part of officers’ military culture. “It gives
me satisfaction when I consider my case is left to the decision of a Court who have a
just sense of the dearness of an Officer's reputation, and the delicacy of his honor,”
he stated.390 Campbell expected the officers judging him to hold him blameless, to
understand the supreme importance of an officers’ personal honor. And he was
correct to do so; the court-martial unanimously found him not guilty of murdering
Boyle.
And this dispute, by no means atypical, suggests some reasons for officers’
constant quarrels, fight, duels, and other violent behavior: often, no middle ground
was possible. No compromise could be honorably reached.391 The social benefits of

388.Banks, "Killing with Courtesy: The English Duelist, 1785–1845," 557.
389.Banks, A Polite Exchange of Bullets: The Duel and the English Gentleman, 1750-1850, 120.
390.WO 71/97, p. 80.
391.Peter Way, "Rebellion of the Regulars: Working Soldiers and the Mutiny of 1763-1764", William and
Mary Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2000): pp. 761-792, suggests that this lack of a middle ground was an
inherent feature of eighteenth-century society, whose hierarchical structure allowed for no compromise

164
inflicting violence were high, and the social costs of accepting violence were ruinous.
Officers had created a society in which inflicting violence was a key way to gain
masculine status—indeed, refraining from violence under many circumstances was
seen as unmanly and dishonorable. However, because they also considered being
the victim of violence deeply shameful, army society was a place of continual tension
as men all sought to inflict violence on others, while preventing others from inflicting
violence on them.
Because officers held to courage as a most perfect expression of masculine virtue
and status, violent behavior was one of the easiest and most effective ways for
officers to gain status. This, combined with the practical difficulties of conducting
warfare with an army that held pacifist values, made it perhaps inevitable that the
eighteenth-century British army would develop a culture of violence and a society in
which violence was an essential marker of masculinity. But it came at the cost of
making officers ever more disinclined to seek peaceful rather than violent resolutions
to conflicts. Violence gained so much cultural power as a fundamental value of
military masculinity that, as the next chapter shows, military commanders had
extreme difficulties regulating the various quarrels that broke out over questions of
officers’ personal honor, even when these disputes threatened the interests of the
army itself.

between dominance and dependence, between violent revolt and submission.
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Chapter 6: A Government of Men, Not of Laws

On February 22, 1780, John Lawrence was tried for murder. Lawrence, an ensign
in the 1st Battalion of New Jersey Volunteers, was brought before a military court in
New York, then occupied by the British Army, and accused of murdering Ensign John
Moffatt of the Queen’s Rangers. The prosecution’s case seemed clear: Several
witnesses agreed that Lawrence had shot Moffatt with a pistol and the ball had gone
all the way through Moffatt’s body. Moffat collapsed to the ground and, upon being
approached by an anxious friend who had witnessed the scene, could say only “My
dear fellow I am killed” before dying.
But this was no unprovoked attack by Lawrence. His homicidal violence took
place in a highly ritualized form, and was mirrored in every particular by the victim,
Ensign Moffat. The encounter took place beside a hill on the property of Mrs. Pryan,
a widow, and both ensigns had travelled several miles from their respective quarters
in New York to arrive there. The journey had been arranged the night before
through several messages exchanged between the two ensigns, who had agreed
upon a suitable place and time for their meeting. Furthermore, each of them had
brought another officer with them: Lawrence had brought another ensign in the
battalion, John Thompson, to accompany him, while Moffat had asked his friend
Lieutenant John Pendred, a fellow officer in the Queen’s Rangers, to accompany him.
Once all four men had arrived at the appointed place, Pendred and Thompson chose
the ground in consultation with the other two, agreed that Moffat and Lawrence
should stand six yards from each other, and marked out the distance. Thompson
testified that he had personally witnessed that Lawrence and Moffat each had a pistol
loaded with one shot, and Pendred testified that both had waited to shoot until they
were given an express command to fire. The two men fired at exactly the same

166
time, and both bullets hit their targets: Lawrence received a slight wound on his
right side, but Moffat was fatally wounded and died within minutes.
The encounter had, in other words, conformed in every particular to the rules and
customs of the duel. In this regard, none of the witnesses could find any fault with
the conduct of either Ensign Lawrence or Ensign Moffat, who had exchanged shots
precisely according to the established procedure. Moreover, each had conducted
himself in a cool and dispassionate manner throughout the proceedings, and—apart
from the portion of the event when they fired loaded pistols at each other—were
careful to behave to each other with courtesy and consideration. On the journey to
the appointed dueling grounds, Lawrence and Moffat had a friendly conversation
about matters unrelated to their dispute, and Lawrence, who had brought two pistols
with him, graciously asked Moffat if he would care to choose one of them to use.
Moffat, with equal politeness, declined and said he would rather use one of his own.
Though each thought the insult done to himself by the actions of the other severe
enough to necessitate the hazarding of his life in this contest of honor, neither lost
his self-control and charged at the other in a rage at any point. Neither did they
resort to vulgar brawling with their fists or sticks; instead, they were careful to
confine their exercise of violence to the civilized and gentlemanly method of
exchanging pistol fire.
Furthermore, Ensign Thompson and Lieutenant Pendred had behaved in a
similarly exemplary fashion as seconds. They understood that their role was not to
act as partisan supporters of their particular friend, joining in the contest of arms
and turning it into a general mêlée, but to be disinterested regulators of the event:
marking out the ground, overseeing the loading of the weapons, and giving the
command to fire. They also had important duties before the duel itself: they were
charged not only with carrying messages between the duelists, but also with
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attempting to persuade the duelists to make up their differences amicably and
negotiating with their counterpart to see on what terms the principals would
apologize or ask the other’s pardon and obviate the need to duel. Thompson and
Pendred had spoken with each other and discovered that both parties refused to
make any acknowledgment of wrongdoing as each thought himself entirely innocent
of any misconduct and unjustly injured by the other. Thompson “thought it was a
pity that the dispute could not be settled without a Duel,” and Pendred told him that
“he had endeavoured every thing in his power to Settle the affair,” but they both
concluded that their efforts had been to no avail, and that a duel was inevitable.392
Yet, no matter how impeccably the duelists and seconds had behaved according
to the rules of gentlemanly honor, they had acted in a manner totally contrary to the
rules of the actual law. Dueling was manifestly illegal, and the law made no
provisions for exceptions when death occurred in the private settling of differences
through a proper and gentlemanly duel. In this legal theorists were agreed: a death
that took place during the course of a duel was, legally speaking, indistinguishable
from a homicide.393 To arrest and try John Lawrence for murder was the state’s only
possible correct response according to the common law.
But none of the participants in the duel between Ensign Lawrence and Ensign
Moffat seemed to be troubled about its illegality, and though many of them thought
that the duel was regrettable, none thought it was immoral.

Rather than dueling,

which had an unfortunate tendency to kill its participants and undermine the unity of
the officer class, military authorities had been promoting the court-martial as a nonviolent method of dispute resolution since well before the mid-eighteenth century.
The court would hear the complaint of the aggrieved party, question witnesses, allow
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the defendant to tell his side of the story, determine whether a serious offense to
honor had actually occurred (important in an age when drunken quarrels about the
proper way to strike billiard balls or which officer was the handsomer could escalate
into deadly duels), and sentence one or both parties to publicly ask the other’s
pardon, or, if the matter was especially egregious, dismiss them from the army. In
this way, disputes could be settled without the risk of death for any of the
participants.394
Yet the court-martial did not work as anti-dueling advocates had hoped. In the
trial of Ensign Lawrence for the murder of Ensign Moffat, the utter impotence of the
law to outlaw dueling was made plain. The court-martial board questioned the
witnesses minutely about all aspects of Lawrence’s conduct and declared themselves
satisfied with it. Lawrence had, in fact, shot Moffat with a pistol and killed him, but
the death had occurred during a duel in which he had conducted himself with the
utmost propriety. Therefore, they acquitted him, in flagrant defiance of the law but
in their eyes the only verdict they could honorably render.
In this case, then, the court-martial, which military leaders hoped to promote as
an alternative to dueling, was itself used to give public sanction to an officer who not
only spurned the court-martial as an authority in matters of honor, but who openly
declared that he had killed another man completely unjustified by any law other than
that of honor. Lawrence’s acquittal signaled that whatever the law might declare,
dueling remained a viable method for receiving satisfaction for slights to one’s honor.
Had the incident taken place in Great Britain, civilian authorities might also have
involved themselves. Lawrence might have found himself facing a jury of
tradesmen, farmers, and merchants unconcerned with a military man’s delicate
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sense of honor—or he might have had to flee abroad to avoid prosecution.395 By the
early 19th century, the mood of the country turned decisively anti-dueling: less
tolerant of violence, more enamored with the ideals of politeness, self-restraint, and
respectability as markers of masculinity; and more convinced that all men ought to
be subject to and governed by the rule of law.396 To duel was to publicly claim to be
above the law—a reason why it had such appeal for elite men, but also why the duel
was attacked so vigorously by middle-class reformers.397 In Britain, anti-dueling
advocates directly interfered when they saw a duel, but they also used the law to
prosecute duelists, who in turn sought to conceal their actions from the law.
Gentlemen who dueled had to conspire to prevent prosecutions by concealing the
manner of death and refusing to testify if they were witnesses, and even producing
deathbed declarations that they wished no one to face any legal consequences for
killing them.398
Thus, in Britain, the law was increasingly more effective at preventing duels and
undermining dueling culture. But Lawrence killed Ensign Moffat in British-occupied
New York during the American War of Independence, and there was no civilian
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authority by which he might be tried. The military court of the British army was
literally the only court in town, and it gave the officers deciding cases an ability to
impose their own views of honor and acceptable violence that was only possible on
the contested edges of the British empire. Abroad, therefore, military duelists were
willing to take their chances with a jury that was far more assuredly of their peers
than any that might be assembled from the civilians of the British Isles.
Army officers were one of the last holdouts of men claiming to be above the law,
and in a courtroom where other army officers acted as judge and jury, they often did
not even need to conceal their beliefs or their actions. Officers who dueled
considered it prudent to conceal their intentions before the duel took place, but
afterwards, they openly related them to the court. Lawrence and the other officers
present at the duel showed no reticence at testifying to what had occurred.399 And in
their decision to acquit Lawrence, the officers of the court-martial board made
manifest their rejection of the principle of the rule of law. The law said that what
Lawrence had done was murder, but in the officers’ minds he had only done what
any honorable gentleman would do. Their sense of honor demanded that Lawrence,
and others who had committed similar deeds, be judged not by the standards of the
law, but by their own personal judgment as honorable men.
Two things were necessary for the court-martial board to acquit Lawrence when
the law said he was guilty of murder: A lack of a civilian court, which would
otherwise have jurisdiction for trying a murder case, and the system of military law
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in which the procedures for administering military justice were controlled almost
entirely by officers.
In keeping with contemporary ideas about British liberty and fears of the military
usurping control of the government, military law was supposed to occupy a position
strictly subordinate to the civilian system of law. The Articles of War insisted that
soldiers accused of non-military crimes were to be tried by civil magistrate:
if any Officer, Non-commission Officer, or Soldier, shall be accused
of any capital Crime, or of any Violence or Offence against the
Person, Estate, or Property of any of His Majesty's Subjects, which
is punishable by the known Laws of the Land; the Commanding
Officer or Officers of every Regiment, Troop, Company, or Party, is
and are hereby required to use his utmost Endeavours to deliver
over such accused Person to the the Civil Magistrate; and shall
also be aiding and assisting to the Officers of Justice in the seizing
and apprehending of such Offender, in order to bring him to
Trial.400
What this meant was that unless an area was under martial law, a court-martial
had no right to try non-military crimes. If a soldier deserted, or disobeyed his
superior, or neglected his duty, that was the legitimate province of the military court.
However, if a soldier committed a robbery, rape, or murder, he was to be delivered
up to the civilian authorities to be tried by them.
But military courts often illegally usurped the power of the civil law. When
William Turner and John Ball, privates in the 50th, were accused of desertion and of a
robbery in Salisbury, a general court-martial tried them for both crimes and
convicted and sentenced them. But when the proceedings were sent to London for
the sentences to be confirmed, the Judge Advocate General ordered the commander
to turn the two men over to "a Civil Magistrate, in order to their being Tried for the
Robbery, with which they are charged, in the Ordinary Course of Law."401 This case
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was a problem because the crime was committed in Britain, a civilized territory with
a functioning legal system. But overseas, it is most likely that trying this case in a
military court would have been completely authorized; in imperial space, there was
usually no civilian court to which these crimes could be referred.402 Away from
Britain, and especially in wartime, officers necessarily had to be the sole
administrators of military law; they were often far from alternate sources of
authority, and during a war it was naturally extremely inconvenient to demand that
the army be accompanied at all times by civilian judicial authorities, especially as the
army might occasionally need to resort to immediate and summary punishment to
preserve order.
The necessities of empire and war made it a requirement to cede almost all
control of the military justice system to officers and removed central oversight.
Supposedly, a check on officers’ power existed because all general courts martial
(the only ones allowed to try capital cases) had to have the proceedings sent to
London for approval by the king before the sentence could be executed, but this, too,
needed to be dispensed with in overseas posts. The right to approve the
proceedings and confirm the sentences of courts-martial was delegated to the
commander-in-chief. The government eventually received records of these
proceedings, but this was so that they could properly archive and preserve them in
accordance with the Articles of War, rather than to approve of them. Because only
the military commander of the theater and not the government in London had to
approve of the sentences of overseas courts-martial, in imperial settings, one of the

402.See Tatum, "Civilian Intervention and Military Justice in the Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic," 66:
“For much of the eighteenth century, key portions of the British Atlantic were claimed solely by military
garrisons, which were, in theory, free to proceed as they desired in maintaining order as long as their
reports met with approval from the army’s headquarters at the Horse Guards.”
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only sources of civilian oversight, observation, and control was removed, leaving the
army free to impose its own values.403
Almost the entire court-martial process was under the control of the officers. The
commander-in-chief determined whether a general court martial was to be held or
not (and in the case of regimental courts-martial, this was the job of the regiment’s
commander); the court-martial board, which acted as judge and jury, was drawn
exclusively from the roster of officers; the Deputy Judge Advocate, who controlled
the administrative aspects of the trial, was also an officer. Enlisted men were
specifically barred from all these roles—most importantly, they were never permitted
to sit on court-martial boards, even when the defendant was one from their own
ranks. The class hierarchy meant that it was unthinkable to have enlisted judging
officers, or even other enlisted soldiers. Therefore, officers’ practical ability to
manipulate the court-martial meant that they operated more like two parallel justice
systems, separated by class, in which the double standards for acceptable behavior
for officers and for enlisted that existed in practice were also formally upheld by the
law.404
The power that officers held within the system of military law gave them the
ability to direct the legal procedures that governed courts-martial. Unlike civilian
courts, which by the eighteenth century had been transformed into spaces where
formal legal procedure was interpreted by lawyers and judges with specialized legal
training, courts-martial retained a more informal tone.

Officers who judged cases

403.Gilbert, "Military and Civilian Justice in Eighteenth-Century England: An Assessment," 54.
404.A N Gilbert, "British Military Justice During the American Revolution", The Eighteenth Century: Theory
and Interpretation 20 (1979): 24-38; G A Steppler, "British Military Law, Discipline, and the Conduct of
Regimental Courts Martial in the Later Eighteenth Century", The English Historical Review 102, no. 405
(1987): 859-886.
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lacked legal training, and the format of the trial was often subject to the whims of
the senior officer presiding over it.405
In many cases, the court-martial board appear not to have been conversant
with recent legal developments. For example, the court allowed hearsay evidence,
although legal authorities as well as Adye’s Treatise on Courts-Martial declared that it
ought to be disallowed.406 And in contravention of the standard of proof nominally
required in civilian courts by this time, courts-martial convicted on evidence that was
hardly conclusive beyond a reasonable doubt.407 This was especially apparent and
complained of in cases of desertion, the crime most often tried before a general court
martial, but convictions despite scanty or contradictory evidence occurred in trials for
other crimes as well. Furthermore, court-martial boards were apparently often
ignorant of the most basic principles of modern legal procedure. Cuthbertson had to
warn officers that members of the court-martial board were not supposed to give
evidence in the cases they were judging.408
However, this is not quite to say that officers rejected any innovation in law.
The end of distinction between principals and accessories in felonies—so that “any
soldier who shall persuade another to desert the service, or to commit any other
crimes contrary to the articles of war, will be deemed a principal, and be perhaps
found more deserving of punishment than the person who actually commits the
crime”—was a reflection of a comparative development in common law, which no
longer held that "those only were to be judged principals in felony, who actually did

405.Arthur Gilbert, “Military Justice and Civilian Justice,” p. 48.
406.Adye, p. 85.
407.Dayton notes that during eighteenth-century, courts in North America were increasingly influenced by
new rules of evidence and higher standards of proof, imported through treatises on English law (pp.
59-60).
408.Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry,
145-146.
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the fact; as in murder, those only who gave the mortal blow; in rape, those only who
actually ravished the party," but now asserted that all those present with intent were
to be treated as principals.409 Officers freely borrowed the common law
developments that would enhance their power, but rejected the others. Thus, this
was not the wholesale rejection of the legal process, but an insistence on using and
controlling the legal process, and a firm intention that military justice should proceed
according to their own values and allow them to uphold those values; the more
objective law and the increasingly elaborate legal process that was developing in the
common law did not suit their purposes.
In general, therefore, they were ignorant of the law, and furthermore they
were indifferent to their ignorance. The Deputy Judge Advocate was the only person
on the court-martial board who had any legal training. He supposed to challenge the
selected members of the board if he doubted their ability to be impartial, collect the
witnesses before the trial, notify the prisoner when his case was to be heard and
give him a copy of the charges brought against him, and ask the prisoner which
witnesses he intended to call in his defense so that Judge Advocate could call them
to appear. However, he had no vote and had no power to overturn the verdict of the
board even if it was not in accordance with the law.410

Even throughout the trial, he

could offer advice as to what was legal and what was not, but the court-martial
board was not actually obliged to accept his judgments.411
409.Adye, A Treatise on Courts Martial, 66.
410.Adye, pp. 44-46.
411.Adye, who acted as Deputy Judge Advocate in numerous cases in North America during the
Revolution, complained about the tendency of court martial boards to ignore legal rules and admit
evidence that was irrelevant to the charge, despite his attempts as Deputy Judge Advocate to insist on
proper legal procedures: "Every Court Martial brings together a new set of men, who from not having
fixed rules or recorded precedents, have each an Opinion of their own to adopt. Young men are too
apt to imagine, that the parchment on which their Commissions are written, inspires them with military
knowledge, and those in superior ranks...fancy that length of service must make them adepts in their
profession, and consequently render them above information" (Stephen Payne Adye to Sir Charles
Gould, 30 September 1782, Stephen Payne Adye Papers, American Philosophical Society).
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The trial of James Barton, Surgeon to the 88th Regiment, in Jamaica in 1781,
clearly demonstrated officers’ unwillingness to abide by the Deputy Judge Advocate’s
legal advice. In this case, the deputy judge advocate made repeated objections to
the questions that the court asked of the witnesses—primarily, it seems, because the
court was seeking hearsay testimony. But the court constantly overrode him and
demanded that their questions be answered. When he later objected to a question
asked by the defense of one of its own witnesses, "as not tending to disprove any
thing contained in the Charge,” the reply was, “The Court were of Opinion that it
ought to be answered." And, in fact, they did not just overrule his objections; a few
pages later, when the deputy judge advocate himself wanted to ask a question, it
was "Rejected by the Court"!412
And in the regimental courts-martial formed to try lesser offenses, there was
no provision to have an officer with knowledge of the law present for the trial, and
the officers serving on regimental courts often found themselves quarreling with
each other about points of law and about how to conduct a regimental court
martial.413 With no deputy judge advocate to advise them on legal points, the
members disputed over whose opinion should prevail. Lieutenant James Paterson
was tried for his "unmilitary behavior" to Captain Faviere, who was president of a
regimental court martial that the lieutenant was a member of. The two men
quarreled over what was proper to enter in the court martial proceedings, Faviere
insisting on his own opinion because "he was a Judge." Paterson "then said that he
was a good a Judge as he, in an angry manner, & that they were all Judges alike."414
412.WO 71/58, pp. 447, 452, 454, 456, 457, 462.
413.Alexander Fraser Tytler, An Essay on Military Law and the Practice of Courts Martial (Edinburgh, 1800),
183-184.
414.WO 71/78, pp. 75-78. The diary of George Nicholson, a major 3rd Regiment of Foot, oﬀers a more
extended view of oﬃcers’ squabbles over their authority to judge and punish enlisted men, containing
a complaint that a sentence that Nicholson imposed on a drunken sergeant was countermanded due
to the defendant “being a favorite of the Commanding Oﬃcer” who was “Jealous of his Power &
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Eighteenth-century commentators commonly disparaged military law and
denounced it for its lack of consistent guiding principles. The seemingly arbitrary
nature of courts-martial and military justice in general was the most prominent
criticism.415 But more generally there was a contemporary belief that army life was
not compatible with traditional English liberties—a view adopted not only by civilian
critics but also by officers themselves.416
"The rigorous principles of military law, and the arbitrary manner in which it is
administered, have given occasion to several writers, to exercise their real or
pretended humanity, in lamenting that so many of their fellow creatures are
unhappily subjected to its coercion,” wrote John Williamson in his treatise on the
discipline of war.417 But, he continued, the military could not have the same liberties
as civilian society, for "those principles and institutions, that constitute freedom in a
state, would be productive of licentiousness in an army."418 He argued that, because
of the military's needs, "Courts-martial are certainly warranted to act in a more
summary, which some may call a more arbitrary, manner than the courts of common
law: and it cannot be expected, that they should be in every respect tied down to the
observance of the same punctilio."419
Officers were convinced that if they were forced to observe the “punctilio” of
civilian court practice, the law would be incapable of delivering true justice. In his
analysis of regimental courts, Glenn Steppler claims that the absence of codified

Authority” as well as complaints of excessive authority in the other direction, when he wrote of his
resentment of General Barrington’s insistence on punishing men for drunkenness “without the
Sanction of a Court Martial”—which, Nicholson pointed out, was highly illegal (George Nicholson
Journals, 10 September 1758 and 11 June 1759, National Army Museum, NAM 2001-02-400).
415.Steppler, "The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III, 1760-1793," 144.
416.Gilbert, "Military and Civilian Justice in Eighteenth-Century England: An Assessment," 41.
417.Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, 152.
418.Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, 183.
419.Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, 125.
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standards in fact allowed for a more nuanced response to the disparate defendants
they tried: "the chronic drunkards, the insensitive brutes and the honest soldiers
gone astray by misadventure," he suggests, all required different standards of
judgment: merciless floggings for the "unsavoury and unruly men," and lighter
sentences or outright pardons for the "men of better character and generally good
behaviour."420 Certainly, the discretion allowed to officers in these regimental courts
could prove more advantageous than a strict adherence to a harsh and inflexible
legal code. However, these benefits were only realized when officers were diligent,
experienced, and men of good judgment—and the complaints about officers' neglects
of duty and inappropriate levity seem to imply that many were not. Those who
wished to uphold the 'consequence' of courts martial not only had to fend off
challenges to their authority from enlisted defendants, but also had to police the
behavior of the officers assigned to judge the cases. Despite the Articles of War
warning that “All Members of a Court-martial are to behave with Decency,” there
were complaints about inappropriate levity and lack of attention by officers assigned
to sit on regimental courts martial, particularly the youngest officers.421 Occasionally
this behavior was egregious enough to result in the courts-martial of the officers
themselves, such as Lieutenant Samuel Shephardson of the Royal Artillery, who was
accused of being drunk while serving on a court martial.422

420.Steppler, "British Military Law, Discipline, and the Conduct of Regimental Courts Martial in the Later
Eighteenth Century," 878-879. See also Rabin, "Drunkenness and Responsibility for Crime in the
Eighteenth Century," 477, who suggests that in England's civilian courts, "the plea of drunkenness
provided a convenient and almost universally applicable excuse that could serve as grounds for lesser
punishment or pardon." This gave juries a way avoid conforming to the harsh legal code of the time,
instead adhering to the older practice of determining an appropriate punishment based on the
defendant's character rather than the standardized sentences prescribed by the law.
421.An Act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion, 190; Steppler, "British Military Law, Discipline, and the
Conduct of Regimental Courts Martial in the Later Eighteenth Century," 874.
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The "immilitary & improper behaviour" of Lieutenant James Hoy at the regimental
court martial held by the 39th Foot at Gibraltar in July 1779 began when Hoy
objected to the wording of the charge in the first case to be tried, claiming that it
was disallowed by the Articles of War. During the next case, the president of the
court "could not prevail on Mr. Hoy to attend, as he was turning over the Articles of
War, still objecting to the former Crime, and saying he wondered he cold not find the
Article that was against it, which he continued to do so (i.e. turning over the leaves)
during the greatest parts of this tryal." When the court then proceeded to the trial of
two soldiers who had "broke into the house of a Serjeant of the 12th Regiment and
ill treated his Wife," Hoy wanted to ask her prurient questions about just exactly
what sort of ill-treatment she had received. When another officer said that he was
convinced that she had been treated rudely and that "he did not think it necessary to
urge the Woman to say any thing that was indecent; that they were not trying the
man for a Capital Crime" (i.e. the victim had only accused the soldiers of assault, not
rape, and therefore was not obligated to give the intimate details necessary to prove
a charge of rape), Hoy insisted on questioning her further, claiming that "as a
Member of the Court Martial I may ask any question I please." The president
exclaimed, "why will you put a Modest Woman to the Blush by obliging her to answer
so particularly upon so nice a point," and he and Hoy got into a quarrel that led to
Hoy's arrest and court-martial.423
Yet such behavior was supposed to be an isolated incident. Officers proposed
that a court-martial board comprised entirely of officers was superior to a civilian
jury, for "an officer is bound by a sense of honour with which we cannot always
expect a juryman to be actuated,” and that officers, with their liberal education,

423.WO 71/82, pp. 359-376.
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gentle birth, lofty principles, and delicate sense of honor, were manifestly superior to
the rustic clods that the system of trial by jury might select.424 Officer defendants
echoed this view on the superiority of military courts to civilian because they were
tried by men of honor. "It is a privilege and the dearest one which a Soldier enjoys
as a Compensation for the civil Liberties which he relinquishes,” claimed on officer,
“that he is tried in a Court of honor, where no Stain can be fixed on him by the low
chicaneries of form unsupported by the sacred and substantial Maxims of Justice."425
Stephen Payne Adye, an army officer, a deputy judge advocate, and the author
of a popular guide to conducting courts-martial, with the customary British pride in
the system of trial by jury, explicitly compared the military and civilian systems of
justice, and defended the military system from critics who pronounced it corrupt,
capricious, and a perversion of traditional English liberty. Indeed, Adye claimed, the
court-martial had several advantages over a trial in a civilian court, primarily in that
it did not need a unanimous verdict. Adye claimed that the requirement for
unanimity in trials by jury meant that, because the jury was not allowed “meat,
drink, fire, or candle” until they had delivered a verdict, jurymen would agree to
convict the defendant simply so that they could leave, “injur[ing] their souls for the
conveniencies of their bodies.” Even in capital cases where the sentence was death,
the concurrence of nine of the thirteen members of the court-martial board was
sufficient. Adye suggested that when the members of a jury were required to come
to a unanimous verdict, they would be too “ready to acquiesce in the sentiments of
some overbearing and dogmatic leader.”426
424.Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, 99; Gilbert, "Military and Civilian Justice in
Eighteenth-Century England: An Assessment," 62.
425.WO 71/60, p. 151.
426.Adye, A Treatise on Courts Martial, 27-30. See An Act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion, 15, for the
relevant Article of War providing that military trials ought normally (“except in Cases which require an
immediate Example”) to proceed only “between the Hours of Eight of the Clock in the Morning and
Three in the Afternoon,” adjourned until the next day without hesitation when necessary, and without

181
Remarks that the court martial's lack of formal legal principles was, in fact, a
benefit were common. Williamson claimed that a military court was "not be
governed by the same principles, clogged with the same formalities, nor open to the
same sophistry and chicanery, with the ordinary courts of law."427 While the civilian
courts of Britain were filled with cases where clearly guilty prisoners were acquitted
on legal technicalities, the army scorned them.428 Military courts were, as seen,
readily prepared to convict or acquit in defiance of the established law to uphold their
own values.
Military law, Adye claimed,
is laid down in so plain and simple a manner, that every military
man is or ought to be well acquainted with what are thereby
deemed crimes, and may judge in a great measure what is to be
expected by one who is guilty of any of them, but at the same
time he has the satisfaction to know that he must be previously
convicted by a court, where justice and equity always preside, and
where the innocent can run no risque of punishment, but the guilty
are sure to meet with their deserts.429
And if this was indeed so, officers might have been happier. While it was
certainly preferred to civilian law, even plain and simple military law had its
pitfalls.430 Officers showed a deep distrust of legalism, which they saw as a
pernicious influence that might result in the conviction of defendants who—in their
opinion—were not at fault at all (such as an officer who had honorably dueled) and

any provisions for hurrying the court-martial board into deciding a verdict.
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likewise the acquittal of the certainly guilty (such as an enlisted man who had shown
undoubted insolence to his officers but was now demanding appeals and re-trials and
careful records showing that every particular of his trial had been conducted with
exact adherence to legal procedure).
Those who turned up in court looking too prepared with notes and legal treatises
were regarded with suspicion.431 There was a concern that too much formality and
preparation got in the way of truth; this why witnesses were forbidden to prepare
their testimony in advance. This was also the reasoning behind the ban on defense
attorneys. Although a prisoner was allowed to seek the advise of counsel before his
trial, no lawyer was to be permitted "to take an active part in the trial, as by
addressing the court, questioning the evidences, &c."432 Writing at the end of the
eighteenth century, Tytler sugested that it was "not unusual for a prisoner to request
the aid of counsel to assist him in his defence," but not in any direct fashion; rather,
the counselor was limited to "suggesting fit questions to the witnesses, or in drawing
up in writing a connected statement of his defence, and observations on the general
import of the evidence." This, Tytler thought, was an acceptable reliance on a legal
specialist, for "in those unhappy circumstances, the party may either want ability to
do justice to his own cause, or may be deserted by that presence of mind which is
necessary to command and bring into use such abilities as he may actually possess."

431.Written documents, in particular, seem to have been regarded with some disfavor. Richard Joseph
Sulivan, Thoughts on Martial Law, with a Mode Recommended for Conducting the Proceedings of
General Courts Martial (London, 1784), 59, claimed that all witnesses must give their evidence “viva
voce, no matter prepared in writing is admissible; neither is a witnesses permitted to read it as his
deposition: he may, however, have reference to notes.” Tytler, An Essay on Military Law and the
Practice of Courts Martial, 251-252, wrote that “No witness is permitted to read his evidence to the
court; for this might give room for subornation of evidence, against which every court is most anxious
to guard, by the preliminary questions, whether the witness has been instructed to say, or received any
reward, or promise of reward, for giving his testimony.” See also the legal dispute between Thomas
and Gordon (discussed later in this chapter)—there was a common perception that a man who came
into a military court with lots of legal-looking papers and testimony he wished to read was clearly up to
no good.
432.Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, 115-116.
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However, he denounced the excessive legal formalities of civilian courts, warning
that "the prisoner's counsel who properly understands his duty, will see that it is his
part not to embarrass, to tease, or to perplex the court." He was not "to force the
discordant and unsuitable axioms and rules of the civil courts upon a military
tribunal, but candidly to instruct himself in that law which regulates their procedure,
and accommodate himself to their forms and practice.”433 Tytler was of the opinion
that military men and lawyers simply did not mix:
Courts-Martial being in general composed of men of ability and
discretion, but who, from the nature of their profession and general
mode of life, are not to be supposed versant in legal subtilties, or
abstract and sophistical distinctions...counsel, or professional lawyers,
are not allowed to interfere in their proceedings...For lawyers being in
general as utterly ignorant of Military law and practice, as the
members of Courts-Martial are of civil jurisprudence and the forms of
the ordinary courts; so nothing could result from the collision of such
warring and contradictory judgments, but inextricable embarrassment,
or rash, ill-founded, and illegal decisions.434
Military commentators made unflattering comparisons to civilian courts, with
predictions of further woe if military courts continued the trend of adopting practices
then becoming increasingly common in civilian courts, such as the innovation of reply
and rejoinder: “[O]f late the judge advocate has been permitted to reply to the
prisoner's defence, and bring other evidences to endeavour to weaken what the
prisoner and his witnesses have urged, and to strengthen the testimony of witnesses
for the prosecution,” Adye wrote in 1778. And “where such a reply has been
allowed, as it seems but just that every advantage should be granted the prisoner to
clear himself of the crime, he is always indulged with an answer, and new witnesses
to confirm his former assertions, which is called a rejoinder.”435 By 1791 this custom
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had apparently become well established, and Williamson condemned in particular the
protracted exchanges of lawyerly rhetoric at the end of cases: "It is now the general
practice of courts-martial, when the prisoner has finished his defense, to allow the
prosecutor to reply...The prisoner is also permitted to rejoin...This reply and
rejoinder seem to be a excrementitious shoot, which has sprung from the unnatural
mixture of civil with military law, since counsel have been admitted at courtsmartial.” And in “the pleadings of counsel at common law,” it was even worse, for
there “we have reply, rejoinder, sur-rejoinder, rebutter, and sur-rebutter." If
military courts adopted this practice of allowing extended statements and replies to
statements by each side's counsel, he claimed, the now-straightforward military
justice process would become "frittered and lengthened out in the same manner" as
the civilian courts.436
The general principle that officers wished to adopt regarding military courts was
that the individual judgment of the members of the jury ought to have primacy over
formal legal practices. This was most apparent in considering which witnesses ought
to be permitted to give testimony. The focus on individual judgment allowed the
court martial board to dismiss the testimony of some witnesses because of their
personal feeling that the witness was unconvincing; but, on the other hand, this
principle also allowed the a wider variety of people to testify because the courtmartial board, rather than the court, was to determine whether they were proper
witnesses. In his defense statement, one officer reminded the court martial board
that they must evaluate the honesty of the witnesses as well as the substance of
their testimony, and "reject all Evidence however legal or formal that does not bring
the Conviction of Truth to his Mind along with it.” This, he added, “is the Office of

436.Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, 127.
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the English Jury and this is the single Cause why England is a free Nation and why
the other Nations that surround her are not free."437 Thus, the rejection of legalism
and the rule of law, in favor of personal feeling and judgment, was now being
proposed as the foundation of English liberty.
This was in keeping with army officers’ culture and ideas on masculinity. The law
was a tool, useful for bolstering the authority they enjoyed by virtue of their class
and rank, but also something that could not be allowed to reign supreme over their
lives, because of its ability to interfere with military authority, class privilege, and
masculine honor.
Especially in its opposition to private violence, the law undermined the
fundamental sources of officers’ identity as honorable gentlemen. Maintaining their
status necessarily required the judicious exercise of violence, and they had an
understanding that the law was not the sole arbiter of interpersonal violence.
Certain relationships, even when they were characterized by extreme or even lethal
violence, were outside the regulation of the law. The duel as a method for settling
disputes between gentlemen was one primary example of officers’ preference for
extralegal violence over the using the law.
Defensive violence was not only natural and uncontrollable, but also an action
that had clear moral superiority over seeking redress from the law. Officers believed
that legal mechanisms allowed others to abuse them contrary to the rules of honor
enforced by violence. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Thomas bewailed his position as
defendant in a court martial:
In addition to the Mortification of being obliged to answer to such a
Charge from such a Man, I have found myself a Prisoner,
subjected to the Humiliation (without having it in my Power to
make the proper reply) of having myself loaded with every
437.WO 71/60, p. 150, Portsmouth, 1782.
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approbrious Epithet; with a Torrent of Abuse and Aspersion, not
hastily dropt from Excess of Passion, but coolly and deliberately
from written Papers.438
His prosecutor’s use of the law rather than violence to satisfy the supposed slight
Thomas had given him; Thomas’s own inability to reply to insulting words with
violence, because they were said in a courtroom and he was a prisoner of the court;
and the legal process which allowed his adversary to “coolly and deliberately” think
up insulting remarks about him, write them down so he could remember them later,
and then say them in the public forum of the court, Thomas suggested, were all
nearly intolerable to a man of proper honor.
Rev. Robert Newburgh, chaplain to the 18th Regiment during its unhappy postings
in North America in the years leading up to the Revolution, was despised the other
officers of the regiment for constantly rumors and accusations that he was a
“notorious Buggerer” with lawsuits instead of violence. Furthermore, he was
continually offering up various papers and certificates as legal proof of his innocence
from the charges. The officers of the 18th soon became exasperated with these
sorts of appeals. In their minds, a man who was accused of buggery ought to
challenge or assault the person who had so insulted his character; to respond by
deluging the various third parties who had heard the accusations with certificates
from respectable persons testifying that he was not a buggerer but a decent Anglican
clergyman was the height of ridiculousness.
But Newburgh was not a soldier—could a clergyman really be expected to engage
in the violent defense of honor customary to a military man? Perhaps not, but in
that case, the officers of the 18th insisted, Newburgh had no right to claim the
masculine privileges and honors that were rightfully the soldier’s.

438.WO 71/56, p. 125.
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The officers initially called a court of enquiry to into Newburgh’s behavior and
reputation. Captain Benjamin Chapman claimed to have observed "unbecoming
behaviour in him [Newburgh] as a Clergyman,” citing among other things an incident
“on a Sunday in the month of November last at Bristol in the province of
Penselvania; he was walking with Colonel Fanning, when the Rev. Mr. Newburgh
Galloped Close by him full Speed, in a very unbecoming dress.” Colonel Fanning
“asked him if he knew whose groom that was,” and Chapman “answered that he was
sorry to say, he was a Clergyman and Chaplain to the 18th Regt. and Colonel
Fanning reply'd he was also sorry to see it, for that he Looked more like a Groom or
a Jockey than one of that Sacred Function.” This, according to Chapman, was the
final straw. This incident (and the rumors of sodomy that were constantly
surrounding Newburgh) were the “particular reasons he determined within himself
never to take any notice of him unless unavoidably compelled to it."439
The particulars of Newburgh’s “Indecent dress” were described in detail: “a Close
light Coloured Surtout, with a Scarlet or Crimson falling Collar, with a round Buck
Hatt, perfectly in the Stile of a Groom.” Furthermore, Newburgh had also been seen
“in the Barracks and Streets at Philadelphia in a Dress that had not the least
resemblance to that usually worn by a Clergyman,” such as “a light Coloured frock
made of Bath Coating, Close Buck or Lamb skin Breeches, white Silk Stockings, and
a smart Fashionable Cocked Hatt, in short what is now termed a Macaroni
Dishabille.” And his fashionable dress was not the only defect in Newburgh’s
“appearance and Deportment.” Chapman related that, “to his utter Surprise,” he
had seen Newburgh “during an Entertainment, plant himself in the front row of the
Stage Box in Philadelphia Theater.”440
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“This Style of Behaviour…might indeed become a Captain of Grenadiers,”
Chapman claimed. Such a dashing officer, he implied, perhaps had the right to
parade himself in fashionable attire at fashionable entertainments, unhampered by
any accusation of effeminacy for his eye-catching clothing because of the glorious
violence he dispensed on the battlefield. But, he continued piously, it was “badly
Suited to the Gravity and Dignity of a Clergyman, whose Character should be like
that of Caesars Wife, not only free from Vice but even from the Appearance of it.” In
fact, Chapman claimed, Newburgh’s dress and behavior were offending the
inhabitants of Philadelphia, “a Country, where strict Propriety and Decorum are the
distinguishing Characteristick of almost every Clergyman, and who Studiously avoid
appearing at any publick amusement whatsoever.” But Chapman’s complaints
suggest another intriguing point. He was implying that soldiers were immune to the
normal rules of local behavior—they could patronize the theater and wear
fashionable clothing decidedly not in keeping with the sober tastes of the local
Quakers, but Newburgh, by doing these things, was scandalizing the local
community. And it was wrong for him to cause scandal, but officers could not be
expected to restrain their disorderly drinking, swearing, violence, whoring, and
theater-visiting merely because the locals disapproved.
Newburgh in particular ought to have been careful to avoid any appearance of
scandal, Chapman noted disapprovingly, for his “reputation was by no means free
from blemish,” but Newburgh showed an utter disinclination to reform his behavior:
“when the Impropriety of his wearing a very fashionable Cock’t Hatt was mentioned
to him,” Newburgh “replied in a very determined Tone of voice, that he would next
day wear another still more fashionable.”441
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Newburgh was also hated by the officers of the 18th for encouraging the enlisted
men of the regiment to pursue legal means of redress. Private Nicholas Gaffany,
who spent many months trying his officers’ patience by demanding his legal rights,
consulting lawyers, bringing charges against his officers for daring to punish him
without trying him by court-martial first, and being flogged for his impertinence for
doing these things, claimed that Newburgh had encouraged him in these legal
activities and offered to pay his fees for consulting an attorney. Captain Shee
claimed that had Newburgh not been there to egg him on, Gaffany “would not have
carried Matters to those violent lengths, had he not been assisted.” Shee
characterized Newburgh as a “Miscreant, Enemy to the peace & harmony of the
Regt.”442 Therefore, the officers of his regiment considered themselves utterly
justified in using legal trickery of their own to attempt to remove Newburgh from the
regiment.
Soldiers who chose to use the law when military ideas about masculinity
demanded that they should respond to insult with violence were scorned. But there
was also a more generalized disapproval of people who eagerly embraced the law
and sought out precedents, legal rules about evidence, and other such things to
support themselves in the courtroom. The army, Williamson wrote, had better
things to do with its time than to indulge offenders with the "the sophistry and
chicanery of the ordinary courts of justice, and the useless forms, with which their
proceedings are impeded."443
Military courts showed a marked dislike of those who were thought to have
evaded justice due to their exploitation of legal technicalities, such as Private John
Bolton of the 35th, who was tried for desertion in Brooklyn in July 1778. An officer
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reported that Bolton had actually deserted from the 35th almost two years previous
to his trial, but by January 1778 he had enlisted in the New York Volunteers, a
loyalist corps. But Bolton had gotten into trouble and had apparently been
sentenced to be flogged when,“in order to avoid a punishment assigned him,” he told
the adjutant that he “declared himself a Deserter from the 35th Regt.” This strategy
was successful in the short term—the adjutant of the New York Volunteers “therefore
had not punished him” and instead sent him to the custody of the 35th, where the
lieutenant colonel of the regiment had pardoned him. But in July Bolton went
missing again, and when he was recaptured he was tried and sentenced to death.444
The court showed a similar disdain for officers who sought legal loopholes. While
some officer defendants emphasized their “Candour,” “Manly Openness,” and trust in
the court-martial board’s ability to instinctively determine whether their actions were
honorable or not without any reference to law books or any code other than the
informal one of honorable military gentlemen, others seized upon the court-martial’s
(deliberate) resemblance to a civilian court and barraged the court with objections,
demands for clarifications of legal technicalities, and sarcastic references to the
Articles of War.
Captain George Isham Parkyns, accused of being away without leave for several
months and of embezzlement, objected to individual questions asked by the
prosecutor of the witnesses giving evidence against him, some of the witnesses
themselves, and to the particular article of the Articles of War under which he was
charged, requiring the court to be cleared several times while the board discussed
and determined the merit of the objections.445 Captain John Rutherford, charged
with “insulting his Commanding Officer,” informed the court that he had “carefully
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examin’d the Articles of War, and so far from finding any crime specified under the
denomination of 'Insult'; I have not been able to find even the word itself. If there is
such a word, the Judge Advocate will I am sure do me the favor to point out the
passage which contains it. If there is no such word how shall I reply to a Charge
under a denomination not found in the Law itself?" He also noted that he had also
done the court’s work for them should they wish to contend that case law and
precedent might support the charge even if statute did not: “I have examined such
trials as I have been able to select, to seek for a precedent of the charge of Insult;
but have not succeeded. I have enquired of Military Gentlemen for such a
precedent; but also without success.”446 Major Edward Drewe replied to his
prosecutor’s charge that he was constantly “lying a Bed in the Morning” by
demanding to to know “under what Article of War it falls,” and also wanted similar
information about the supposed crime of “Breakfast[ing] on a Crust of Bread
accompanied by Grog, Punch, or Porter.”447
Although Adye in the 1770s was insisting that courts-martial needed to name
specific violations of the Articles of War with which to charge defendants in order to
add legitimacy, by 1800 Tytler was recommending that courts omit them to prevent
sophistry, perhaps in direct response to officers who followed the example of
Rutherford and Drewe:
It was formerly a very usual custom, to express in the sentences of
Courts-Martial, the particular Articles of War of which the sentence
declared the prisoner to be guilty of a breach or violation; but the
more recent, and better practice, is to omit all such reference to the
Articles of War; as being in itself unnecessary, and frequently affording
handle for cavilling, and sophistical objections of irregularity or
incongruity with the articles referred to.448
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Officers and enlisted alike were disposed to prefer direct and manly violence to
the indirect, circuitous, lengthy, and somewhat effeminate recourse to the law. The
wartime needs of the empire gave officers far more authority to use the law for their
own purposes than they would have been allowed at home, but empire and war also
had effects on officers’ view of the law. The finer points of law were not something
that could be indulged in uncivilized places, or in wartime. Military law was a marker
of empire; uncivilized colonies in the throes of war and rebellion could not be allowed
the same civil liberties as the metropole. "The slow and cautious procedure of the
King’s ordinary courts of justice, keeps no pace with that daring celerity which
attends the operations of rebellion; nor are their regulated forms and publicity of
procedure fitted to bring to light the dark designs of a conspiracy,” wrote Tytler.449
In these circumstances, he argued, it was foolhardy to depart from the necessary
speed and secrecy of military law in order to indulge defendants with the rights they
rightfully ought to enjoy only in peaceful Britain. And war itself disrupted the
workings of law and the pursuit of justice. When Lieutenant Colonel Cosmo Gordon
wanted to prosecute another officer, Frederick Thomas, for aspersing his character
by questioning his behavior during a Revolutionary War battle, the events of the war
itself overtook him. Eventually, Gordon and Thomas had to fight a duel to settle the
matter, four years after the events that provoked it, and on another continent,
because the matter of whether or not Gordon had behaved as a coward in a battle
now had absolutely no chance of being resolved by a trial—all of the other witnesses
had died in subsequent Revolutionary War battles.450
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Often, officers’ understanding of the law was like paperwork to fill out, a formality
that was necessary to keep up appearances. When circumstances allowed, it could
help create a pleasing appearance of civilization. The court-martial's primary value
in an imperial setting was to establish and legitimize colonial authority. The
appearance of legality seemed to be more important than an actual commitment to
the law. So officers found that the apparatus of the law had its uses. But they also
recognized its dangers, and were determined to keep it firmly under their own
control.
Officers thought that the law was a threat to their honor. As seen in the
examination of dueling at the beginning of the chapter, a strict adherence to the
terms of the law could be an obstacle to protecting honor and reputation, and it was
often willingly broken by officers seeking what they claimed was a higher form of
justice.451 When Private Nicholas Gaffany used the system of military courts to bring
charges against one of his officers, Captain Shee, Shee’s reply to Gaffany began,
An attack upon the Character of any Individual let his Situation in
Life be what it may, is, & ought to be considered as a circumstance
of the most serious nature, "Good name in man or Woman, is the
immediate Jewel of our Souls." If this Hypothesis be true in it's
[sic] general sense, How much more forcibly must it appear when
applied to the Reputation of a Soldier, the Characteristick of whose
profession is Honour, Without which he may be justly looked upon
as a Body without a Soul, An object deserving the Scorn and
Reproach of every one.452
Of what value could the law be to officers if it could be used to damage their
honor and their reputations in this way? Already they had discovered themselves
willing to die to protect their honor, and kill to protect their honor, and to inflict
Kirke published the proceedings in 1772; Wall's crime was committed in 1782, and he was hanged for
it 1802.
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brutal violence, and to break the law to protect their honor. Is it any wonder that
they would also use all the power that the court-martial placed in their hands to
subvert the workings of the law in defense of their honor?
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Chapter 7: The Supremacy of Honor

Even by the standards of a culture that celebrated violent masculinity and upheld
the principle that deadly force was acceptable if necessary to defend personal honor,
the quarrel between Ensign William Mair and Ensign Thomas Milward Smith, both of
the 60th Regiment of Foot, had spun wildly out of control.
The conflict had started while the regiment was stationed in Jamaica in 1777. In
the presence of several other officers, Smith had told a barkeeper to “give my
Compliments to Mr. Mair and tell him he is a damned Coward.” Once Mair had heard
the remark, Mair sent Smith “a Challenge in writing to fight with Pistols and meet
that Evening at six o’clock at the horse course.”453 But that meeting resulted in not a
duel, but a violent argument over the conditions under which the men sought to
duel. When the negotiations about the terms of the duel were revealed in court, it
could not be doubted that the participants were not so much concerned with
upholding gentlemanly honor as with trying to murder each other. Each man had
been determined to fight the duel with the weapons he thought had the best chance
of inflicting a fatal wound upon the other party.
Smith then caused further embarrassment when he blatantly violated the cultural
standard that assumed that an officer need not be supervised when under arrest,
because his word of honor was sufficient to bind him. When the officers’
commander, Captain Spiesmacher, had heard of the dispute, he had confined both
men to their quarters. Ensign Smith, Spiesmacher said, had “leave to go out to
dinner,” but was required to be back in his quarters by the evening. But a few days
later, Smith was seen at a tavern two hours after he was supposed to be in his
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quarters, “in a dispute with one Mr. Eberall [about] which of the two, Lord Chatham
or Lord Mansfield was the better Orator.” This quarrel about the speechmaking
abilities of the two politicians then escalated into a general mêlée in the tavern, in
which Smith was “extreamly abusive” and “Challenged almost every body in the
house to fight with him.”454
But the final straw occurred the evening after the abortive duel, when Mair’s
second, Lieutenant Palmer, and Ensign Smith were together on the parade, “in the
dismissing of which,” reported one witness to this very public altercation, “Ensign
Smith treated Lieutenant Palmer with disrespect, that Lieutenant Palmer
reprimanded him for it in words arose between them, in the course of which dispute
Lieutenant Palmer was heard to say ‘You puppy or you Rascall if you don't hold your
Jaw I will Lather you.’” After another exchange of insults, both men drew their
swords, fought, and were disarmed and rearmed themselves numerous times before
they were finally separated, with Lieutenant Palmer wounded in several places, and
both men were put under arrest.455
All these events worked to undermine the military hierarchy and destroyed
military discipline. But examining the conflict between Mair, Smith, and Palmer and
the way in which Captain Spiesmacher responded to it reveals how honor culture
harmed the military, but also the difficulties the army had regulating it.
Commanders had an interest in preventing quarrels, but their efforts were
complicated by the complicity of army administrators in the masculine culture they
found detrimental to the army. Their high rank placed them at a remove from the
mass of officers, but they were ultimately of the same class and occupation. They
had lived their lives within the midst of the culture of martial masculinity that they
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now found so exasperating, and they found it difficult, if not impossible, to regulate
it. Upholding the honor-conscious masculinity of army officers meant allowing them
to subvert the law and regulate themselves by the standards of gentlemanly
behavior instead, even when it was detrimental to military and imperial interests.
Whereas the previous chapter has focused on junior officers’ determination to uphold
the principles of honor culture even if it subverted the law, this chapter focuses on
the effects of using honor culture, rather than the law, to govern officers’ behavior.
This culture of masculine violence was a threat to military discipline, but the
government capitulated instead of making real efforts to end it; tacitly they
recognized that officers’ personal honor must necessarily trump military interests
and the hierarchy.
Captain Spiesmacher’s original arrest of Mair and Smith after he had heard about
the challenge to duel was the orthodox response of a commanding officer. The
Articles of War banned officers from dueling itself, but also prohibited the mere
sending of a challenge to duel.456 But there his strict adherence to the terms of the
law ended. At the court-martial, he made it plain that he objected to the behavior of
the two ensigns not because they had planned to duel, but because they had wildly
deviated from proper dueling behavior.
This was not unusual behavior for an officer. Not only did officers undermine the
anti-dueling prescriptions of the Articles of War by declining to use the court-martial
as a peaceful method for the settlement of their disputes, they subverted the charge
of “behavior unbecoming” and the institution of the court-martial itself to uphold,
strengthen, and encourage the practice of dueling. When court-martial boards were
faced with a case that might involve dueling, their concern was not to discover
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whether a challenge had been issued or accepted or if a duel had taken place and to
punish the participants according to the regulations set down by the Articles of War.
To them, whether or not a duel or an invitation to duel had taken place was not
important; what mattered was whether the participants had dueled improperly.
Dueling had certain standards. The participants might kill each other, yes, but no
one was to be killed dishonorably. No one was even to be touched dishonorably.
The rules of the duel stipulated that the participants were only to be assaulted in two
specific ways—by the blade of a sword or by the shot of a pistol. Only these two
methods, with their associations with battlefield combat, allowed violence but not
dishonor to be inflicted upon the body of a gentleman. Officers were censured for
proposing any other means for settling disputes among themselves. Ensign
Fothergill, accused of lying by Lieutenant Mostyn and wanting “to have the
Satisfaction of a Gentlemen,” told Mostyn that “he did not understand the use of a
Sword but wo[ul]d either draw a Pistol or play at Handy Fisty with him.” Mostyn
frostily replied that to “fight handy Fisty” was “not a Gentlemanlike way of
fighting.”457
Similarly, when Ensign Somerville Murray was accused before a court martial of
“behaving unbecoming the Character of an Officer and a Gentleman,” the complaint
made against him was not that he had challenged another officer to duel, but that he
had challenged another officer to duel, and then suggested that the weapons to be
used be their own fists rather than swords or pistols, the only weapons suitable for
gentlemanly fighting. He had further breeched propriety by calling at the quarters of
his opponent the next day with a mere sergeant in tow for his second, when all the
unwritten rules of dueling insisted that all participants of a duel must be gentlemen,
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and that, indeed, only gentlemen had a sufficiently refined sense of honor to
understand the principles behind dueling. His outraged opponent indignantly pointed
to this behavior as proof that Murray was no gentleman and ought to be dismissed
from the army.458
Mair and Smith did nothing so vulgar as proposing to settle their difference with a
fistfight. But their argument about whether their duel ought to be fought with pistols
or swords betrayed a rather dishonorable concern with committing convenient
homicide rather than establishing a reputation for manly courage. Opponents of
dueling who denounced the practice as the moral equivalent of murder were not
exaggerating for effect. Certainly there were men who were drawn into duels much
against their will and against their inclination. But other men deliberately provoked
and actively sought duels, because for them the duel served as a de facto legal
method of killing another man.
Earlier historiography on dueling often notes its ritual nature and how one could
refute accusations of cowardice merely by standing and “receiving fire,” even if both
parties merely fired into the air. However, this is more accurately a description of
British dueling conventions of the early-to-mid-nineteenth century, when the practice
was in decline. In the nineteenth century, when the duel was a dying practice, it
was socially acceptable to accept a challenge and then fire into the air during the
duel itself, thereby technically satisfying the requirement to shoot, but at the cost of
turning the duel into something of a farce.459
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Although many duels ended once the parties had exchanged fire—this being
sufficient to prove the courage of both participants—the practice of confining the duel
to a single exchange of shots was by no means universal.460 It was not the case at
all in most of military duels of the late eighteenth century, in which the participants
were were expected to at least attempt to kill each other, and manipulating the
circumstances of the duel to make it less lethal was not widespread and an open
secret yet. In fact, in this this earlier period honor codes insisted that the
participants must at least give a credible display of deadly intent; “dumb-shooting or
firing in the air” was explicitly forbidden.461
When the seconds negotiated the terms of the duel between Mair and Smith,
they “agreed that Mr. Mair and Mr. Smith should each exchange two Shot with the
Pistols and that if neither of them received a wound by the Pistol Shot that then they
should determine the matter with their Swords."462 By stipulating that the duel was
not to end until at least one party was wounded, the participants specifically ensured
that the duel would not devolve into any relatively non-violent ritual exchange of
inaccurate pistol fire.
The clear point of the engagement was not to discharge any accusations of
cowardice by standing and receiving fire, but to actually wound at least one of the
participants. Before the duel, a witness reported that Smith “say’d that ‘with this
good Sword (putting his hand to his Sword and then putting himself in a fencing
posture) I will do for Mr. Mair if he were attended by twenty of his Country Men.’”463
Smith was even more explicit on the dueling ground, according to the report of
Mair’s second, Lieutenant Palmer: “Mr. Smith declared he would only fight [with
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pistols] upon Condition that Mr. Mair would draw Swords afterward if no wound was
received, that he came with a resolution (first drawing his Sword) to do Execution
and pistols would not answer his purpose.”464
Homicidal intentions among duelists were by no means universal, but many
officers seem to have seen duels as an opportunity to kill. The night before he was
killed in a duel, one officer was heard to say that he had his opponent “now in his
Clutches and he should not escape so easily as he thought."465 After a fight between
Lieutenant Bird of the King’s Orange Rangers and his commanding officer, Lieutenant
Colonel John Bayard, which ended in Bird’s death, several witnesses claimed that
Bird had deliberately provoked the fight, in which he had hit Bayard with a cane.
Upset with Bayard for refusing him a leave of absence, Bird sought to revenge
himself through a duel. One officer reported that Bird had told him that “he [Bird]
had repeatedly Challenged Col. Bayard, but never could get him to give him
satisfaction, and that he was determined to Cane Col. Bayard, and oblige him to
fight.” Another said that Bird claimed that “the next time Col. Bayard insulted him,
he would take a Cane in one hand and his Sword in the other, and Cane Col. Bayard
at the point of his Sword and then he would be forced to fight him.”466
Ensign Mair suspected from Ensign Smith’s strange behavior regarding the initial
alleged insult Mair had given to Smith that Smith was trying to provoke a duel. After
Smith had found out that rumors were circulated through the regiment that Smith
had allowed himself to be caned or horsewhipped by Mair, Smith had told another
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man, in the presence of several other officers of the 60th, that Mair was a coward.
Mair claimed that this was a violation of proper gentlemanly behavior: Smith should
have either called upon Mair and given him a chance to explain that he had never
actually claimed to have disgracefully assaulted Smith, "or at least he ought to have
sent me a Challenge.” The only way that Mair could “account for his behaviour on
this occasion” was by speculating that because Smith
was brought up in the Army from his infancy and thereby
supposed to know the Laws of dueling better than I confess I do,
or had an opportunity to do, he thereby wished or wanted to draw
the Challenge from me, from which it was his opinion, that he
would have the choice of weapons, and thereby avail himself of
that skill and knowledge he had of the Sword and which he knew
very well I professed I had no knowledge of.467
Mair pointed to this as a further example of Smith’s poor character: “it is not to
be thought that an Officer and a Gentleman would insist upon an undue advantage, a
Gentleman will always fight on equal terms.” Smith had “often boasted that he was
an expert Swordsman,” while Mair had “just come from the Study of Divinity” and,
due to this “Sudden departure and change in Life” to a military career, “had little or
no opportunity of Studying the polite accomplishments, particularly the use of the
Sword.”468 It was considered bad form to insist on fighting with swords against an
opponent who did not have the same skill level.469
In the end, the duel didn’t happen—not because Mair and Smith thought better of
their homicidal intentions, but because each man was insistent on securing terms
most favorable to himself for killing the other man, and could not come to an
agreement on this point. Smith wanted to make sure that the duel was fought with
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swords alone, or, as his second choice, to be started with a single exchange of
pistols shots before proceeding to swords. Mair refused to fight with swords at any
point during the duel, citing his ignorance, and instead insisted on fighting
exclusively with pistols. But Mair made certain that all knew that his preference for
pistols stemmed not from any attempt to mitigate the inherently hazardous
conditions of a duel (pistol fire in this age was inaccurate enough that a single
exchange of shots would quite possibly result in no wound to either party, unlike a
sword fight), but merely from his desire to fight with weapons with which both he
and Smith had similar levels of skill. Mair declared that he would "fire as many
Pistols with Mr. Smith as he pleased,” and that he was willing to exchange shots with
Smith “as long as there is Powder and Ball.”470
Dueling provided numerous opportunities for officers’ status to be threatened,
because of the contradictory demands of trying to channel passion and resentment
into proper gentlemanly modes of expression. It was not proper to be in an
uncontrolled rage; one was to be resentful, yes, but coolly resentful. One might be
in a passion, but one was to make visible attempts to control it. One did not let
one’s resentment lead one into ungentlemanly behavior.

Allowing a duel to descend

into a brawl was a betrayal of one’s status as an officer and a gentleman.471 When
Lieutenant Haines accused Ensign Townshend of “ungentlemanlike behavior” because
when Haines struck him, Townshend “did not draw his Sword but clench'd his fist,
and attempted to strike him,” Townshend acknowledged that this was what he had in
fact done, but denied that this was an attempt to fight in a vulgar and
ungentlemanlike way. Rather, he claimed, he was not brawling, but had specifically

470.WO 71/54, p. 94, 127.
471.See, for example, WO 71/69, p. 70, in which a duel between oﬃcers started with pistols and swords,
but ended with the participants trying to beat each other with sticks before being pulled apart by other
oﬃcers.

204
chosen not to draw his sword in order to assault Haines in a way that disgraced
Haines’ body to the same degree that Haines had just disgraced his by hitting him
with a riding switch: “Can it be wonder'd that I shou'd first wish to put the Can'd
Townshend on a footing to obtain Satisfaction of the can'd Haines, on equal terms
before I drew that Sword, which I allow to be the Weapon a Gentleman shou'd have
recourse to.”472 Courts-martial faced a parade of cases like this one, featuring
defendants who had shown themselves incapable of restraining their tempers long
enough to even have a duel, with far worse consequences to the service.
The abortive duel between Mair and Smith did not descend into a vulgar fistfight
during the duel itself, but the next evening, as Captain Spiesmacher related, “fresh
matter occurred which has involved another Officer in this Unhappy dispute”: the
fist-and-sword-fight that broke out between Ensign Smith and Mair’s second,
Lieutenant Palmer, on the regimental parade ground.
The fight between Palmer and Smith was improper because it violated the
conventions of fair play and appropriate weapons. Corporal Strauss reported that
after the initial insults, the two men stood around daring each other to draw swords,
but neither did, until Palmer took "the Stick or Supple Jack that was in his hand and
gave Ensign Smith two or three blows, upon Ensign Smith receiving the last blow his
hatt fell off; and as he was picking it up he drew his Sword"; Palmer drew as well,
and after "several passes at each other," Palmer's sword bent or broke. Upon
"seeing his Sword had failed him, he immediately turned from Ensign Smith and
desired that he might be kept from him as his Sword had failed him, and was making
towards the Guard house, and was striving to straighten his Sword" when "Ensign
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Smith's seeing Lieutenant Palmer's back to him, he advanced and ran Lieutenant
Palmer into the back."473
Palmer had violated the rules of gentlemanly combat by striking Mair with a
“Stick or Supple Jack,” and Mair had behaved dishonorably when he tried to strike
Palmer when he was disarmed and when his back was turned. But the far worse
violation committed by both men was indicated by Corporal Strauss’s eyewitness
testimony: that he was in fact an eyewitness reflected damningly on Palmer and
Smith’s behavior by having an altercation witnessed by enlisted soldiers. One of the
requirements of a proper duel, as was alluded to in the arrangements originally
made by Mair and Smith, was a certain degree of privacy. Duels usually took place
in an isolated location at odd and early hours of the morning, not only to prevent
interference from bystanders but also to prevent the lower orders from witnessing a
display of the officer class as anything other than a united brotherhood.
Furthermore, it prevented enlisted men from seeing an officer suffer shameful or
dishonorable treatment should matters get out of hand. Officers found it humiliating
to be struck or insulted, but to have that treatment witnessed by their social inferiors
was utterly intolerable. Major John Cotton was convicted of “using opprobrious
Language and improper behavior towards Lieutenant Thomas Simpson of the same
Regiment, tending to the breach of good Order and Military Discipline.” Upon
reviewing the proceedings, the king noted that Cotton’s behavior was especially bad
because Cotton had called particular attention to it (instructing his listeners to “take
notice that Lieut. Simpson is a Rascal and Scoundrel and that I call him so") and he
had done it “at the head of the Battalion” in the presence of all of the men. And the
ridiculous origins of the dispute between the two men—Cotton’s servant had spotted
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his own mislaid stockings on Simpson’s legs—further diminished the dignity of the
officers before their men.474 Captain Dussaux claimed that being marched at the
point of bayonets when under arrest was not only a violation of his sacred rights as
an Englishman, but also scandalous because it had been done in full view of the
enlisted soldiers of the regiment.
Palmer and Smith’s fight had occurred directly after the regimental parade, when
the majority of the enlisted men were present to witness it and observe the
particular details of the officers’ poor behavior and name-calling. Sergeant Jacob
Kurtz reported that "Mr. Palmer say'd 'God damn the good for nothing rascal carry
him to the Guard Room”; Private Atherton claimed that Palmer had called Smith "a
puppy" and a “Rascal” and said “that if he did not hold his Jaw he would thrash him
and then have him a one blow with his Stick."475 Corporal Peters related that after
Smith was under arrest, he wanted to know if Palmer had been wounded. Upon
Peters telling him that he "did not know but that some of the Men had carried him to
his Lodgings,” Smith “then say'd he wished he run the Yankee (meaning Mr. Palmer
as I believe) through the Arse.”476
Officers attempted to further reinforce their power and the authority of their
position by drawing on the institutional power of the army, claiming that the assaults
and insults they had suffered required retribution not only because it insulted their
personal honor as gentlemen, but because it also insulted their authority as officers,
and by extension the authority of the army as a whole. Captain Dussaux claimed
that when enlisted men witnessed his treatment it was a “Subversion of the very
foundation of Military Order and Discipline,” because it had the effect of “making an
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Officer of the Rank of Captain appear in a contemptible and Humiliating light to the
Soldiers.”477
When Lieutenant Glenie was reprimanded for disobeying Captain Aubrey’s
orders, he complained that, whatever faults he may have committed, Aubrey had
most unjustifiably undermined his authority with a public general order given out
that might be interpreted as a reprimand of him for neglect of duty: "It appear'd to
me, I must confess an Order, very extraordinary and equally personal. It cou'd not
possibly answer any one good End, but it had an Evident tendency to hurt the
Service, as it shew'd clearly to every Person & Soldier in the place, that he wished as
far as in him lay, to exhibit the Engineer [i.e. Glenie] in as insignificant &
contemptible a light as possible, on the most trivial & frivolous Pretences. It
render'd the Men themselves more negligent in discharging their duty, & more
presumptuous in neglecting it.”478
Major Drewe, defending himself from charges of neglecting his duty by not
appearing at parades, as we have seen, claimed that Colonel Cockburn’s public
disrespect of him was the true fault. According to Drewe, he could hardly appear at
a military parade if he was not treated with the deference due to him from his rank.
Any neglect of duty on his part in not attending parades was completely overridden
by Colonel Cockburn’s worse neglect of duty by treating him disrespectfully
whenever he did attend. A great many people heard Cockburn "at the Publick
Parade, speak of me in a Manner tending to lessen my Authority, with the Officers,
and Men,” Drewe claimed. Not only had Cockburn given Drewe orders in an
“unnecessarily loud” voice and “in a haughty, imperious and Overbearing Manner,”
he had also publicly criticized Drewe: another witness heard Cockburn say “he was
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sorry there should be such a Major to the 35th Regiment.”479 Actually, Drewe
claimed, it was rather his duty not to show up to parades in those circumstances,
“lest the Men in Particular should Observe any Disagreeable altercations, between
the Lieut. Colonel and the Major,” which would have the sad consequence of “greatly
Affect[ing] this Discipline of the Regiment.”480 Smith's defense statement made a
similar claim: “even in civil Society there are various Modes of insulting a person,
both in Public and private, but the Severest trial of a Man is by a Blow, this is the
treatment of a Slave or of a Malefactor and he who is above the Rank of the lowest
of Mankind or has any consciousness of his own welfare, ought in Justice to himself
and the community require Satisfaction, because it is an Offence against Society, of
which the Laws take Cognizance.”481
When Lieutenant Berks and Captain Baudin began to quarrel on the parade
ground, another officer highlighted the importance of concealing officers' disputes
from outsiders and those of lower rank: "An altercation hereon arose, and several
very high words passed...Perceiving the affair likely to take a Serious turn I turned to
Lieut. Col. Gould who was on Horseback and desired the meeting of Officers might
Adjourn, as I saw several Soldiers and Strangers assembling near the place."482 And
when the Berks and Baudin’s courts-martial were reviewed by the king and the
Judge Advocate General, the latter reported that “His Majesty extremely disapproves
the reciprocal Conduct of Capt. Baudin & Lieut. Berks in suffering their Animousities
to break forth in an open violation of good Order,” and demanded that the two
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officers make “a mutual and public Apology” in order to rectify the “ill example
thereby exhibited to the Soldiers.”483
But Palmer and Smith’s fight was so scandalous because it not only undermined
the military hierarchy, but also overturned it. The enlisted men of the battalion not
only witnessed the fight, but had to break it up, disarm the men (repeatedly), and
confine them. After Smith tried to stab Palmer in the back, Private Thomas Knox
reported that “Matthew Keith and I immediately laid hold of Mr. Smith and Corporal
Strouss came up and took his Sword from him.” Private Matthew Keith reported that
he “laid hold of Mr. Smith and say'd 'Mr. Smith for god's sake moderate your
passion.’”

Sergeant Kaston had to find Smith and “took him by the Arm and told

him he must go with him to his Lodgings.” During the subsequent outbreak of
fighting, Corporal John Peters, the corporal of the guard that night, said that he saw
Smith go “up to Mr. Palmer and made a lunge at him and say'd to Mr. Palmer, 'If you
speak one word Sir, you are a dead Man,’” requiring Peters to intervene physically.
“I and one Landerkin immediately charged our Bayonets against Mr. Smith,” Peters
reported, and Sergeant Kurtz "interfered and took Mr. Smith's Sword from him and
took the Stick from Mr. Palmer.” The enlisted men then “took him into the Barrack
Yard as a Prisoner.”484
This fight destroyed the illusion that officers were worthy of special status and
privileges because they, unlike enlisted men, were able to moderate their tempers,
behave rationally and virtuously, and to regulate themselves and others. Palmer and
Smith had exposed their bodies to the forcible touch of their social inferiors, because
their uncontrolled behavior had given the enlisted witnesses no other option for
preventing them from killing each other. In doing so, they put in jeopardy not only
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their own privileged status, but also the status and reputation of the officer class as
a whole. Thus, Captain Spiesmacher felt obligated to prosecute all the officers who
had been involved in the affray—not because they had participated in the illegal
practice of dueling, but because they had violated the social rules that governed the
practice of dueling.
But the court martial did not limit itself to regulating acceptable dueling behavior.
It also asserted itself as an authority on what actions were too serious to be resolved
without a duel—in other words, it sanctioned officers not only for improper
challenges and behavior, but also for not demanding satisfaction when they had
been, in the courts’ opinion, grievously insulted. Captain John McKinnon was
discharged from the army after he was charged with “Suffering himself to be
kicked…on a Parade, without properly resenting it.” This public reception of a bodily
assault from another officer, which McKinnon had neglected to respond to with a
challenge or a demand for a formal and public apology, destroyed his ability to be
perceived as a gentleman and his authority as an officer.485 Similarly, Captain Lowe
was court-martialed after another officer had, in the presence of other officers and
gentlemen, said to his face that he was “a dirty Dog and no Gentleman.” Lowe did
not respond properly, according to his brother officers; he merely “soon went away”
and “never afterwards…shew’d any resentment at such Treatment.”486
In fact, officers’ actions reveal that to refuse to demand satisfaction for a slight to
one’s honor was a greater offense than to unlawfully challenge another officer to a
duel. Lieutenant Mark McGrath was arrested and tried for the crime of “suffering
himself to be posted as a Coward by Mr. John McLaughlan.” McLaughlan, acting as
the company adjutant, had made an incorrect report, for which McGrath had rebuked
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him. McLaughlan reacted angrily, claimed he was an injured party, and, in the
customary fashion, sent other officers of the regiment with messages to McGrath
insisting on an apology before the other officers. But McGrath refused to make any
apology, and “said that a Court martial must decide the difference” between the two
of them. McLaughlan “replied that was not the manner he wished to have it
settled,”—by which he meant that he wanted to duel. McLaughlan refused, and two
weeks later McLaughlan was observed “putting up a Paper upon the Publick Post,”
alleging that Lieutenant McGrath was a coward. When the commanding officer of the
garrison, Captain Holmes, saw the paper, he immediately ordered the arrest of not
only McLaughlan but also of McGrath. Holmes was even explicit about his reasons—
McLaughlan, obviously, ought to be arrested for so publicly broadcasting his dispute
in language calculated to provoke, but in his mind, McGrath, too, was at fault for
“not accepting the Challenge and settling it in a private manner.”
Lieutenant McGrath strongly objected to his arrest, but he did not do so by
appealing to military law and claiming that he had done nothing wrong according to
the Articles of War, and that all the fault was on McLaughlan’s side—he had been the
one to speak insolently to his superior, to issue a challenge to duel, and to publicly
use provoking language impugning the reputation of an officer. Rather, McGrath
claimed, there was no possible way he could have, as the formal charge put it,
“suffer[ed] himself to be posted as a Coward,” because the paper accusing him had
been on display for all of three minutes before he had been arrested by Captain
Holmes, and McGrath himself had never even seen it. The quick arrest made it
impossible to determine whether McGrath would have responded properly to this
accusation of cowardice. But McGrath further claimed that his refusal of duel was
entirely proper and in no way an admission of cowardice, for the dispute concerned
“a point of duty upon the Parade,” and therefore McLaughlan “had no business to
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make a point of honour of it.” Furthermore, McGrath testified, he was under no
obligation to render unto McLaughlan the honor of deigning to duel with him, for
although McLaughlan was acting as the company’s adjutant (normally a position
given to one of the company’s junior officers), he was merely a sergeant major and
therefore McGrath “could not look upon him as a Commissioned Officer” and,
correspondingly, a gentleman. Because it was perfectly acceptable for a gentleman
to decline to duel with someone below his station (indeed, it would have been a
betrayal of the solidarity and privileges of his class to have accepted), and because
McGrath’s supposed insulting behavior did not actually impugn McLaughlin’s honor
(and, in fact, McLaughlin’s lack of an officer’s commission suggested that he might
not actually have any honor to impugn), McGrath was acquitted as soon as these
facts were made known. In fact, the court went so far as to claim not only did they
“most Honorably Acquit him,” but added that “it is the farther opinion of this Court
that the Conduct of Lt. McGrath on this occasion has been thoroughly consistent with
the Character of an Officer and Gentleman; Judging it proper at the same time to
declare the whole Charge appears groundless false & malicious & that the Conduct of
Acting Adjutant McLaughlin is highly censurable tending to subvert all order,
Subordination and military Discipline.487
When Captain Spiesmacher was relating the disagreement between Ensign Mair
and Ensign Smith, which within a few days had escalated to a plan to duel, he noted
that the two men and their seconds had in fact met at the appointed dueling
grounds, but “what passed…I am sorry to say was nothing but bad language.” In
other words, Captain Spiesmacher, who was the present commander and whose job
it was to prevent quarrels and challenges between officers, reacted to the news that
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the duel had been prevented from occurring not with relief but with censure for the
officers who had not dueled, but had merely met each other on the dueling grounds
to exchange verbal insults instead of pistol fire.488 And Mair, faced with this
disapproval, insisted that he had been prepared to fight: "I do declare to this Court
and to the world, that I would have fought him as I told him on the Ground,
according to the tenor of the Note, with Pistols, and that as long as there was
Powder and Ball,” he claimed.489 Here, the open admission of an intent to duel,
grossly contrary to the Articles of War, was considered clearly preferable to even
being thought too afraid to fight a duel.
A court-martial even more completely demonstrated its willingness to uphold the
values of the officer class rather than the law when it convicted an officer of
ungentlemanly conduct after he declined a challenge to duel. When the case was
sent back to England for review, the Judge Advocate General objected to the
conviction: "I do not conceive that the sentence of a Court of Justice can at any rate
be supported which awards a punishment for neglecting to seek a method of redress
forbidden as well by the military as the common law."490 But this was the very limit
of central administrators’ ability to interfere with officers’ ability to use military
courts for their own purposes. The Articles of War stipulated that the king or the
commander-in-chief was to approve of all court martial verdicts and sentences. This
was supposed to provide some constraint on the power of the court-martial board, as
the commander could pardon the defendant, reduce the sentence, or point out errors
and order the court to correct them. He could not, however, order them to change
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their verdict.491 With the king or commander having only the power to pardon those
they thought were convicted unjustly, and having no power to punish a defendant
that the court-martial refused to convict, control of the court-martial remained firmly
with officers.492
But kings, military commanders, and government officials was also unable to
effectively regulate honor culture because they themselves were also complicit in
it.493 The position of the law was that a death occurring during a duel was clearly
murder; however, royal pardons for those who killed during duels were routine in
both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.494 And civilian courts also refused to
adopt the view that killing a man in a duel was indistinguishable from homicide.
Civilian jurors in the eighteenth century consistently proved unwilling to convict a
man for killing in a duel, so long as both parties had behaved "honourably."495 There
is only one known execution of a man for killing another man in a duel—and this
because it was done improperly, and in such a manner (specifically, without
witnesses and without seconds) that made it impossible to determine if what had
occurred was a death from dueling or a murder. It did not conform to the norms of
honor culture, and its secrecy associated the killer with the dishonorable assassin
rather than the candid gentleman.496
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This established practice of pardoning or acquitting duelists undermined
government attempts to abolish the duel, but even more problematic was the fact
that high-level government officials and army administrators dueled themselves.
Lord Germain, the Secretary of State for America, participated in a duel in 1770,
which originally stemmed from a charge that he had behaved as a coward during the
Battle of Minden. He was almost drawn into another in 1778.497 Colonial leaders,
too, often put personal quarrels above their military or administrative duties,
personally fighting in deadly duels even on the eve of battle.498 Admonitions to more
junior officers to put aside their differences for the greater good could not be very
effective when men at the highest level of government routinely let their concerns
about their individual honor to override national interest.499
And when they were not dueling, they and other high ranking officers were often
using their time and influence to settle quarrels among their subordinates. Lord
Amherst had to try to reconcile two officers willing to kill each other over hot words
that broke into a fistfight; likewise, the altercation between Lieutenant Graydon and
Lieutenant Scriven of the 60th is notable for the time that other officers of the
regiment had to spend resolving the disputants’ quarrels over points of honor and
investigating the conditions under which they would apologize to each other. The
perceived importance of personal honor in relation to military duty is further
suggested by the fact that, after all these attempts at mediation, Lieutenant Graydon
then applied for leave from active military status so he could travel from Spanish
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Town to Kingston to consult with a friend on the matter of whether he should
apologize to Scriven, and was given it.500
The immense social power of honor culture is indicated by the further language in
the Articles of War, which banned officers from "reproachful or provoking Speeches
or Gestures"; sending challenges; carrying messages of challenges from one officer
to another; and "knowingly and willingly suffer[ing] any Person whatsoever to go
forth to fight a Duel.” Furthermore, it promised punishment not only those who
fought duels, provoked duels, challenged others to duels, and failed to do their
utmost to prevent duels, but also to officers who berated or shamed other officers
who refused to duel. “Whatsoever Officer or Soldier shall upbraid another for
refusing a Challenge, shall himself be punished as a Challenger,” it declared, and
attempted to remove by fiat the customary stigma that accrued to any officer who
refused to duel: “We hereby acquit and discharge all Officers and Soldiers of any
Disgrace, or Opinion of Disadvantage, which might arise from their having refused to
accept of Challenges, as they will have only acted in Obedience to Our Orders, and
done their Duty as good Soldiers, who subject themselves to Discipline.”501 Yet the
language used indicates why these prohibitions were so ineffective—with its
emphasis on how obedient and subordinate those who refused challenges were, the
Articles implicitly endorsed the view that an officer who dueled was displaying a
manly independence to authority.
Because officers who openly and flagrantly violated the law by dueling were often
acquitted, because officers who had the misfortune to be convicted were often
pardoned, because there often was no further penalty for dueling other than the risk
of death or injury during the duel itself, officers sneered at those who considered
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themselves bound by the spirit as well as the letter of the Articles of War. In fact,
the Articles of War made it more difficult for officers to oppose dueling, because it
unambiguously forbade the practice, but the army rarely followed through on its
threatened punishments. Thus, to refrain from dueling could be interpreted as the
act of a fool and a coward whose fear of the toothless threats of the Articles of War
overrode his concern for his priceless and irreplaceable honor.
The Articles of War praised officers who refused challenges in quite damning
terms when it lauded them as “good Soldiers, who subject themselves to Discipline,”
and it is not coincidental that officers used the terms of the Articles of War to accuse
each other of unmanly and cowardly obedience when they referred to its strictures.
In fact, the duel’s illegal nature gave further opportunities for officers to demonstrate
their superior masculinity, such as ridiculing those who neglected to act with the
proper secrecy to ensure that the quarrel would not culminate in an actual duel.
When Ensign Garrison told Ensign Leech that he “looked upon it as a mark of his
Cowardice to call on him [to duel] in so public a place,” the implication was that a
proper challenge to duel was delivered in private, and the only reason for delivering
it so publicly was in the hope that other officers would observe it, and consider
themselves forced to intervene.502
The prohibitions of the Articles of War did not prevent dueling; at best it forced
the duel to become a slightly underground activity, as officers tried to adhere to the
letter of the law while blatantly violating its spirit.503

When Ensign Mair was tried for

sending a challenge, he admitted he had done so, but claimed that he tried “to avoid
as much as possible a literal breach of the Articles of War relative to Challenging,
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and that as much as was consistent with my honor and Character.”504 Officers often
tried to shield themselves from prosecution by issuing challenges orally to ensure
that no written challenge could be presented as evidence at a court-martial, or they
resorted to euphemisms and unclear language that implied, but did not state.
Ensign Farrell, who was tried along with his opponent for dueling, testified as to the
sort of language used to plan the duel:
a gentleman of the 92nd Regiment called on me and told me that
Mr. Cawley desired a meeting with me in half an hour at the
bottom of the Race Course. I asked him if he was his friend when
he said he was. I asked him if I was to meet Mr. Cawley with
Pistols, when he said Yes, I accordingly waited on the Gentleman
at the time appointed.505
It was a near-universal practice among officers to use the ambiguous term
“friend” rather than the unmistakable “second,” though this had dangers of its own.
In the dispute between Lieutenant Colonel Bayard and Lieutenant McDonald of the
King’s Orange Rangers, witnesses to the negotiations for a duel reported that neither
party had made public mention of “Weapons or Seconds.” But Bayard had made his
intentions quite clear when he gestured to Captain Johnston and said that “he had
his friend then with him, on purpose to have satisfaction.” (Unfortunately, this
nebulous term, so useful for lending some slightly plausible deniability if the matter
led to a court-martial, ended up misleading the proposed second himself. Johnston’s
reply revealed that he had been under the impression that Bayard was using the
term “friend” in its more traditional sense: Bayard had asked Johnston to come to
this meeting as Bayard’s friend, and Johnston had assumed Bayard wanted him
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there to help settle the quarrel amicably. Thus, when Bayard stated that he had
brought Johnston as his friend, Johnston immediately disclaimed it, saying, “Yes
Bayard, but not to go to the Field.”506)
Captain William Barry, who thought himself insulted by his commanding officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Doyle, responded to a message from Doyle by telling the
messenger that he “did not know what business Col. Doyle could have with him,”
and that “he would meet him at the back of the burnt Church in the Ruins.” Barry
was then told that a burnt church “was a very improper place to settle business in,”
but that was precisely the point of Barry’s remark. The only reason a gentleman
would go to such a place would be to fight a duel, so Barry’s proposed meeting place
was a barely-veiled challenge to duel.507
Honor culture undermined the military hierarchy, but attempts to disrupt it did so
as well. Even the Articles of War, otherwise dedicated to strengthening and
upholding the military hierarchy, was forced to interfere with the military hierarchy in
order discourage dueling, when it granted to all officers the “Power to part and quell
all Quarrels, Frays, and Disorders," even if the quarrelers were of superior rank or
belonged to another regiment.508
More importantly, honor culture undermined the law. The Articles of War banned
the rituals of dueling, yet these rituals often served to mitigate the damage caused
by the duel, and a properly-conducted duel was less destructive to military order,
honor, and human life than the uncontrolled brawl that might otherwise occur. Thus,
even officers who opposed honor culture and the violence that sustained it often
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found themselves violating the Articles of War as they tried to prevent or at least
delay informal violence by channelling it to the formalized structure of the duel.
The Articles of War banned dueling, but the supremacy of honor in officers’
conceptions of masculinity meant that officers dueled regardless of the practice’s
legality; the fact that it was illegal did not stop them from dueling, but only served to
further convince them that the law operated in opposition to masculine virtue, and
that breaking the law was often the necessary action of an honorable man.
The crown’s response to a rash of duels and other quarrels that broke out among
the officers stationed in Jamaica in 1782 suggests another consequence of the
entrenched culture of violent defenses of honor. The king and the Deputy Judge
Advocate noted that “the Several Duels which have lately taken place in the Island of
Jamaica appear to have been occasioned by contentious and provoking Language,
improper to be used by one Gentleman towards another.” Therefore, they
suggested, it would have
a Salutary effect if a special Order be issued as by His Majesty's
immediate Command, admonishing and strictly injoining all
Officers bearing His Majesty's Commission carefully to repress
inordinate animosities and expressly inhibiting under pain of His
Majesty's Severe displeasure any intemperate, reproachful, or
provoking Speeches from one officer towards, or respecting the
Character of another, as having a natural and obvious tendency to
the breach of good Order and highly detrimental to His Majesty's
Service.509
In other words, the crown’s solution to this outbreak of dueling was not to
reiterate the prohibitions of the Articles of War and demand that officers refrain from
dueling, but rather that officers should stop doing things that caused other officers to
issue challenges to duel.
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And what caused these duels? One stemmed from an officer feeling personally
offended when another officer confined the first officer’s personal servant for not
attending drills. Another started, as we have seen, when one officer, Captain
Townshend, felt personally offended after another officer, Ensign McKenzie, threw a
bottle at a black woman in his presence, challenged him on whether he had done it
deliberately, and implied that he was a liar. The officers' general appraisal of the
affair was that McKenzie obviously had to refute the claim that he was a liar by
issuing a challenge, so in prudence Townshend ought not to have made such a fuss
about the circumstances of the bottle-throwing—which, after all, had not injured
anyone that the officers considered important. This altercation was also actually
indirectly the cause of the third duel, which occurred after two officers had been seen
flourishing their swords in front Townshend’s house after he had been wounded in
the second duel, which Townshend’s friends perceived as a mortal insult to the honor
of the convalescing officer.
In essence, officers were being instructed that other officers’ abuse of their power
over enlisted soldiers or colonial civilians ought to be overlooked in order to preserve
harmony among the officer class. The response of another officer on hearing the
reason behind one of these quarrels was in keeping with the crown’s message: “if we
as Brother Officers did not look over trifles of this nature and be more obliging to
each other,” he said, “there would be an end to all kind of Society and we should
lead the most wretched lives imaginable."510 Casting “reflections” on other officers’
misbehavior, pointing out their abuse of enlisted soldiers or civilians, or expressing
open disapproval of another officer was dangerous and unproductive.

510.WO 71/60, p. 390.
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When officers’ personal honor was threatened, they were to act outside the law;
when attending to the unimportant concerns of those not within the officer class, it
was trivial and quarrelsome to question an officer’s treatment of them—and it could
not be done except at the extreme cost of also calling into question the officer’s
honor. This was a culture that had strong incentives to uphold neither the
supremacy of the rule of law nor a strict commitment to the welfare of civilians.
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Chapter 8: Imperial Protectors?

Major Robert Donkin, reflecting on “heroism” in a military treatise published
during the Revolutionary War, was surprisingly unconcerned with the purely military
side of this virtue. The highest form of heroism, in his mind, was not a dashing
cavalry charge through enemy lines, or an inspiring feat of battlefield bravery.
Rather, he claimed not to have
read or heard of a nobler kind than that exhibited by the earl of
Peterborough at the siege of Barcelone in 1705...He flew
everywhere with his officers; found [his allies] the Germans and
Catalonians ransacking the houses of the principal inhabitants!
disperses them, and restores the plunder they had taken: meets
the duchess of Popoli in the hands of these Germans who were
going to dishonor her! and delivers her safe to her husband.511
Note the proper targets of heroic protection in Donkin’s mind: the property of the
wealthy, and the honor of aristocratic women. To be a hero was to be the defender
of class and gender hierarchies, a protector of property and of upper-class women,
who, by virtue of their status and gender, could not be perceived as threats to a
military campaign or—more importantly, to the masculinity of individual officers.
Thus, officers could come to the aid of such women, even if they were on the
opposite sides of a war.
This chapter examines how officers’ established ideas about masculinity, status,
and the rule of law constrained how they could act as imperial protectors during the
American War of Independence. Officers’ affinity for the ideals of chivalry might
have inclined them to act in a protective role to enhance their claims to masculine
status in some cases, but the military tactics of the war, the increasing cultural
divergence between the army and the colonists, and the leveling ideologies of the

511.Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, 143-144.
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Revolution all worked to convince many British officers that the colonists were, in
general, undeserving of protection.
Roger Lamb, who had served as an enlisted soldier in the British Army in the
Revolutionary War, expressed great annoyance that reports of atrocities committed
by British troops had freely circulated in Britain during the war. “It cannot be matter
of much surprize, that such reports were fabricated by the Americans to serve their
own purposes,” he wrote, “but that they should obtain circulation and credence at
home is truly astonishing.”512 The fact that they did—that Britons as well as
Americans could readily believe that their army would would treat civilians in
wartime with violence and brutality—suggests that the culture of the army was
growing more distant from British culture as well as from that of the American
colonies.513
Americans were increasingly uneasy about British rule not only because they
associated it with corruption and tyranny, but also immorality.514 British soldiers
were denounced for the danger they presented to American women (and relatedly,
to the masculine and patriarchal identity of American men) because of their
supposed sexual immorality. Anti-British propaganda contrasted virtuous American
sexual propriety with the licentious, unrestrained, and shameless attitudes of British
troops of all ranks towards sex.515
The war itself made matters worse. In occupied towns where no civil
government existed, the army was free to impose its own norms, completely

512.Lamb, An Original and Authentic Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War From Its
Commencement to the Year 1783, 158.
513.Anderson, A People’s Army, 118.
514.Robert M Calhoon and Robert M Weir, "The Scandalous History of Sir Egerton Leigh", The William and
Mary Quarterly 26, no. 1 (1969): 47-74, on increasing American "feeling that Great Britain and her
servants were corrupt.”
515.Block, "Rape Without Women: Print Culture and the Politicization of Rape, 1765-1815," 861.
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disregarding civilian mores. British military authorities had little interest in
regulating the morality of the people when it did not adversely affect the army's
needs. Prostitution flourished, even more scandalous than before the British
occupation because it was now open rather than hidden.516 Theaters, associated with
immorality and idleness in colonial America and barely tolerated before the war, now
proliferated, a very popular entertainment among the gentlemen of the British
military.517 And soldiers showed no inclination to be restrained by the dictates of
religion. Officers violated the Sabbath with bawdy entertainments and made few
efforts to promote religion among their men.518 Americans (and well as German
soldiers allied with the British) expressed horror at the irreligious behavior and
blasphemous language commonly used by British soldiers.519 Americans in mortal
dispute over loyalty to Great Britain could agree that British military leaders were far
too inclined to chase women and indulge in other luxurious vices, and Britons with
widely differing views on the morality of the war itself were often unified in their
condemnation of vices of high-ranking military officers.520
Most importantly, among civilians in both Britain and America, the acceptability
of violence was in decline, and violence was rapidly losing ground as an essential
marker of masculinity.521 In particular, private violence to settle disputes rather than
516.Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies: Patriots and Loyalists in Revolutionary New York, 23, on the rise of
prostitution in occupied New York. Urban, Fusiliers : The Saga of a British Redcoat Regiment in the
American Revolution, 10, on Boston.
517.Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies: Patriots and Loyalists in Revolutionary New York, 31-32.
O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate
of the Empire, 136, on British oﬃcers' involvement in the theater and Burgoyne as a playwright in
occupied Boston, writing plays that mocked Congregationalists, performed in Faneuil Hall.
518.Anderson, 116-117; Van Buskirk, 32-33, suggests that the army's appropriation of religious spaces as
entertainment venues further alienated the populace.
519.Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only, 135.
520.Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies, 30-31; Royster, 14; Stead, "Contemporary Responses in Print to the
American Campaigns of the Howe Brothers," 130-131.
521.Shoemaker, "Male Honour and the Decline of Public Violence in Eighteenth-Century London,"
190-191, argues that the long-term decline in homicide between the 16th to 19th centuries was due to
a change in the role public violence played in constructing masculinity. Before, it was an essential part
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having recourse to the law was becoming more problematic; it was less and less
acceptable for people to claim that their high status made them above the law. This
was occurring in Britain itself, but even more so in North America. In Britain, using
one's position and influence to help relations was normal; the rise of revolutionary
spirit in the thirteen colonies meant that men now gained status instead by publicly
proclaiming their concern for the common good over enriching their relatives.522
But some of the army’s vestigial practices made it hard to distinguish between
legitimate privilege and immoral corruption. Putting fictitious names on muster rolls
was a common practice of Tudor proprietary soldiering. The pay assigned to these
non-existent soldiers could be used to pay for common regimental supplies,
supplement the pay of officers, or provide pensions for the widows and orphans of
the regiment’s soldiers. In theory, this practice was banned in the early eighteenth
century because it was too similar to the crime of submitting a false muster—putting
fictitious names on muster rolls to pocket the pay the government would provide for
them.523 Yet decades later, the practice continued with the approbation of the king
himself, who ordered his officials “to allow upon the Muster-rolls of all the
Regiments, Troops, and Companies, a Number of fictitious Names therein mentioned,
instead of private Men, in order to raise and settle a Fund of the Maintenance of such
Widows or Officers as are or shall be intitled to his Royal Bounty,” adding that in this
case, “no Allowance of any such fictitious Name upon any Muster-roll shall be
construed to be a false Muster.”524
of asserting male status; later, it was not necessary to be violent to be a good man, and in fact might
hurt one's male status, as evangelical masculinity supported instead the virtues of domesticity and
restraint.
522.Calhoon and Weir, "The Scandalous History of Sir Egerton Leigh," 73; Charles Royster, A
Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783, (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 25-53.
523.Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline: Oﬃcership and Administration in the British Army, 1714-63, 64.
524.An Act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion, 22-23; Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline: Oﬃcership and
Administration in the British Army, 1714-63, 76, on other diﬃculties distinguishing 'corruption' from
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The far clearer division between legitimate practices and corruption in America
led to a growing American perception that the British, corrupted by aristocratic vices,
were unfit to rule.525 But British officers, who perceived a strict separation between
their private and public lives, found this idea ridiculous. Their authority certainly
didn’t come from any conspicuous public virtue they might chance to display; their
authority stemmed instead from something more intrinsic to their character—their
status, acquired at birth, as gentlemen of honor. This status was so connected with
them personally that no vice (so long as it was not dishonorable vice) could remove
that authority from them; indeed, the very fact of their authority and high social
position allowed them to have an unregulated private life and indulge in private
misbehavior, if they were so inclined. Restraint, sobriety, refraining from violent
outbursts—these were things that the unfortunate men at the lower end of the social
spectrum were forced to do; they were markers of their lack of masculine power. An
officer, on the other hand, by virtue of his high rank and social position, could enjoy
all the luxurious vice he pleased; it might perhaps reflect poorly on some aspects of
his character, and lead him into some sad financial and personal woes, but to
suggest that such behavior made him unfit to be an officer and a source of authority

legitimate practice; mustering arrangements and the delays in receiving soldiers' pay often meant an
oﬃcer who acted with scrupulous honesty in reporting his numbers to the government would not have
enough money to support the regiment for the coming year.
525.Calhoon and Weir, "The Scandalous History of Sir Egerton Leigh," 63; Royster, 3-24.
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was preposterous.526 Thus, when officers encountered colonial inhabitants, the two
groups often had completely different ideas about legitimate sources of authority.
The two groups also differed on the correct way to conduct a war. The terrain of
North America did not suit British ideals of warfare. “The nature of the country was
peculiarly favourable to defence,” one soldier wrote, with “many natural barriers of
hills and mountains, intersected by rivers, and interspersed with trees, rocks, and
precipices; several defiles, skirted by impenetrable woods, and majestic rivers,
flowing with impetuous currents, which seemed to bid defiance to the invader.”527
When rebel forces took full advantage of this defensive terrain, sheltering behind
trees to pick off individual soldiers with rifles and negating the British army’s superior
battlefield discipline by fighting in wooded and mountainous areas, British soldiers
reacted with contempt.528 These methods of fighting were “skulking,” and
“cowardly”; their use of the rifle was not honorable—it was the tool of the assassin,
not the brave soldier.529 The rifle was inhumane, barbaric, and the weapon of a
coward.530 The rebel refusal to attack openly, to declare their hostile intentions

526.Phyllis Deutsch, "Moral Trespass in Georgian London: Gaming, Gender, and Electoral Politics in the
Age of George III", The Historical Journal 39, no. 3 (1996): 637-656, notes the increasing popularity of
linking the right to rule with personal moral virtue. Carter, "British Masculinities on Trial in the Queen
Caroline Aﬀair of 1820," 258, 265, suggests that by the early nineteenth century, "private behaviour
had become as crucial to masculine reputation as it had long been to feminine reputation" as it
"became increasingly impossible for men who wished to be entrusted with public confidence in
political and civic life to openly diverge from contemporary ideals concerning private conduct. The
public man whose private life was in disarray undermined his reputation as a wise and judicious man,
diminished the currency of his word and damaged public trust in his overall competency to fulfill his
oﬃce or station."
527.Lamb, An Original and Authentic Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War From Its
Commencement to the Year 1783, 63.
528.Wayne E. Lee, Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare, 1500-1865 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 171-208; Lee, Crowds and Soldiers; John Shy, A People Numerous and
Armed, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 133-161.
529.Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America,
1775-1783, 134.
530.Starkey, "Paoli to Stony Point: Military Ethics and Weaponry During the American Revolution," 13-15.
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before shooting, rather than firing without warning from a hidden position, was in
the view of British troops a serious breech of proper masculine battlefield behavior.531
Officers took an exceedingly dim view of what they termed la petite guerre. It
was a form of warfare that was both cowardly and savage. Officers disliked the
"barbarous" nature of guerrilla warfare in America, and, after the rebels allied with
France in 1778, were far more keen on fighting the French, who had undisputed
status as a sovereign nation and adhered to the accepted norms of European
warfare.532 “The rebellion now in America,” Donkin wrote, was sadly characterized by
the miseries of guerrilla warfare, not only because of the terrain, which favored
defense, but from “the cowardliness of the rebels, who delight more in murdering
from woods, walls and houses, that in shewing any genius or science in the art
military.”533 (Donkin’s introduction mentioned that the profits from the sales of his
book were to be used "to relieve and support the innocent children and widows of
the valiant soldiers inhumanly and wantonly butchered" while "peaceably marching
to and from Concord" on 19 April, 1775.534)
Officers’ rhetoric about “secret” and “Assassin-like” attacks on an officer’s
reputation—in comparison to open, honest, and manly accusation—was reflected
exactly when military positions rather than other officers’ reputations were being
attacked. They linked the bayonet charge with bravery, in contrast with the

531.Stephen Conway, "The British Army, 'Military Europe,' and the American War of Independence",
William & Mary Quarterly 67, no. 1 (2010): 69-100.
532.Conway, "British Army Oﬃcers and the American War for Independence," 273; Lambart, A New
System of Military Discipline, Founded Upon Principle, 275, suggested that enemies on the battlefield
could find common ground by their shared ideals of courageous military behavior.
533.Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, 223; Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only : The British
Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783, 128-129, describes enlisted feeling of British
superiority over the inferior military skill of the rebels, as well as outrage over their “unnatural rebellion.”
See also Lambart, A New System of Military Discipline, Founded Upon Principle, 251, who advised
oﬃcers to teach their men to despise their enemy: “The more that the private men can be brought to
hold their enemy in contempt, the more resolute they become.”
534.Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, iii.
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American penchant for fortifying defensive positions from which they could fire in
relative safety. "Men of their bodily strength and even a coward may be their match
in firing,” Burgoyne told his troops, “but the bayonet in the hands of the valiant is
irresistible. The enemy, convinced of this, will place their whole dependence in
entrenchments and rifle pieces. It will be our glory and our preservation to storm
when possible."535
Because the rebels were using methods of fighting which they associated with
cowardice but also savagery, British soldiers argued that colonists did not deserve
the practices of “civilized” warfare. Furthermore, the rebels were rebels; even
commanders who were acclaimed for their compassion and advocated for the
humane treatment of enemy soldiers often maintained that these guidelines only
applied to those participating in “legitimate” wars between sovereigns.536 But
rebellion was a criminal act, and those in rebellion against legitimate authority had
forfeited any right to protection.537
This was a common view among military and legal theorists of the eighteenth
century, and soldiers who were tried for various crimes against civilians proposed
similar justifications for their behavior. Three men who were “employed in recruiting
for different provincial Corps in His Majesty’s Service” were accused of breaking into
the house of William Seton, a New York merchant, in the middle of the night and
stealing furniture, guns, money, silverware, and variety of clothing, including the
handkerchief that Seton was carrying at the time and the hat on his head. When the

535.Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America,
1775-1783, 218.
536.Stephen Conway, "To Subdue America: British Army Oﬃcers and the Conduct of the Revolutionary
War", William and Mary Quarterly: Third Series 43, no. 3 (1986): pp. 381-407.
537.Stephen Conway, "The Great Mischief Complain'd Of": Reflections on the Misconduct of British
Soldiers in the Revolutionary War", William and Mary Quarterly: Third Series 47, no. 3 (1990): pp.
370-390.
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men were charged with the crime, all three men acknowledged that they had robbed
Seton’s house, and they had “never made a secret of what they had done,” because
“Mr. Seton was reputed to be a notorious rebel.” Therefore, they claimed, they
thought that the pillaging of his house was “a meritorious act in favour of the King
and Government.”538 Though this defense was not accepted by the court, some
measure of its general popularity among the soldiers is indicated by the orders
General Howe had to issue informing the members of his army that a person’s open
statement of disdain for British authority did not render him an acceptable target for
theft.539
But methods of abusing civilians could closely resemble actions that were
considered legitimate acts of war. When some soldiers of all ranks maintained that
plundering enemy civilians was a soldiers’ natural right, they were referring to the
taking of civilians’ property for their own personal use.540 In theory, this was
supposed to be easily distinguished from the legitimate seizure and destruction of
rebel property by the institution of the army, or the requisitioning of supplies for the
use of the army. However, the distinction was far more difficult to uphold in
practice, especially because of the custom of distributing prize money after the
successful capture of enemy property. Furthermore, many British officers believed
that plundering and burning the colonists’ property would be an effective method for
reconciling them to British rule by demonstrating the might of the crown’s forces and
538.WO 71/83, pp. 220-227.
539.Fourteenth Foot Orderly Book, 5904/175, National Army Museum, cited in Conway, "The Great
Mischief Complain'd Of": Reflections on the Misconduct of British Soldiers in the Revolutionary War,"
379. Also, WO 71/91, pp. 154-200: the defendant’s statement justifying his robberies: “being out of the
Line often under the Sanction of General Clinton to distress the Rebels; the Encouragement given
them has induced me to go greater lengths than Government might think proper to countenance; tho’
in fact these people that has been distressed, are as great Rebels, & as ill wishers of His Majesty’s
Government, as any we ever plundered out of the Lines, by permission of His Excellency the
Commander in Chief.”
540.Starkey, "War and Culture, a Case Study: The Enlightenment and the Conduct of the British Army in
America, 1755-1781," 3.
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the price they would pay for continued resistance. Even those who favored a
conciliatory stance advocated for their views not on the grounds that taking colonists’
property was immoral or illegal according to the rules of war, but that it was impolitic
and would alienate their support for the crown.541 Similarly, assaults on civilians
resembled too closely the soldiers’ actual battlefield behavior. The tactics of guerrilla
warfare and the use of rifles by the rebelling colonists led to a desire for retaliation
against these enemies, who did not clearly identify themselves as combatants, and
made it easier to justify attacks on civilians.542 These practices belied claims that
legitimate targets for violence were to be found only on a designated field of
battle.543
Captain John Campbell of the Corps of Engineers was charged with “beating and
offering to send to the Guard Mr. Joseph Tweedy, a Gentleman of the Town of
Newport; for Persisting he was right in what he had done; and for Declaring, let the
Consequences be what they will, under the like Provocation, he would beat him
again.” Campbell’s defense statement claimed that Tweedy was merely
masquerading as a gentleman, that he was “in fact the son of a Transported Convict,
an inveterate Rebel, and himself notoriously reprobated.” He claimed that Tweedy
was connected “to a Man, engaged in the heat of Rebellion,” and was only in
Newport to protect this rebel’s property. Campbell praised “His Majesty’s most
Clement intentions of recalling his deluded American subjects, to a proper sense of
their real Interest, and Duty,” but suggested that Tweedy was pretending to be a
loyal subject and that his complaint was merely an example of attempts by
541.Conway, "To Subdue America: British Army Oﬃcers and the Conduct of the Revolutionary War,"
542.Starkey, "Paoli to Stony Point: Military Ethics and Weaponry During the American Revolution," 13;
Conway, "To Subdue America: British Army Oﬃcers and the Conduct of the Revolutionary War," 398.
Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America,
1775-1783, 136-137.
543.Conway, "The Great Mischief Complain'd Of": Reflections on the Misconduct of British Soldiers in the
Revolutionary War," 377.
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“atroceous Rebels to endulge their Rancour, and throw a die against the Honor and
fortune of his [the King’s] most approved servants whilst they themselves risque
nothing.” He warned against allowing “such Complainants” the ability to “with
Impunity give Officers the trouble of sitting Courts Martial” as it would soon “prove
an incessant source of dangerous accusations against the very worthiest
Characters.”544 Campbell was proposing that the rule of law had little place in this
war; it was a threat to officers trying to subdue the rebellion and allowing American
civilians access to courts, even military courts, was making officers vulnerable to the
twisted designs of rebels intent on distressing them.
Yet the rule of law and a conciliatory attitude towards American civilians had
advocates as well. There was a widespread belief by both officers and civilians that
assault, theft, and rape by an occupying army was merely one of the usual costs of
war borne by a civilian population.545 But the presence of loyalists, and the fact that
the British saw the Revolutionary War as a rebellion by their own people rather than
war against a foreign enemy, complicated the situation, as British officers and
officials disagreed on whether the colonists would be more likely to reconcile
themselves to British rule if treated mildly or if terrorized into submission.546

544.WO 71/84, p. 159-177; for a similar case, see WO 71/88, pp. 16-29: Accused of abusing and arresting
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Soldiers in the Revolutionary War,” William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Jul., 1990), pp. 370-390.
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Therefore, officers subscribed to a range of views on how seriously they should
attempt to prevent wartime crimes. Some thought that the army should act
decisively to curb plundering and pillaging by soldiers, while other officers led raids
of the countryside and appropriated civilian property for themselves.547
Some officers thought that the only way to win the war was to regain the loyalty
of the American colonists. Imagining that the colonists had been unhappily deluded
by republican demagogues, they believed that if the army could enforce law and
order in the areas that it occupied, and treat colonists with kindness and
consideration, the Americans would soon perceive the benefits of being under British
rule, and abandon the rebel cause.548 But naturally plundering civilian property and
abusing civilians more generally would not cause anyone treated so to like the British
any better, and loyalists whose property was damaged or confiscated might turn
against the British.549 Commanders issued orders exhorting troops to respect the
property of the inhabitants and to give them no “Annoyance.” General Howe’s
orders called for officers to extend greater amounts of control over their soldiers, “as
the Present Licentious behaviour of the troops is a Disgrace to the Country they
belong to.”550 He condemned theft and marauding, and threatened to hang soldiers
caught plundering without trial.
But although commanders favoring reconciliation often issued orders of this sort,
the majority of soldiers were of a different opinion.551 Enlisted soldiers argued for
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the legitimacy of plunder, and their officers were often also of the opinion that the
rebelling colonists deserved whatever distresses the army inflicted upon them.552
Despite commanders' high-minded and humanitarian orders, officers' desire for
harshness often prevailed on the ground, as the junior officers were far more able to
direct the actual treatment of civilians in practice than the high-level commanders.553
Officers insisted that proper behavior towards civilians in Britain necessarily
differed from proper behavior overseas; it was ridiculous to have the same
standards--it would make imperial governance impossible. Imperial warfare
provided an opportunity to use different military norms and disregard the laws of war
adhered to in Europe; indeed, many Britons held the idea that disputes in colonial
zones necessarily had to be settled, ultimately, with violence, rather than the law.554
Rebels and savage people were treated differently from European regular troops; the
developing standards of legal and illegal warfare were thought to apply only to
regulars.555 And before the war, the civilian inhabitants of Britain to some extent
agreed.556
But Americans rejected this view; they made the appeal that their colonies were
not like other colonies, and they refused to play the role of the imperial Other, citing
their kinship ties with and cultural similarities to the inhabitants of the metropole.
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Loyalists insisted that they were Britons and deserved the same rights and
protections as the citizens who lived in Britain itself; the rebels insisted that they had
been Britons, deserved the same rights and protections as other Britons, and were
rightfully rebelling against Britain because they had been denied these rights. The
inability to easily distinguish loyalists from rebels caused further headaches for
soldiers wishing to punish the rebels but placate the loyalists, and colonists took full
advantage of this difficulty.557
American forces also weakened the ability of the British army to justify their poor
behavior because they partially adopted the conventions of European warfare. The
American War of Independence did not degenerate into unrestrained savagery
because in addition to their militia and guerrilla forces, the rebels also decided to
establish the Continental Army on a British model and fight according to European
convention—thus restraining the ability of the British to use the tactics of terror they
had used in the '45 rebellion in Scotland. When faced with an enemy fighting
according the rules of “civilized” warfare, officers and soldiers who used tactics fit
only for “savage” opponents were harshly criticized for their inhumanity by their own
countrymen.558 British soldiers seem to have clearly wanted to characterize their
American counterparts as unprofessional rebels and not part of the larger European
military community.559 But when they were faced with an enemy that consciously
modeled its organization and behavior on their own standards, and which proposed
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to keep discipline in its ranks by the wholesale plagiarism of the British Articles of
War, (the Continental Articles of War had almost no alterations other than the
deletion of references to the King), the British could not deviate from their rules for
war without attracting criticism from their own people.560
The tendency of Britons to be critical of the army’s behavior to colonists, as well
as some officers’ genuine distaste for brutality to civilians, meant that officers
sometimes sought to play the role of imperial protectors. The failure of the British to
act as proper protectors, and their arbitrary and tyrannical rule, were general themes
of patriot propaganda.561 And officers in particular were often targeted by these
works, as circulating reports of officers’ misbehavior undermined the legitimacy of
British rule and officers’ role as authorities who could be counted on to restrain the
baser passions of enlisted soldiers.562 Thus, British officers found value in refuting
these allegations by using military courts to both give the appearance of their
respect for the rule of law and to conspicuously display their behavior as imperial
protectors.
Although the court-martial was a tool for controlling the internal affairs of the
army, as we have seen, it could also be used to publicly control and demonstrate
control of the behavior of their troops. Formally trying those accused of crimes
against civilians had several advantages. Summary justice had an appearance of the
exercise of arbitrary and capricious power, which in the political climate of North
America, had become inextricably linked with tyranny. On the other hand, when

560.Starkey, "War and Culture, a Case Study: The Enlightenment and the Conduct of the British Army in
America, 1755-1781," 10.
561.Eustace, Passion Is the Gale : Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 466, on
patriot writings characterizing the British as unfit parents unworthy of the loyalty and obedience of their
American children. Block, "Rape Without Women: Print Culture and the Politicization of Rape,
1765-1815," 859, on the usefulness of rape stories as anti-British propaganda.
562.Conway, Military-civilian Crime and the British Army in North America, 1775-1781, 42.
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colonists were allowed to confront their assailants at a court-martial, they could be
reassured by its resemblance to a civilian court.
By using these military courts, the British army could publicly proclaim its
respect for the rule of law and counteract patriot propaganda depicting the British as
unfit rulers by showing that they took crime against civilians seriously. Furthermore,
these courts enhanced British authority: if civilians used them to seek redress for
their grievances, they were implicitly publicly acknowledging and accepting the
authority of the British, and thereby legitimizing their rule in North America.
But civilians would hardly see military courts as an option if the courts
themselves shielded members of the military from justice. Therefore, if the army
was to successfully make the transition from classifying assaults on civilians or their
property as legitimate acts of war or the unfortunate but inevitable consequences of
war to crimes that ought to be prosecuted, officers had to demonstrate a willingness
to prosecute other members of the British military community for crimes, to assist
civilians with negotiating the intricacies of military law, and to actually convict
accused soldiers brought before the court. This transition required the cooperation
of members of the British forces in prosecuting other members of the same group.
There was often no outside authority which could adjudicate these cases, and the
British military had the responsibility of jailing, charging, trying, convicting, and
punishing all offenders. Assaults, rapes and thefts could not be prosecuted as crimes
unless members of the British military community acted at every stage of the
proceeding, from the initial criminal investigation to the carrying out of the sentence.
Inertia and inaction played a significant role in the treatment of crimes against
civilians. The default was for these crimes to be ignored; inattention at any stage
doomed the process. Convicting soldiers for abusing civilians required people willing
to disregard group loyalty to the army at every stage. The long chain of events from
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the initial apprehension of the suspect to the administration of the sentence meant
that there were numerous opportunities to disrupt the proceedings. Soldiers could
turn a blind eye to crimes committed by their comrades; officers could refuse to
assist the civilians who appealed to them for aid; soldiers stationed at the guard
house could allow the prisoner to escape; the commanding officer could release the
prisoner on his own authority instead of ordering him to be tried563; the Deputy
Judge Advocate could hinder the prosecution by not exerting himself to arrange for
the presence of all the necessary witnesses; the court martial board could acquit the
defendant in the face of flagrant evidence against him; and soldiers and officers with
influence could use their connections to make sure that the sentence was never
carried out. The process could also be interrupted without any person’s active
intervention simply by the exigencies of war. After the British were forced to
evacuate Boston in March 1776, Ensign James Foxon of the 10th Regiment of Foot,
accused of plundering a house in Boston, had to be tried in Nova Scotia the next
month, without any witnesses who had remained in Boston.564
When the war itself did not make trying cases impossible, the initial step,
apprehending the suspects, often required the direct efforts of British officers, who
often had to personally chase down suspects when civilians complained to them.
When a Long Island civilian was robbed and murdered by a party of soldiers one
night, two Captains were ordered to wait on the beach for hours until daybreak to
intercept them.565 When Elizabeth Johnstone appealed to Donald McIntire for aid
after she was raped by two soldiers, McIntire, surgeon to the 43rd regiment, took

563.e.g. WO 71/86, pp. 155-158: three female camp followers were confined for plundering, but by the
time of the trial, one had been “released by order of Genl. Knyphausen.”
564.WO 71/82, pp. 292-302.
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charge and ordered her servants to restrain one of the men and “ran himself after
the other man.”566
Welbore Doyle, a lieutenant in the 55th Regiment of Foot who was staying at the
house of Joshua Loring, a resident of New York, awoke one night thinking he had
heard a noise in the cellar. He alerted Loring, and both men went in search of
soldiers to assist them. Then they entered the cellar, “and after searching a good
while for

people, they found two soldiers in an inward Cellar,” who were “beastly

drunk” after having consumed a good portion of the wine in Loring’s cellar. They
apprehended the two men, who were then “conducted both to the main Guard.” The
two men told the sergeant on duty that they would return in the morning to “send a
crime against the prisoners,”—make out a formal complaint of the crime with which
they desired the prisoners to be charged.

567

Even when officers did not have to personally chase down suspects and conduct
them to the guard house, they could be called upon to assist in the investigation of
crimes committed by soldiers in other ways, such as assembling their men so the
victims could examine them and determine whether any of them were seen at the
scene of the crime.568 When Hannah Dray of Long Island complained to Colonel
Tarleton about the soldiers who had broken into her home, stolen numerous articles,
raped her mother-in-law, and tried to set the house on fire, Tarleton offered his men
a monetary reward for information concerning the crime, at which one of the soldiers
involved confessed and named his accomplices.569
After a soldier was accused of a crime, he was customarily kept in the guard
house until a court martial could be assembled to try him. (An officer was generally
566.WO 71/82, p. 413.
567.WO 71/83 pp. 41-48.
568.e.g. WO 71/95, pp. 294-304.
569.WO 71/90, pp. 376-383.
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allowed the privilege of being confined to his own quarters.) Keeping the accused in
confinement actually required a number of people of varying ranks to cooperate in
this goal. Prisoners could be released inadvertently when the guard was changed, or
through the active intervention of officers, or through the collusion of the noncommissioned officers and enlisted men who actually supervised the prisoners for
most of the day. When Loring returned to the guard house to charge the soldiers
whom they had found drunk in his cellar, “he found to his great surprize, that they
were both dismissed.” The captain on duty that night had sent them back to their
own unit two hours later, and Loring had to go to another guard house, persuade the
corporal there to “let him see all the men” on duty there, and pick out the suspects
again.
If the suspects were to be kept in confinement, they had to officially be charged
with a crime. As seen by Loring’s return to the guard house the morning after he
and some soldiers had apprehended the men who had broken into his house, the
responsibility for this lay with the victim; there was no duty on the part of the
military to provide legal assistance in choosing the charges and writing them with the
proper legal language, a practice that might hinder military officers who wanted to
proosecute for crimes committed against them as well as civilians.
The 88th’s Surgeon, James Barton, was arrested for disrespecting Doctor John
Hunter, his immediate superior, as well as a major. On the spot, "A Crime was wrote
by Dr. Hunter sign'd and address'd to the Commanding officer...and given to
Lieutenant French [the officer tasked the arrest] to be presented with the Prisoner."
After being told a few days later “that no Crime had been given in against him
[Barton],” Hunter “used the freedom to consult with General Garth upon this
occasion,” and ended up charging Barton with another crime that he had not
referenced the first time, and the result seems to have been two different sets of
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charges leveled against Barton. Barton protested at his court-martial that he had
been told about one set of charges earlier, only to found out at his court-martial that
he would be tried for the other set.
Both incidents suggest that while complaining parties might appear to write out
the charges against the defendant without the advantage of any particular legal
knowledge, in practice there were opportunities for consultation with those with
more knowledge. Hunter admitted that his unfamiliarity with military law led him to
seek the advice of the general when he thought he had an opportunity to re-do his
listing of Barton’s crimes, while Loring’s decision to return in the morning to give in a
crime rather than writing one on the spot, as seems to have been more normal,
suggests he might have wanted the opportunity to learn how best to charge his
prisoners—though in this case, his delay also meant that the captain of the guard
released his prisoners before he could return, thinking that they had committed no
crime except being drunk in public.
Many female victims especially appear to have had the benefit of advice from
someone knowledgable about the intricacies of military law. For example, Catherine
Stone and Isabel Mitchell, unmarried women, seem to have been advised by an
officer to charge their assailants with robbery rather than rape. This was done on
the flimsiest of pretexts—a cloak had incidentally been carried away by one of the
rapists—but allowed them to avoid the intrusive personal questioning customarily
done by the court to a woman prosecuting a man for rape. Without such cooperation
and informal assistance of members of the British military community, many victims
of crime would not have been able to prosecute.
The women who complained of having been raped by British soldiers tended to
be those who had reason to expect a sympathetic hearing by the British officers who
comprised the members of the court-martial. Many of the victims had formal or
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informal ties to the army or to Britain, and were Loyalists—not surprising as the
trials were primarily concentrated in New York City, which was occupied by the
British Army for the majority of the war, and thus became a haven for Loyalists
fleeing there from other parts of the North American Colonies. Catherine Stone and
Isabel Mitchell were servants of Mrs. Douglas, the wife of a British Lieutenant, and
lived in their house.570 Other women bringing rape accusations before the court may
also have had the help of British officers with whom they were acquainted, and who
advocated on their behalf and helped them prepare their cases for trial. Elizabeth
Johnstone apparently knew the surgeon Donald McIntire, who testified for the
prosecution at the trial of the men she accused; he testified that he had called at her
house earlier in the day. Hannah Dray might have been socially acquainted with
Colonel Banastre Tarleton; normally rather cavalier about the depredations of
soldiers under his command, Tarleton nevertheless personally visited her house to
inspect the damage after the robbery and rape, and furthermore offered a “Reward
for the discovery of the Party concerned,” after which one of the soldiers who had
participated in the robbery but not the rape confessed and named his accomplices.571
Though officers were often ambivalent about whether colonial women—in the
abstract—were worth protecting, when faced with specific appeals from women they
knew, they leapt into the role of the heroic champion of a woman in distress. The
gentle treatment of women and the defense of their virtue were part of the chivalric
ideal that appealed to many officers.572 A woman appealing to an officer for
assistance after being raped gave him an opportunity to display his status as a
legitimate patriarch and masculine protector, especially valuable in a political climate
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that regularly used the rhetoric of rape to characterize the perceived relationship
between Britain and the American colonies, and circulated stories of British soldiers
as rapists in order to argue that the British were abusive and unfit rulers of the
colonies.573
The court-martial provided a useful forum for displaying their authority, initiative,
and bravery, which they could contrast with the timid responses of civilian men.
When Lieutenant Robert Douglas, a Royal Artillery officer stationed in Philadelphia,
learned that his maidservant Catherine Stone had been raped by a soldier and two
other men connected with the army, he testified that he immediately went in search
of her. Douglas noted that she had first tried to run away from her assailants and
take refuge in a civilian’s house. (Catherine Stone testified that she “screamed out
and made all the resistance she could, but nobody came to her assistance,” despite
the fact that she briefly escaped from her captors and knocked at the door of a
house, but that “the owner would not let her stay there,” and her captors dragged
her away again.) But when Douglas had tried to locate her there, the inhabitants
“acknowledged that a Woman had come there in a good deal of distress, but that
they were afraid; as they were frequently alarmed with riots, that she was some
disorderly woman, & they might get themselves into a scrape, they therefore insisted
upon her quitting the house immediately.”574 By referring to Catherine Stone in such
terms, they may have been trying to discredit her claims of being raped. Lieutenant
Douglas, in contrast, presented himself as recognizing Catherine Stone’s right to
protection from sexual assault.

573.Block, "Rape Without Women: Print Culture and the Politicization of Rape, 1765-1815"; see also
O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate
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supposed to be under the protection of her fiancee, a loyalist oﬃcer, which fueled American
propaganda claiming that the British were unsuitable protectors.
574.WO 71/85, pp. 203, 206.
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Another officer claimed that Catherine Stone had run up to him screaming for
help and covered with blood, and that he had assisted her. Lieutenant William Green,
the officer whom Catherine Stone appealed to for assistance after she escaped her
captors, testified that when he had earlier that night “heard a female voice cry
Murder,” he went to the door and attempted to ascertain if anyone needed
assistance, but was foiled by the darkness of the night. That he had made such an
attempt was in stark contrast to the civilians who turned a desperate Catherine
Stone out of their house. William Green also testified that Catherine Stone “came
running up to him and taking hold of him cry'd out, for God's sake, Sir, save me,
save me; that upon asking her what was the Matter, she said that she had been very
ill used by three Men & beged that he would see her home as she was afraid to go
alone.”575 And Lieutenant Douglas was instrumental in identifying the culprits and
testifying before the court. After Catherine Stone and Isabel Mitchel told him about
the assaults, he took careful note of their descriptions of their attackers and
apparently had likely suspects apprehended and brought before him some days later,
by which method he eventually identified the defendants.576
Officers also portrayed themselves as the legitimate authorities to whom
women could turn for redress and assistance by apprehending the culprit. Donald
McIntire, a surgeon, testified that after Elizabeth Johnstone appealed to her for aid,
he took charge and ordered the servants to restrain one of the men, John Dunn, and
“ran himself after the other man,” apprehended him, and had them both conducted
to their commanding officer. Colonel Robinson testified that when he saw Elizabeth
Loundberry come out of her house looking distressed, “he went to her, and asked
what was the matter.” Upon learning of the rape and ascertaining who committed
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the act, he “desired the Orderly Serjeant attending General Vaughan, to take them
prisoners.” Women appear to have accepted the view that officers represented a
higher standard of behavior as well: Elizabeth Johnstone told the court that when
(the aptly named) Private John Lusty expressed his intentions of raping her, “she
told him that if he did not let her alone, that she would tell his officers of him, upon
which he said, damn you and the officers too.”577
But the scarcity of these cases suggests that while officers took advantage of
opportunities to portray themselves favorably when avenging injury done to their
acquaintances when such opportunities presented themselves, they made no
systematic efforts to prevent sexual assaults of civilian women. All of the cases
prosecuted unambiguously fit the stereotypical pattern of the ideal rape case in the
English Common Law tradition: an unexpected and violent act, often committed in
conjunction with another crime (usually assault or robbery), perpetrated by a
stranger to the victim, where there was absolutely no presumption of the defendant
having any sort of legitimate sexual access to the woman.
All were crimes of extreme violence and included outrageous details which could
have easily taken their place among patriot propaganda about British atrocities.
Sergeant Boswell tore apart Elizabeth Loundberry’s house and dragged her to the
bed, threw her on it, and raped her while she was attempting to hold on to a baby in
her arms.578 Bartholomew McDonough raped Phebe Coe’s disabled daughter, and
then he and two associates attacked, held down, and took turns raping Phebe Coe
herself when she attempt to intervene and protect her daughter.579 Elizabeth
Johnstone testified that two soldiers, John Dunn and John Lusty, had broken into her
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house while intoxicated; that as she was at her spinning wheel, they grabbed her
and threw her on the bed and each held her down as the other raped her, in the
presence of her four-year-old daughter.580 Thus, these cases were brought to trial
not because they were representative, but because they were exceptional. They
were shocking crimes that demanded redress, and, from a legal point of view, they
were very strong, unambiguous cases with multiple witnesses. They were the ideal
cases for an officer seeking to make a public display of protective masculinity to lend
his assistance to, and the fact that the only rape cases for which detailed records
survive are these exceptionally violent ones suggests that British officers were not
interested in assisting in the prosecution of more ambiguous or less “serious” sexual
assaults, or in making any more systematic effort to prosecute rape cases, which
would not have given them the same opportunities for imperial display.
In general, successful prosecutions exploited tensions between soldiers of
differing statuses. In order to get to the stage of a verdict, civilians prosecuting
soldiers had to have the cooperation of members of the British army at numerous
points. But even after they had successfully brought the case to trial, they still had
to rely on the court martial board to actually convict the defendant. British military
courts and American civilians seeking redress for crimes had interests that only
occasionally overlapped, and it is at this juncture that convictions occurred.
Enlisted soldiers were at an obvious disadvantage because a British court martial
board was comprised exclusively of officers, who were much less willing to convict a
defendant who came from their own ranks.581 Suggestions that soldiers’ assaults and
plundering were undermining the authority structure of the army and appealing to
580.WO 71/82, p. 413. Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, in “Wheels, Looms, and the Gender Division of Labor in
Eighteenth-Century New England,” William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 1 (January, 1998), 21,
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455-481, on the creation of class identity among enlisted soldiers.
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the paternalistic feelings of both commissioned and non-commissioned officers
helped civilians make the case that abuses of civilians should be considered crimes.
Social differences between the accused and their judges, and the officers’ desire to
reinforce those differences, helped women gain convictions. This was perhaps due to
officers’ insecurity for their own authority; officers had considerable difficulty
enforcing orders against plundering and marauding.
But more importantly, officers’ willingness to convict enlisted defendants, and
their willingness to assist women prosecuting for rape at every step of the process,
was not merely because the victims were often personally known to them and
because crimes were egregious and undermined officer authority. Rather, officers’
behavior in these cases was an outgrowth of an existing cultural standard in the
British army: Officers had already established their right to regulate the sexual
behavior of enlisted men as part of a larger process of denying them the privileges
that they would usually enjoy as adult men.
In the public view, these rape cases were crimes. But examined from within the
workings of the internal social relationships of the army, officers intervention in the
rape of civilian women by enlisted soldiers functioned similarly to, and had the same
goal as, their interventions in the marriages and sexual relationships of enlisted
soldiers examined in the second chapter. That is, all of these interventions were
only tangentially related to protection or oppression of the involved women
themselves; rather, they served to display the class-based power of officers to
regulate and interfere with enlisted expressions of masculinity.
The independence of the court from both their military superiors and from the
law itself allowed these rape cases to serve as displays of officers power. The only
officer present who was required to have any legal training was the Deputy Judge
Advocate, and while he was called upon by the court to clarify legal matters upon the
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court’s request, the court was under no obligation to follow his guidelines and his
opinions on proper legal procedure could be overruled by the court. Furthermore, he
had no vote and had no power to overturn the verdict of the board even if it was not
in accordance with the law. Thus, a victim who had a weak case but who had gained
the sympathy of members of the court martial board might gain a conviction, while a
victim who had a more substantial case but who was accusing a defendant of high
status or who was known by reputation to the court might find the defendant
acquitted despite the evidence presented.
For American civilians British military courts were not dispensers of justice, but
occasional dispensers of the appearance of justice. Outraged civilians could extract
very satisfactory outcomes from these courts when the prosecution of crimes done to
them allowed officers to present themselves favorably to the court and to the world,
or to uphold their status and reputation as upper-class gentlemen. But within the
context of the American War of Independence, this was not the usual occurrence; it
was far more common for officers to ignore civilian complaints, on the grounds that
by rebelling, they had forfeited any claim to protection, or that the confiscation of
property by the army was merely an inevitable burden of war that civilians must
bear. And ultimately this business of portraying themselves as imperial protectors
was a side note for officers. While appeals for individuals in need of aid allowed
officers to play this masculine role, the winning of the war itself took precedence,
because the loss of honor to be suffered from neglecting to protect a distressed
civilian was entirely negligible compared to the loss of honor that would accrue to
them from being defeated in battle by the enemy soldiers that they had denounced
as skulking, unmanly cowards. Thus, they were willing to abandon the honor to be
gained from playing the imperial protector role whenever it conflicted with the need
to seek wartime victory.
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Conclusion: No Surrender

The officers’ need for victory in battle was the logical outgrowth of their culture of
manly honor. An officer could not submit to insult or interpersonal violence without
losing honor, and the tactics of the rebels resembled too much the dishonorable
assaults that an officer could not endure. Thus, the skulking way of war adopted by
many fighting on the rebels’ side was not just a hated military tactic, but a personal
insult that could only be rectified by the utter crushing of the rebellion.
Some officers might have had the idea that their Revolutionary War duties
included upholding law and order, protecting the property and bodies of defenseless
civilians, and generally acting to protect American colonists from the ravages of war.
This, they thought, would end the unnatural rebellion of the colonists and win them
back to loyalty to the mother country. But some officers had the exact opposite
view—what would convince the colonists was not kindness and conciliation but wrath
and destruction. With their fields destroyed and livestock stolen, American colonists
might learn that defying the British had consequences, and their fear of being
terrorized by republican revolutionaries might be replaced with a salutary fear of
British power.582 If winning the war took primacy, and destroying civilian property
and distressing the inhabitants was the way to win it, then officers were quite willing
to embrace these tactics, or, even more easily, simply refuse to take any action to
prevent abuses.583
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This understanding of how to gain loyalty was exactly what their previous
experience running an army had taught them. Loyalty was won through coercion—
there might be a role for love and kindness, but only when allied to a strategy of
instilling fear. Thus, it is not surprising that officers as well as enlisted soldiers were
dissatisfied at orders to act in a conciliatory manner and refrain from antagonizing
the populace. Captain Payne clearly resented orders aimed at not escalating
tensions with disaffected civilians in the volatile years of 1774 and 1775, reacting
angrily to orders to march the companies of his regiment with the bayonets unfixed
in order to appear less threatening to the crowd.584
Officers’ experience in the army did not incline them to conciliation; the enemy’s
treatment of them was perceived as an insult, and their code of masculinity insisted
that the only possible responses to an insult were violent retaliation or the
permanent loss of all honor. Conciliation was dishonorable; it was the equivalent of
being insulted and patiently suffering the insult. It was not the soldier’s way, and
they did not think it was a real man’s way. The military conception of masculinity
was too bound up in the ability to effectively deliver violence.
Thus, the army’s insistence on retaining the violent military masculinity that
allowed them to continue to fight the War of American Independence made it
impossible for them to actually win that war. Their reliance on violence as the most
fundamental marker of masculinity inclined the army to prefer offense to defense, to
attack and seek battle rather than withdraw and wait, and—most importantly—
demanded that they seek victory in battle at all costs. Thus, they were far less
resilient than their opponents. “We fight, get beat, rise and fight again,” the
Continental General Nathanael Greene claimed after his troops were defeated at the
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Battle of Hobkirk’s Hill.585 This attitude would have been impossible for the British
army to adopt. To accept defeat—to willingly embrace defeat in pursuit of larger
goals—was unthinkable to them.
Military historians suggest that British commanders often went on the offensive
even when the risks were high and the gains were uncertain because they believed
that they could not even allow their troops to appear to retreat, fearing an increase
in rebellious feeling from scornful civilian observers.586 Furthermore, they also
adhered to military doctrines emphasizing attack, destroying the enemy’s army, and
capturing key enemy cities.587

They were hampered by both their adherence to

European military principles and their need for victory.
However, British generals’ pattern of gaining tactical victories that were
nevertheless costly strategic defeats was not due a lack of intelligence, or insight, or
adaptability. Rather, adopting tactics that might have brought a greater chance of
success had an enormous cultural cost. After building up the myth of the brave
British fighting openly, in contrast to the cowardly rebels hiding behind defensive
works, the British commanders would have more trouble advocating a defensive
strategy, or one in which they avoided battle. And the officers' culture, with its
emphasis on honor, violence, and action—and the need to retaliate against attacks
on one's honor and reputation—might have made it psychologically impossible to
hold to a defensive strategy. For British commanders, victory on the battlefield was
nearly the sole criterion necessary for winning the war, and they consistently
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disregarded other goals in order to seek this type of victory.588 In their unwillingness
to abandon certain cultural ideals about masculinity, and their preference for direct
action and obvious victory, they were aided by the king himself, who favored
commanders who advocated daring, high-risk strategies instead of those who
advocated caution and defense.589
But war also made Britain’s military masculinity vulnerable; defeat called into
question the value and correctness of soldiers’ masculinity.590 Indulgence in luxury
was linked to military defeat not only in America, but in Britain itself. Howe was
criticized in Britain for settling down comfortably in occupied Philadelphia instead of
engaging in vigorous military campaigns, and other commanders faced similar
criticisms.591 These criticisms made officers even more sensitive to defeat, and more
eager to risk all for victory.
This desire for victory at all costs meant the ideas about the law were always
secondary concerns. When officers thought that particularly egregious crimes
against civilians needed a public example of punishment to sway the population to
their side, they readily subverted the course of justice to punish the guilty (so long
as it did not violate the army’s class hierarchy). When they thought abusing civilians
would help, they did that, too. Both of these tactics might form part of the army’s
strategy for dealing with civilians. But dealing with civilians was not the army’s main
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business; they could not conceive of any victory that might occur without the army’s
violence.
Therefore they were determined to fight to the end, and at the end they were still
capable and willing to fight. Here, too, the army retained the sympathy of their king
if not their countrymen. Even after his ministers had become disillusioned and
despaired of victory in America, the king urged them to press on rather than "suffer
his dominions to be dismembered."592 The king and the army both refused to accept
defeat, but they were outnumbered by the rest of the country, who sought peace.
Ultimately, ideas of manly honor and the norms of violence that developed to govern
officers’ culture made the British army an effective fighting force in battle, but
damaged its ability to function as an army of occupation among people who could
not be made into unrelated, alien subjects of their dominion. Their culture made
them ever more eager to seek violence, fueled by both professional pride and a
desire for personal vengeance, and the types of people who could call upon them to
act as imperial protectors without threatening their fragile masculine honor grew
ever smaller.
Officers’ vigorous defence of their violent, arbitrary, class-based masculine
privilege had constrained the ways that they could interact with Britain’s imperial
subjects—especially when those subjects could make their own claims to imperial
protection. Their default method of conflict resolution was violent coercion, and in
their hyper-masculine environment violence soon became their only honorable option
for numerous social interactions. But the fact that their culture of violence severely
limited their options as imperial actors seemed to cause them little concern.
Ultimately this study reveals how marginal the idea of imperial effectiveness was for

592.O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate
of the Empire, 36.
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the imperial army; it remained more concerned with preserving its internal social
dynamics. Thus, unwilling to give up its violent foundations, even to preserve the
empire, the imperial army withdrew from the lost American colonies and sought
instead distant lands where their violence might win them new empires.
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